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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the linkages and the underlying causes of the current episode of global 
imbalances and of the 2007-09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). It consists of three independent 
yet interconnected essays. The first essay is a theoretical paper. It sets the scene for the 
theoretical debates by first describing how the GFC unfolded, its economic consequences, the 
causes that are identified. It is followed by a critical assessment of three competing theories to 
explain the linkages between the global imbalances and the GFC: the global savings glut (GSG) 
hypothesis, the endogenous money (EM) and the global financing glut (GFG) hypotheses. The 
second essay is an empirical paper, which seeks evidence for each underlying logic chain 
behind the three theories. It has a particular focus on how credit creation and international 
capital flows impact on the US housing boom, credit boom, and consequently the consumption 
boom, before the GFC. A partial equilibrium model is built to simulate the propagation 
mechanisms based on the empirical findings. The third essay is a modelling chapter. It begins 
with a discussion of the development of macroeconomic models in general. Following Wynne 
Godley’s stock-flow consistent (SFC) modelling approach, the focus of this essay is to build a 
fully estimated empirical SFC model for the UK. The model features detailed financial balance 
sheets for the banking sector, which can be used to simulate the endogenous credit creation 
process and the interactions between the real and the financial sector within an economy. The 
simulations focus on the role of housing finance in generating the economic expansions and 
contractions as discussed in the second paper. 
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1. Introduction
Many economists agree that the 2007 – 2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was
the worst crisis since the Great Depression. More than a decade later, its effects
are still clearly evident. In the years since the crisis, research on its origins has
developed from numerous directions. It is generally accepted that the initial trigger
of the crisis was the bursting of the US housing bubble in 2007 due to relaxed
credit standards in mortgage lending. However, economists hold different views on
the underlying causes of the crisis, especially regarding the relative importance of
different contributory factors. While issues such as ineffective financial regulation
and low policy rates set by the US Federal Reserve after the dotcom crash of 2000
are widely seen to have contributed, the story of the origins of the GFC cannot be
adequately understood without consideration of another key contributory factor –
the accumulation of global imbalances.
The primary purpose of this thesis is to investigate the linkages and the underlying
causes of the current episode of global imbalances and the 2007- 2009 GFC. Current
account imbalances, often referred to as global imbalances, have been at the centre
of policy debates for a long time. These imbalances have gradually built up since
the late 1990s. Some countries, such as the US and the UK, have traditionally ex-
perienced long-term current account deficits, while other economies, such as China,
other emerging Asian countries and many major oil exporters, have run persistent
current account surpluses. As a result of this large foreign reserves have been accu-
mulated, which have subsequently been invested in dollar-denominated assets. The
dominant theory behind the global imbalances phenomenon is known as the Global
Savings Glut (GSG) hypothesis. This hypothesis argues that excessive global sav-
ings in trade-surplus countries lowered global long-term interest rates, which in turn
eased access to credit and facilitated consumption booms and housing bubbles in
the run-up to 2007. Growing domestic expenditure in deficit countries then led to
higher demand for imports from surplus countries, with the surpluses generated as
9
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a result being channelled back to the deficit countries. As the cycle continued, the
imbalances grew larger (see Bernanke (2009) and Krugman (2009)).
This thesis consists of three independent yet interconnected essays. The focal point
of the first essay (Chapter 2) is the theoretical validity of the GSG hypothesis in
explaining the GFC. Within this chapter, Section 2.2 describes the major events
during the GFC between 2007 and 2009. It also presents a literature review on
the economic consequences and the causes of the GFC. A critical assessment of
the linkage between the GSG hypothesis and GFC is set out in Section 2.3. In
particular, this section explores in detail the theoretical ties between GSG and the
GFC. However, as the section will reveal, a review of the consequences of various
episodes of global imbalances in the economic history literature finds mixed evidence
for the relationship between global imbalances and financial crises. Section 2.4 shifts
the focus to two alternative theories, the Endogenous Money (EM) and the Global
Financing Glut (GFG) hypotheses and considers whether these may address the
theoretical weakness1 of the GSG hypothesis.
Combining appropriate theory with empirical observations2 can provide critical in-
sights as far as predicting future events is concerned. For example, for advocates
of neo-classical economics, events such as the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis are purely
exogenous, causing only short-run deviations from the long-run trend. Money and
banking are neutral to the economic equilibrium, which is determined by real fac-
tors3, at least in the long-run. The proponents of Minsky’s Financial Instability
Hypothesis (FIH), however, would argue that the GFC was endogenous to the mod-
ern capitalist economy, considering the important role of the banking sector in the
endogenous money (EM) creation process. According to Minsky (1993), it is useful
to model the capitalist economy using a set of interrelated balance sheets, which has
substantial implications for empirical analysis in macroeconomics.
Therefore, following the theoretical analysis in the first essay, the second essay
(Chapter 3) aims to provide a thorough empirical investigation of the internal logic
1For example, the framework that underpins the GSG hypothesis essentially relies on the pre-
Keynesian saving-investment balance via natural rate of interest. Money and credit play a
central role in the GFG and EM hypotheses, whereas they have no role in the GSG story.
2In the field of science, in order to prove or disprove a hypothesis or theory, one can either use
logical reasoning or empirical evidence.
3New Keynesians rely on market imperfections and friction to generate non-neutrality results
(Minsky, 1993). See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion on the methodology of macroe-
conomic modelling.
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chains of the three competing theories discussed in the first essay using US data4.
The investigation aims to answer four specific research questions:
1. What role did access to credit and housing prices play in determining US
domestic consumption? (See sec. 3.3)
2. What were the key drivers of the US credit and housing boom before the crisis?
(See sec. 3.4)
3. Was the GSG (trans-Pacific capital flows) the primary cause of the 2007– 2009
financial crisis, or was the GFG (trans-Atlantic capital flows) the primary
factor? (See sec. 3.5)
4. Did international capital flows lower US long-term interest rates? (See sec. 3.5)
International capital flows and domestic credit conditions are the most critical ex-
planatory variables in order to prove or disprove the three theories. While the GSG
hypothesis focuses on trans-Pacific capital flows into the US before the financial
crisis, the GFG story stresses the importance of trans-Atlantic capital flows. The
domestic credit conditions are thus useful for examining the validity of the EM hy-
pothesis. Other explanatory variables are selected based on the existing empirical
literature. Section 3.6 builds a partial equilibrium model to simulate the propagation
mechanisms based on the empirical findings.
The GFC also revealed major failings in many mainstream macroeconomic models
in analysing the monetary side of the economy. The decline in macroeconomic
volatility in advanced economies from the early 1990s until the crisis of 2007, a
phenomenon known as the Great Moderation (GM), fostered not only risk-taking
behaviour in the financial sector, but also led to complacency among policy makers
and macro-economists. Most macroeconomic models depict a world with rational
agents, efficient markets and general equilibrium, where the financial sector simply
does not exist in the models. Much of this theory did not help in forecasting the
crisis and central bank models based on this approach performed particularly poorly.
According to such theory, banks take deposits from savers. Some deposits are then
kept as reserves, while the rest is lent to borrowers. Under perfect competition, the
banking sector is merely an intermediary, which allocates funds between alternative
investment projects.
4In macroeconomics, considering the scale of the population under investigation and the significant
financial and personal costs required for data collection, it is almost impossible for an individual
researcher to collect primary data for analysis. Hence, we have to rely on published data sources
from various official and commercial organisations.
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Therefore, in light of the weaknesses revealed in many of the macroeconomic models
concerning the monetary side of the economy, the third essay (Chapter 4) is devoted
to modelling practice. The chapter firstly provides a literature review on the de-
velopment of macroeconomic models before the GFC and the potential direction of
future development (Section 4.2). As one of the few economists recognised to have
successfully predicted and modelled the GFC (Schlefer, 2013), Section 4.3 follows in
the footsteps of Godley and Lavoie (2007) and demonstrates the crucial components
of a theoretical Stock-Flow Consistent (SFC) model. A major contribution of this
chapter is to construct a fully estimated empirical SFC model for the UK (Section
4.4). It adds a financial sector to the UKMOD developed by Gudgin et al. (2015).
As a general equilibrium model, it not only enables us to explore the interactions
between the financial sector and the wider economy based on empirical data, but
also to simulate the credit boom prior to the GFC.
12
2. Global Imbalances and the
Financial Crisis
2.1. Introduction
Global economic stability is one of the essential prerequisites for economic develop-
ment. In an increasingly globalised economy, identifying the driving forces behind
persistent global imbalances and their economic consequences has substantial eco-
nomic implications not only for advanced economies but also for developing coun-
tries. For instance, a sudden cessation of capital flows from surplus countries to
deficit countries would require the latter to export more than before. However, if
the previous capital flows went mainly into non-export sectors (e.g., housing) instead
of the goods and services sector, then the deficit countries would have to reduce their
imports of goods and services from the surplus countries. As this downward spiral
continued, the world economy would enter a recession.
At the peak of the GFC, the world economy recorded its first negative GDP growth
in many decades, global trade collapsed, and unemployment rose dramatically, espe-
cially in advanced economies. Despite the unconventional policies that were adopted
by major central banks, such as cutting policy rates to the zero lower bound and
vastly expanding their balance sheets, in the second quarter of 2013, the US and
UK economies fell below their 1980–2007 growth trend by 14 per cent and 18 per
cent respectively (Wolf, 2014). Recessions in advanced countries, in turn, imposed
a heavy toll on the export sectors of developing countries. Hence, rebalancing the
global economy has become one of the most frequently mentioned phrases in the
global economic reform agenda.
Although the debt flow imbalances have improved since 2006, with the US trade
deficit in particular narrowing somewhat, debt stock imbalances remain a major
threat to the stability of the world economy, according to the IMF (2015). In order
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to avoid a financial crash of similar magnitude to that of 2008 and safeguard global
economic stability, more research on global imbalances is urgently needed. This
chapter seeks to deepen the understanding of a specific economic phenomenon—
global current account imbalances—by examining various channels, including the
impact on economic stability and sustainability, the link with financial crises, and
the relationship with internal imbalances.
A series of recent working papers from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
lay out the conceptual ground and suggest a new direction for research into global
imbalances. The empirical evidence indicates that focusing solely on current account
imbalances can divert attention away from the leading causes of macroeconomic
instability — monetary factors. Once the research focus has made a clear distinction
between savings and financing, which was overlooked in the previous literature, then
both the analytical framework of the GSG hypothesis and its policy implications
become quite shaky (Borio and Disyatat, 2015).
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 describes the entire timeline of the
GFC. It also summarizes the economic consequences and the commonly agreed upon
causes. Section 2.3 provides a detailed account of the theoretical framework of the
GSG hypothesis. Empirical evidence from both economic history and some stylised
facts are also discussed. Section 2.4 focuses on the two alternative theories, the
endogeneous money (EM) creation and the global financing glut (GFG) hypotheses,
that challenge the GSG hypothesis.
2.2. The 2007-09 Financial Crisis
2.2.1. Timeline
The sub-prime crisis in the US in 2007 is widely acknowledged as the trigger of the
GFC. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) has identified all the
peaks and troughs of the US business cycles since the late 19th Century. Using the
turning point method, the researchers conclude that the 2007-09 economic recession
began in December 2007 (the peak) and ended in June 2009 (the trough). This
section briefly describes how the crisis unfolded during that period (See Fig. 2.1).
In April 2007 the largest US subprime lender, New Century Financial Corpora-
tion, filed for bankruptcy. Four months later another American sub-prime giant,
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Ameriquest, failed. BNP Paribas1 soon suspended claims from investors, worth
US$2.2 billion, in three money market funds that specialised in subprime mortgages,
which were exposed to substantial losses. As the majority of US mortgages are fi-
nancially engineered by investment banks and widely sold to institutional investors
in the global market as mortgage-backed securities (MBS), fear of the collapse of the
US subprime mortgage market quickly spread to other regions in the world, espe-
cially Europe. Given the size of the derivatives market, there was much uncertainty
over the potential loss and the exposure of each bank. The interbank lending market
went into distress and sources of financing quickly dried up. The European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) injected EUR95 billion into the banking system and then another
EUR61 billion on 8th August and 9th August. The sterling LIBOR rate shot above
the Bank of England (BoE) base rate and hit a new high since1998.
The liquidity support facility from the Bank of England did not prevent the bank
run on Northern Rock2. It was the first bank run in the UK in 150 years. The
UK government had to guarantee all existing deposits and temporarily nationalise
Northern Rock in February 2008. Similarly, in the US, the problem was extended
to systemically important financial institutions. Bear Stearns was an early casualty.
As one of the major investment banks, Bear Stearns and its subsidiaries were deeply
intertwined with other major financial firms through asset-backed securities (ABS)
and other open derivative contracts, with trillions on its balance sheet. Bankruptcy
could threaten the stability of the entire global financial system. The Federal Reserve
(Fed) reached an agreement with J.P. Morgan to facilitate the purchase of Bear
Stearns for US$240 million in March 20083. The world oil price continued to climb,
resulting in inflationary pressure over this period. Stagflation became a significant
concern for the Fed. Both interest rate policy and liquidity management policies
were ill-equipped to deal with such a situation. By mid-July, the oil price saw a
dramatic decline, which allowed more room for the Fed to extend the emergency
lending programme to the financial system.
The world financial market entered a full-blown crisis by September 2008. On 7th
September the US government had to bail out two mortgage finance giants, the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) due to the continuous weakening of the US
1The second largest bank in France and one of the largest in the world by assets.
2Northern Rock was the UK’s fifth largest mortgage lender. It started as a building society and
became Northern Rock bank in 1997.
3The Fed provided US$30 billion of funding.
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Figure 2.1.: Stages of the GFC
Source: Bernanke (2018)
housing market. As government-sponsored enterprises, both institutions were sup-
posed to generate revenue mainly through insuring mortgage debt, but a large share
of their businesses was actually from making and selling MBSs. A week later Mer-
rill Lynch and Lehman Brothers, both exposed to huge losses due to their heavy
involvement in selling collateralised debt obligations (CDO)4, were no longer able to
sustain their business. The former was purchased by the Bank of America for US$50
billion, while the latter was allowed to go bankrupt, after a series of rescue attempts,
by the US government on 15th September 2008. The fall of Lehman Brothers deliv-
ered a message that not all heavy-weight financial institutions would eventually be
bailed out. On the same day, credit rating agencies downgraded insurance company
American International Group (AIG), as it had been insuring banks against losses
on their CDOs through credit default swaps (CDS)5. AIG ran into acute liquidity
difficulty as losses on CDOs mounted rapidly. Given the size of AIG’s consolidated
total assets (over US$1 trillion), had it been allowed to go bankrupt, many banks
that bought the CDSs from AIG would have also collapsed. Considering its systemic
importance, the US government was forced to step in again to provide an emergency
4A type of ABS that is used to refinance MBS.
5A CDS is similar to insurance. The issuer receives a regular payment stream from the buyer in
return for promising to insure against potential default from a particular exposure, for instance
losses from MBS.
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loan of US$85 billion on 16th September 20086. As market uncertainty continued
to increase the domino effects grew in power.
Europe also went through a wave of nationalisation of financial institutions and
financial rescues, as liquidity froze in the global financial system. The UK govern-
ment pushed through the merger between Lloyds TSB and Halifax Bank of Scotland
(HBOS) on 18th September after experiencing a day of wild fluctuations in share
prices. HBOS was the largest mortgage lender in the UK and Lloys TSB was ranked
the fourth at the time. Together the two held one-third of the UK’s savings and
mortgage market. The stock market volatility had led to a temporary prohibition
of short-selling by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). In October 2008, the UK government spent ₤37 bil-
lion to bail out the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), the largest bank by asset in
the world at the time, and the newly merged HBOS-Lloyds TSB. In addition, the
BoE also provided Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to HBOS and RBS on
a large scale from early October7. The intra-day peak amounted to ₤61.5 billion
(Plenderleith, 2012). The Icelandic government bought the domestic branches of
Blitnir Bank, Glitnir and Lansbanki, but could not afford their foreign branches.
The Governments of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg together invested
over US$16.6 billion to purchase 49 per cent of shares of the Fortis Bank. The shares
held by the Belgian government were eventually taken over by BNP Paribas, but
the Netherlands nationalised its domestic holdings.
On 3rd October the US House of Representatives finally passed the US$700 billion
Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP) after it had been rejected by Congress
in an earlier round. Despite the vast amount of capital injected into the banking
system to prevent collapse, it was still not enough to prevent the global economy
from falling into a deep recession. Even though the US government passed the
TARP, the stock market fell by 40 per cent, of which financial company stocks fell
by over 80 per cent. Isolated interventions were no longer sufficient to calm the
chaos; there was a need for a coordinated response from all major economies. On
8th October major central banks in the world8 made a coordinated effort to stabilise
the financial market by cutting the base rates by 0.5 per cent. On 10th October,
6The rescue cost the US Treasury and the Fed amounted to US$182.3 billion in total by March
2009.
7In order to stablise the financial market this information was not disclosed by the BoE until a
year later.
8Including the US, UK, China, ECB, Canada, Sweden and Switzerland.
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in order to support economic growth and stabilise the global financial markets, the
G7 agreed to a five-point Plan of Action9 to keep the credit liquidity flowing. The
market was not easy to persuade. The Dow Jones Industrial Average recorded the
highest daily volatility in its 112-year history.
Figure 2.2.: Interest rate dynamics of major central banks
Source: Koo (2014)
On 4th November Barack Obama was elected in the middle of this economic tur-
moil. With support from both houses of Congress, the new administration pledged
billions of government spending, in addition to TARP, to provide infrastructure,
unemployment insurance and health care. Later in the month, the Fed announced
the first round of Quantitative Easing (QE)10 in order to drive down bond yields and
inject liquidity into the system. This first round of QE lasted until 2013. Trillions
of dollars were used to purchase Treasury securities, MBSs and agency bonds. In
December the Fed cut the overnight rate to the lowest in history between 0 and 0.25
per cent, but it has come too late. The US economy entered a deep recession, and
9The Action Plan included the following steps: 1. prevent systematic important financial insti-
tutions from collapsing; 2. maintain financial liquidity in the global credit and money markets;
3. support the nationalisation of the financial institutions when necessary; 4. implement better
deposit protection scheme for savers; 5. Ensure the information of banks’ loss position is well
disclosed. (Elliott et al., 2008)
10The BoE followed the same in March 2009 and the ECB continues to do so even today.
18
2.2 The 2007-09 Financial Crisis
it was the worst slowdown since Q1 1982.
In January 2009 President Obama took office. US banks reported an accumulated
loss of over US$1 trillion since the beginning of the subprime mortgage crisis. The
credit contraction lowered aggregate demand, which is reflected in employment fig-
ures. Unemployment reached 11.6 million in the US, and the unemployment rate
rose to 7.6 per cent from 4.9 per cent in 2008. In February Congress approved the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act proposed by the Obama administration.
This fiscal stimulus package was worth US$787 billion, containing many of the crit-
ical policies promoted during Obama’s campaign, of which US$288 billion was for
tax reduction, US$224 billion for unemployment benefits, and US$275 billion for
the provision of public works. The next day the Homeowner Stability Initiative,
worth US$75 billion, was announced directly to help as many as nine million at-risk
homeowners avoid foreclosure by either restructuring or refinancing their mortgages.
The 5th March marks the most significant drop in the Dow Jones Index, (53.4 per
cent from its peak on 9th October 2007) in any bear markets since the Great De-
pression of 1929. The BoE cut the bank rate to 0.5 per cent, which was the lowest
in its 300-year history11. The Fed surprised the market with a round of mega-scale
quantitative easing, of over US$1 trillion, in order to compensate for the credit con-
traction. Later that month the US Treasury Department outlined a new framework
for the financial reform and banking regulations, officially known as the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act12. The Act provides measures to
contain systemic risks in the financial system.
In April 2009, the Obama administration launched the Making Homes Affordable
Programme further to save homeowners from foreclosure. As part of the programme,
the Homeowner Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) aimed to revive the housing
market. Up to 2 million credit-worthy homeowners, who were experiencing liquidity
difficulties, could refinance at lower mortgage rates. Unfortunately, the banks be-
came too risk-averse. After two years only 810,00 homeowners had benefited from
the programme. The newly formed G20 group held a Summit in London on 2nd
April 2009. The G20 committed a US$5 trillion fiscal expansion to safeguard em-
ployment, boost economic growth and reform the financial system. An additional
US$1.1 trillion was allocated to support the expansion of IMF lending capacity which
could serve the immediate liquidity needs from several emerging economies. Fed’s
11The BoE lowered the rate again after the Brexit vote.
12The legislation bill was passed in July 2010.
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stress test in May found that losses of the 19 largest bank holding companies could
amount up to US$600 billion in 2009 and 2010. In order to maintain an adequate
level of capital, ten of them would require an additional capital of US$185 billion.
In June 2009, most of the advanced economies began to show signs of recovery. In
less than a year, the focus of concern shifted to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe.
The ECB consequently lowered its interest rate to the zero-lower bound, but the
Eurozone has continued to experience strains even today.
2.2.2. Economic consequences
This section discusses the economic consequences of the GFC. A systemic financial
crisis differs fundamentally from a typical financial shock. Firstly, a systemic crisis
imposes much higher economic and social costs.
Financial crises and economic downturns are mutually reinforcing events. As finan-
cial losses occur, financial institutions experience liquidity distress due to a frozen
interbank lending market and are reluctant to offer new loans. Borrowers are con-
strained in further lending, which worsens the economic conditions of the real sector.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) conducted extensive research on 100 systemic banking
crises between 1800 and 2011. The output loss averages 11.5 per cent, and it takes
8.3 years to recover. For example, high unemployment rate (more than 10 per cent)
persisted in the US for more than a decade after the Great Depression. Consump-
tion, as a critical welfare measure for households and a significant component of
GDP, fell by 18% between 1929 and 1933 (Mian and Sufi, 2016).
Claessens et al. (2010) looked at the performance of several macroeconomic and
financial variables for 21 OECD countries between 1960 and 2007. They found that
recessions associated with credit and housing bubbles can cause the unemployment
rate to increase continuously for up to 3 years. In contrast to a typical recession,
an amplified boom-bust cycle effect appears to be in both credit growth and house
prices in recessions associated with a financial crisis. During a crisis-led recession,
it also takes longer for the stock market to recover. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)
also added fiscal costs into the matrix. In the five major crises,13 they studied the
fiscal costs of cleaning up the banking crisis ranged from 6 per cent of GDP (Sweden
13Spain (1977), Norway (1987), Finland (1991), Sweden (1991) and Japan (1992), where the
starting year is in parentheses.
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in 1991) to more than 20 per cent (Japan in 1992). The level of public debt also
increased very quickly.
Figure 2.3.: Unemployment, House Prices, and Financial Variables
Source: Claessens et al. (2010); the units on the Y Axis are year-on-year percentage
changes and the X Axis is measured by quarters with 0 being the quarter that enters
into the recession (i.e. passing the peak level of output); the solid line represents
the changes that are irrelevant to the financial crisis and the dashed line represents
the changes that are relevant to the financial crisis.
Secondly, a systemic crisis requires much more aggressive policy responses to reduce
the risk of damage to the economy. In a market economy, it is desirable that reckless
players should fail under an isolated financial shock. As market adjustment takes
place, they should bear the direct consequences of their decisions. In a systematic
crisis, monetary policy becomes much less effective in mitigating the economic dam-
age. Standard liquidity provision or lower policy rates from the Central Bank is the
typical response depending on the nature and depth of the recession. However, in
a systemic crisis, failure can be contagious, and the rest of the system also becomes
destabilised. An excessive build-up of leverage makes economic agents less respon-
sive to the standard monetary policy tools. A much larger fiscal stimulus, much
more aggressive and much less conventional monetary policy response are necessary.
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In terms of the financial system, providing guarantees and protection to limit the
incentive and risk of runs are essential.
The 2007-09 financial crisis led to the worst global downturn since the 1930s. From
2008 to 2011 real consumption in the US fell by almost 2.5 per cent. Real house
prices in the US plunged by 26.9 per cent between 2006 and 2011. The Obama
administration did not deliver economic recovery as promised. Negative equity and
foreclosed homes were widespread in the US. No president since Roosevelt has won an
election with an unemployment rate at near 10 per cent. Traditional macroeconomic
policies faced a dilemma. Monetary policy was approaching the zero-lower bound
while there was little room for expansionary fiscal policies.
Figure 2.4.: Real House Price Index (1971=100), selected countries, 1970 - 2018
Source: OECD, own calculation
The financial crisis originating in the US caused devastating damage to the world
economy through the highly integrated global financial and trade networks. Accord-
ing to OECD data, real house prices in more than half the OECD countries declined
sharply over the same period (See Fig. 2.4). At the peak of the GFC, the world
economy recorded the first negative GDP growth in many decades; global trade col-
22
2.2 The 2007-09 Financial Crisis
lapsed14, and unemployment rose dramatically in many advanced economies. De-
spite the unconventional policies adopted by major central banks - cutting policy
rates to the zero lower bound and engaging in vast expansions of balance sheets15
- in the second quarter of 2013 the US and the UK economy had fallen below its
1980-2007 trend by 14 per cent and 18 per cent respectively (Wolf, 2014). Barnichon
et al. (2018) estimate that the total output loss in the US is equivalent to a lifetime
present-value income of US$70,000 for every American citizen. The recession in
advanced countries, in turn, imposed a heavy toll on export sectors in developing
countries.
Thirdly, despite its frequent appearance and the hugely damaging impacts on the
economy, means of managing the crises are limited. Between 1970 and 2011, there
were 147 banking crises across the globe, of which 39 were twin crises, and 8 were
triple (Laeven and Valencia, 2012). Figure 2.5 shows the frequency of systemic
banking crises in a variety of countries. Crises like the Great Depression or the Great
Recession are rare, especially when in the same country. This is also why such events
can be so difficult to predict and manage. In his lecture at Yale University, Geithner
(2017) drew an analogy between acute systemic crises and natural disasters such as
a flood. Although everyone knows a residential area is affected by flood every few
years, they still decide to reside near the flood plain as small-scale floods cannot
significantly harm their living standards. The further inland one lives, the safer
properties are as a catastrophic flood may only occur once in a lifetime. However,
when such a rare event occurs, it destroys most residential properties in the area.
People will stay further away from the flooded area for some time and start to
move back again as the painful memories wane. This process is very similar to
Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH). The role of collective memory is
critical. If the memory is dominated by a relatively benign period, such as the Great
Moderation of 1986 to 200616, then it is likely that economic agents form a positive
view and project it forward. However, people tend to be more risk-averse when
catastrophic events are still fresh in memory. The psychological constraint tends to
relax over time. Irrational Exuberance was used by Alan Greenspan and Robert
Shiller to explain the possibility of overconfidence in the market and eventually
leading to market panic and economic crash.
14World total value of merchandise trade (including both exports and imports) fell by more than
20 per cent between 2008 and 2009.
15Better known as quantitative easing (QE).
16See sec. 2.2.3 for more details
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Figure 2.5.: Crises between 1970 and 2011
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2012)
If irrationality is deeply rooted in human nature, then future crises seem to be
inevitable, but it is still essential to learn from the last crisis so that we can better
respond next time. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) concluded that
the 2007-09 financial crisis was, unlike natural disasters, fundamentally avoidable
since it was the result of human action and inaction. There were early warning
signs, but alas they were not taken seriously.
2.2.3. Causes
Stability is destabilising. This is the crucial insight of Hyman Minsky’s Finan-
cial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) (Minsky, 1986). Before the GFC, most advanced
economies had been through a period known as the Great Moderation. The term
was first used by Stock and Watson (2003) based on their observations on moder-
ated business cycle volatility between the mid-1980s and early 2000s, which is widely
used by other economists to describe this period (Bernanke, 2004). With great fi-
nancial stability comes, according to Minsky, the inevitability of a great financial
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crash. The Great Moderation sets a perfect scene for the crisis. Drawing on the
FIH, McCulley (2009) uses three types of Minsky income-debt relations to describe
the US subprime crisis: hedge, speculative, and Ponzi. Hedge financing borrowers
are those who have traditional mortgages. Their cash flows can fulfil all the debt
obligations. Speculative borrowers may find it challenging to pay off the principal,
but they can still meet interest payment obligations through income cash flow. The
subprime borrowers are mostly the Ponzi borrowers as their income cash flows are
not enough to cover either principal or interest payment. Such borrowers must rely
on an ever-increasing asset prices to keep their debt afloat.
With reduced volatility of growth outcomes, the memory of the severe crisis grad-
ually faded. Households and businesses became less and less risk-averse. Lenders
were more confident about providing loans to speculative and Ponzi borrowers be-
cause the US housing boom backed these loans. More borrowers were more confident
that the value of their homes would rise so that borrowing a large amount relative
to their income would pay off. As a result, the number of subprime mortgages in-
creased dramatically before the GFC. The long rise in debt to income over time (See
Fig. 2.6) is an important feature distinguishing a systemic from a normal financial
crisis (Dalio, 2018).
Figure 2.6.: Net loan losses ratio for all US Banks (left) and US households debt
to income Ratio (Right)
Source: FRED and OECD
FCIC (2011) identified ten major causes of the GFC. According to Claessens et al.
(2010), four are also commonly found in previous episodes of financial crises. These
are the focus of this subsection.
Credit and Asset Bubbles. According to the FCIC foreign capital inflows fuelled
by the vast amount of foreign reserves built up in China, other large developing coun-
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tries and oil exporters, through trade surpluses, have significantly lowered interest
rates in the US and elsewhere. As the yield (or risk) spreads continued to narrow
up until the end of 2006, financing risky investment became less costly, which led
to credit bubbles in deficit countries. This explanation echoes the famous global
imbalance story, which was seen by many as the primary cause of the 2007-09 fi-
nancial crisis (Bernanke, 2015). As one of the focal points of this thesis, the global
imbalance will be discussed thoroughly in the next section.
Credit bubbles always go hand in hand with asset bubbles. The housing market
was central in the last episode of the asset bubble. Between the late 1990s and
2007, the average house price in the US climbed to a historic high. In some regions
such as California, Nevada, Arizona and Florida, also known as the sand states, the
increase in house prices was even more pronounced. The fast rise in house price was
partly due to the faster population growth in these states that created more demand
for housing. Also, the land use restrictions in some areas further exacerbated the
supply-demand gap (FCIC, 2011). However, these factors cannot explain why there
was a nationwide housing boom in the US.
Figure 2.7.: House Price Index for Sand States
Source: US Federal Housing Finance Agency, created by the author
The nationwide mortgage bubble is a more significant contributor to the housing
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boom in the United States and Europe (Duca et al., 2010). The surge in housing
prices and mortgage lending are two reinforcing forces. Shared expectations of fu-
ture price movements are a self-fulfilling prophecy. As both lenders and borrowers
become overly optimistic about future housing prices, the demand for housing will
be financed by more mortgage lending, which in turn raises the housing price and
demand for mortgages. Since the 1980s credit availability has increased dramatically
in the US and UK through the housing market. There are two channels: lower down-
payment requirements and collateral effect (Ryan-Collins et al., 2017). The former
allows households to access a mortgage with less saving, while the latter makes it
easier for households either to increase debt or refinance at a lower rate via home
equity withdrawal. The falling mortgage rates since the 1980s have also facilitated
the process. Choi et al. (2016) found that, instead of investing in the stock market,
people in the Sand States were more likely to purchase homes for investment pur-
poses. These states had more than double the mortgage originations and defaults,
which amplify the housing cycle. When the demand of all credit-worthy borrow-
ers is met, in order to continue the boom cycle, the financial institutions gradually
turn to non-traditional borrowers, who previously would have been considered risky.
These borrowers cannot service mortgages in the long term. Mortgage originators
provide the initial loan in the expectation that the accumulating home equity will
soon be refinanced in more sustainable mortgages. Ultimately, like all bubbles, when
it bursts (housing prices collapse) the market enters a reverse spiral.
Margin Loans17 and Securitisation. Before the crisis, much of the borrowing is
financed through the expansion of non-traditional mortgages18. Large numbers of
subprime mortgages19 were issued by firms like Countrywide, Ameriquest and New
Century. The financial terms were beyond borrowers’ ability to repay through their
income cash flow. In order to reduce the probability of early default, many sub-
prime mortgages offered adjustable rates (ARMs). ARMs lower borrowers’ payment
in the initial periods and add to the outstanding loan balance and some products
17These are loans taken out for investment either in the stock market or managed funds. It could
be speculative or ponzi financing in Minsky’s terms.
18The standard mortgage in the United States has a 30-year term, with fixed interest rates. Bor-
rowers pay interest and an amortisation of the loan per annum. Alternatively there are mort-
gages with adjustable interest rates for all or part of the term (“ARMs”, 2/28, 5/25 or 5/1,
7/23 or 7/1 etc.), with rates adjusted with certain spreads based on a reference rate.
19According to Mayer et al. (2009), the borrowers of subprime loans generally have low credit
scores, tarnished histories, and limited saving available for down payment. Target borrowers of
Alt-A loans are relatively more credible than subprime borrowers. They either have minor credit
quality issues or cannot provide all the required documentation for a conventional mortgage.
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even offer negative amortisation (Bernanke, 2013). In normal circumstances, an
ever-increasing house price should constrain demand, but with the increase in non-
traditional mortgages, affordability becomes less an issue in the short term. If the
appreciation of property values continues (e.g. 10 per cent per annum), the risk of
default is limited: a 100 per cent mortgage will become an 80 per cent mortgage
after a couple of years. As a result, the use of subprime mortgages increased rapidly
from 2003. The share of subprime mortgages in the entire US mortgage market
jumped from 8.3 per cent in 2003 to 23.5 per cent in 2006, which marks an increase
of US$300 billion in the absolute amount. Following the burst of the housing bubble,
the subprime market also collapsed.
Figure 2.8.: US Subprime Mortgages and Securitization
Source: FCIC (2011)
Securitisation amplifies the impacts of the collapse of the subprime mortgage market.
The asset/liability structure of a traditional bank is inherently fragile, as the assets
are predominantly long-term, illiquid loans, such as mortgages, while the majority of
liabilities are short-term deposits that can be withdrawn on demand. The liquidity
mismatch creates a vulnerable system that is subject to runs and panic. Post-
crisis reforms focus more on improving banks’ short-term liquidity resilience. The
amount of liquid assets on the banks’ balance sheets must be enough to withstand a
30-day stress test (BIS, 2013). Securitisation was initially introduced in the 1990s by
having long-term assets bundled and sold to other investors on the global secondary
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market. It enables the banks to effectively offload long-term assets, with investors
earning payment streams from the securitised assets that they buy. The sale of
mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) allows banks to focus on retail banking and risk
evaluation, and on managing mortgage repayment. Such financial innovation is
considered positive as long as the quality of the mortgages is good. However, as the
share of subprime mortgages increases, the risk associated with MBSs also increases.
Slovik (2012) argued that the capital requirement set by the Basel Accord20 was
one of the contributing factors to the explosive growth of these financial innovations
prior to the crisis. They are designed to circumvent regulatory requirements, such as
the minimal Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR). Therefore, a higher CAR requirement
imposed by Basel III is likely to be counterproductive, as it continues to encourage
such skewed incentives.
Meanwhile, collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) add another layer of complexity
and interconnectedness to the already complicated financial system. Depending on
the preferences for each market segment, financial engineers slice MBSs into several
pieces, with each piece having a different profile in terms of risk, maturity and
financial return. The highest tranche has priority (in terms of getting paid) as the
banks start receiving a payment stream from the mortgage-backed borrowers. It
is the safest layer, which also offers a lower interest rate than the lower tranches.
The bottom tranche is tailored for investors who are less risk-averse and expect
high returns. Such investors only get paid when there is enough payment coming
through to the banks. If default rates are high, they will receive no return, because
the payment stream will have been exhausted while passing through the upper
tranches.
The development of credit-default swaps (CDSs) accentuates the domino effects in
the global financial markets through the intermediation of insurance companies.
CDSs are mostly insurance policies that protect banks from defaults on complex
financial instruments. Although such products may reduce the exposure of banks to
default risk (as long as the insurer remains financially sound), they technically sep-
arate the issuers of credit from the holders, which encourages risk-taking behaviour.
When multiple counterparts suffer large-scale defaults on CDOs, insurance compa-
20The Basel II Accord is a revised capital framework of the 1988 Basel (I) Accord. It was released
in June 2004. The framework expanded the previous standardised rules regarding minimal
capital requirements along with other regulatory requirements. The bank is required to hold
at least 8 per cent of regulatory capital over risk-weighted assets. Basel III further increased
this ratio to 12.5 per cent as of 2020.
29
Chapter 2 Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis
nies can face a severe shortage of liquidity (e.g., AIG), which can create massive
destabilising forces.
Failure of gatekeepers. The GFC revealed major loopholes in global financial
regulation. Since the 1970s, the US has gone through several waves of deregulation
in the financial sector. During the Nixon and Reagan administrations, financial reg-
ulatory bodies experienced a decline in both their workforce and their budgets. For
example, the number of employees of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) declined significantly between 1979 and 1982. Thus, supervisory capacity
became increasingly limited when dealing with a financial system that was growing
in size and complexity (White, 2012). At the same time, policy measures were im-
plemented, and restrictions relaxed that allowed banks to grow in size and which
encouraged competition. As a result, the volume of financial assets increased dra-
matically from the 1980s onwards, far exceeding the growth in GDP. Concurrently,
multiple bank failures began to occur again, for the first time since the end of the
Great Depression.
Figure 2.9.: Gross private investment and total financial assets, % GDP, US
Source: BEA data; created by the author
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Panico et al. (2014) argued that the evolution of financial regulation was the result of
compromises between different interest groups. The enforcement power of regulators
was eroded by a political climate that was in favour of financial deregulation. Igan
et al. (2009) found that between 2000 and 2006, mortgage lenders that had more
securitised assets, more mortgages with higher loan-to-income ratios, and faster-
growing mortgage–loan portfolios also lobbied the most to prevent tighter laws and
regulations on mortgage lending. The lobbying power of these financial institutions
significantly contributed to risk-taking behaviour before the GFC.
According to Bernanke (2013), the regulatory structure in the US did not keep up
with developments in the financial sector. The structure had remained almost the
same since the 1930s, and was segmented. Each regulatory body21 was only respon-
sible for a specific set of financial institutions. This micro-prudential approach was
not sufficient for evaluating the systemic risks that affected the entire system. For
instance, before the financial crisis, there was no federal-level regulator for insur-
ance companies in the US. Each state was primarily in charge of regulating its own
insurance companies. Smaller banks that were owned by large insurance companies
(e.g., AIG) were under the supervision of the Office of Thrift Supervision. Clearly,
a macro-prudential approach was needed if a broader picture of the stability of the
financial system was to be seen.
The share of shadow banking (in terms of total liabilities) proliferated from the
1980s onwards. The shadow banking system refers to “credit intermediation involv-
ing entities and activities (fully or partially) outside the regular banking system”
(FSB, 2018). After the early 2000s, the majority of borrowing came from the shadow
banking sector. At the peak, total financial liabilities in the shadow banking sector
were close to US$20 trillion. Shadow banks included investment banks such as Bear
Stearns and Lehman Brothers, or government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), such
as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or non-bank financial institutions, such as insur-
ance companies and wholesale investors using the repo market and money market
intermediaries to provide short-term loans. Although shadow banks share similar
functions as traditional banks, they are not subject to the same level of regulation.
During the credit boom, many risky financial products (including MBSs and CDOs)
migrated to parts of the financial system that were less regulated and thus did not
appear on traditional banks’ balance sheets.
21Namely the Fed, the OCC, the SEC and the Office of Thrift Supervision.
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Figure 2.10.: Shadow Banking
Source: Noeth and Sengupta (2011)
The FCIC (2011) concluded that the failures of credit agencies were an essential
enabler of the financial crisis. Weak disclosure standards and underwriting rules
may have encouraged irresponsible lenders to issue non-prime mortgages, but none
of these risky mortgage-backed securities (e.g., CDOs) would have been sold so
widely in the global financial market without the good ratings that were granted
by the big three rating agencies22. Each trench of CDOs is rated differently based
on its risk exposure. The safest tranche is typically rated with triple-A before the
GFC. Although investors of the triple-A tranche receive lower interest rates than
those invested in lower tranches, they are also the last to suffer from a loss should
there be any repayment issues from the mortgages.
Rating agencies have an enormous influence on investor perceptions. Therefore, the
firms that issue structured securities are highly incentivised to achieve high ratings.
Some critics even claimed that the three big agencies sacrificed quality ratings for a
lucrative share of the booming market. Moody’s earned more revenue from struc-
tured products in 2006 (US$881 million) than its entire business did in 2001 (Alessi
et al., 2013), but 83 per cent of its triple-A rated mortgage securities that year were
downgraded. In another example, Citigroup purchased 4,499 subprime mortgages
from New Century Financial in 2006 and eventually divided them into 19 tranches
of MBSs (US$947 million). Around 78 per cent of the structured MBSs (US$737
22Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch Group
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million) were rated with triple-A. The structure of the deal was very common before
the financial crisis (FCIC, 2011). However, the agencies rejected such accusations
by pointing out that ratings are a collective decision taken by committees, not by
individual analysts, and that past mis-ratings were mainly due to the lack of trans-
parency.
2.3. Global imbalances and financial crises
Bracke et al. (2010) defined global imbalances as ‘external positions of systemically
important economies that reflect distortions or entail risks for the global economy’.
This definition highlights several key features of the phenomenon. Firstly, global (ex-
ternal) imbalances are a result of the internal imbalances of one or more economies.
Secondly, such economies play systemically essential roles within the global econ-
omy. Thirdly, the imbalances originating within these economies will likely endanger
global economic stability, and therefore, domestic distortions must be identified and
examined so that the root causes can be traced and solutions found.
Accounting identities are useful for demonstrating how internal imbalances are linked
to external ones. In any country, the gross domestic product (GDP ) is the sum of
domestic consumption (C), investment (I), government expenditures (G), and net
exports, (X −M).
GDP = C +G+ I + (X −M) (2.1)
Much of the analysis of global imbalances concerns the imbalances in the current
account (CAB). However, there are three components to CAB: the goods and
services balance23 (X −M), net primary income flows from abroad (NY ), and net
current transfers from abroad (NCT ).
CAB = (X −M) +NY +NCT (2.2)
23This is the dominant component in most countries.
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By adding both (NY ) and (NCT ) to (2.1), we get the national disposable income
(GNDI),
GNDI = GDP +NY +NCT = C +G+ I + CAB (2.3)
Given that the national accounting concept of saving (S = GNDI−C−G) represents
what is left unconsumed from the gross national disposable income, after rearranging
(2.3), we get:
S − I = CAB (2.4)
From identity (2.4), we can note that current account positions24 mirror the gap
between domestic saving and investment. A CAB surplus (deficit) implies that do-
mestic savings (investment) exceed domestic investment (savings), and the economy
is acquiring net financial assets (liabilities) from the rest of the world. More impor-
tantly, this identity highlights an essential feature of global imbalances deficit
countries and surplus countries are conjoined, like the two sides of the same coin. In
other words, the persistent and ever-expanding current account deficit observed in
the US since the early 1990s cannot exist unless there are countries, such as China,
Germany, and Japan, willing and able to run surpluses to match the size of that
deficit. This identity underlines the fundamental reasoning behind the GSG hypoth-
esis. Therefore, to further examine the hypothesis, we need stories from both ends
to solve the puzzle.
If we further disaggregate the identity (2.4) into the private sector and government
sector, then we get:
(Sp − Ip) + (Sg − Ig) = CAB (2.5)
where subscripts p and g stand for the private sector and government sector respec-
tively. The identity (2.5) shows that a large and persistent current account deficit
24Many analysts have not followed strict accounting rules. When they refer to current account
imbalances, they are actually referring just to the goods and services balance.
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in any country reflects either an over-indebted private sector or an over-indebted
public sector (or even both), which raises concerns regarding its sustainability.
If one or more such economies also happen to be the main protagonists within the
global economic system, then their internal imbalances can easily cause concern for
the sustainability of global external balances. Rebalancing their internal imbalances
can therefore potentially provide a way out of global imbalances. Notice that there
is a difference between multilateral imbalances and bilateral imbalances. While a
persistent multilateral imbalance signals internal imbalances, a bilateral imbalance
can be the result of trading based on comparative advantage (McLaren, 2012). The
following subsections review the causes of the current episode of global imbalances
and provide a detailed account of the Global Savings Glut (GSG) hypothesis that
links global imbalances to financial crises.
2.3.1. Causes of global imbalance
The US current account balance has been in deficit persistently since the early 1980s,
while the dominant player on the surplus side kept rotating amongst a few countries,
namely the big oil exporters, Japan, China and Germany. The imbalances seem to
be mainly bilateral between the US and Japan in the 1980s and 1990s. New players,
such as the oil exporters, joined the surplus side at the turn of 21st century, as the
relative share of Japan gradually declined over time. Germany, another key surplus
country in the 1980s, has re-established its surplus position. It has surpassed China
and become the number one surplus country after 2013. China’s share of the US
surplus only became noticeable a few years before the crisis and never reached the
level that the Japan had previously attained. (See Fig. 2.11)
The scale of the global imbalances reached its peak in 2006, which was just before
the outbreak of the GFC. At the peak, China, Germany, Japan and the big oil
exporters together accounted for nearly 75 per cent of world’s total surpluses, while
the US accounted for around 60 per cent of world’s total deficits. The bilateral
imbalance between China and the US accumulated rapidly just prior to the crisis.
Although the imbalance moderated somewhat after 2008, it caught global attention
once again when the Trump administration began threatening a trade war against
China unless the Sino-American current account imbalance was addressed.
It is critically important to identify the nature of the US imbalances. If they are
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Figure 2.11.: Current Account Balance, % of World GDP
Source: IMF, own calculation
multilateral as a result of structural issues within the US, then even if the Sino-
American current account were to become fully balanced, the US would still remain
on the deficit side overall, and there would be one or more new surplus countries to
replace China. In fact, this is what has happened in recent years. Germany overtook
China and became the largest surplus country in the world after 2016, while the US
continued to dominate the deficit side. Therefore, this review looks at the US’ deficit
and China’s surplus separately.
The CAB deficit is financed through changes in net foreign assets. The fear of a
sudden stop in capital inflows was the primary concern in the US before the financial
crisis. Fig. 2.12 suggests that the US gross saving-investment gap has widened since
the early 2000s. The increasing external liabilities of the US may be due to the
decline in the domestic savings rate since the early 2000s. The government sector
was in surplus between 1998 and 2001 and moved into a deficit position by 2002,
while the household savings rate has fallen continuously since the 1980s. During the
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same period, the investment rate in the US has stayed relatively stable, bouncing
back reasonably quickly after the dot-com bubble. Caballero et al. (2008) focused on
the increasing foreign demand for US assets, with the associated capital inflows seen
as a combined result of both decent growth and a reliable supply of safe financial
assets in a country with strong institutions and political stability. Blanchard et al.
(2005) identified two primary forces behind the US deficits: firstly, an increase
in domestic demand for imported products, which may have originated from the
income and credit creation due to the relaxed lending standard in the US banking
system (Dullien et al., 2010); secondly, an increase in foreign demand for US assets.
As Gourinchas et al. (2010) pointed out, the US has an ‘exorbitant privilege’ as the
banker to the world. After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the rest of the world saw
the US as a safe and liquid haven, and investments, mainly in bank deposits and
treasury bills, rose accordingly. The liberalisation of the global financial markets
also offered the opportunity for US investors to enjoy higher returns from equity
investments and FDI in emerging markets.
Figure 2.12.: Gross Saving and Gross Domestic Investment, % of US GDP
Sources: BEA data, own calculation
In contrast, as one of the most influential hypotheses, the Global Savings Glut
(GSG) hypothesis argues that the primary drivers of global imbalances are external
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to the US economy and cannot, therefore, be influenced by American policymakers,
if placing their focus solely on the domestic economy. The hypothesis was first
proposed by Ben Bernanke in his Sandridge Lecture in Virginia in 2005. He argued
that the rising US current account deficit and relatively low long-term real interest
rates around the world were the results of a significant increase in the global supply
of savings (i.e., a global savings glut). This supply was mainly coming from emerging
market economies in Asia, especially China, and oil exporters such as Saudi Arabia
(Bernanke, 2005).
A GSG can occur due to a range of different factors. King (2011) listed three pos-
sible and inter-related reasons to interpret the savings glut in emerging economies.
Firstly, many of these economies have adopted an export-led growth strategy, aim-
ing to boost economic growth and domestic employment, and thus reinforce political
stability. China, along with other emerging Asian countries, deliberately underval-
ued its currency and pegged it to the US dollar to boost its export performance. As
a result, the foreign reserves of these countries grew substantially because of their
trade surpluses. The surplus of savings, as reflected in their current account posi-
tions, are intermediated through the supposedly superior US financial sector, with
only a fraction of those savings re-exported in the form of FDI. The rapid growth
that these economies have seen is partially supported by the more efficient use of
such savings (Dooley et. al., 2004; 2007). Secondly, the Asian financial crisis in the
late 1990s reduced subsequent domestic investments in these countries. Also, for
precautionary purposes, many emerging economies deliberately kept sizeable cur-
rent account resources to hedge against future risks of capital flight and devaluation
(Bernanke, 2009; Wolf, 2014). These reserves became a significant source of capital
inflow into the US’ official sector, and the purchased Treasury bonds were used as
collateral for FDI. Thirdly, constraints on financial movements contributed to the
GSG through a variety of channels. Caballero (2006) argued that there was a short-
age of safe financial assets worldwide after the 1997 financial crisis in Asia. Song
et al. (2011) claimed that, due to financial repression in China, a greater number of
productive private firms were forced to rely on retained earnings to finance future
investment, while Mendoza et al. (2009) found that higher financial risks at home
led many emerging-market investors to prefer safe assets in advanced economies.
Chamon and Prasad (2010), meanwhile, focused on how the inadequate provision
of public services, such as social safety nets, healthcare and education services, en-
couraged the accumulation of precautionary savings. Moreover, ageing populations
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in Asia and Europe (Bernanke, 2005) and the rise in commodity prices (Yueh, 2013)
may have also contributed to the global imbalances.
In addition, Kregel (2008) argued that the global production chain has fundamen-
tally changed since the 1980s. After the profits crisis of the 1980s, the US manu-
facturing sector gradually shifted its production overseas (especially China). Inter-
national capital flows became increasingly important in the global economy, which
coincided with a sharp decline in tariffs, as more and more developing countries
integrated into the global trade system after the Uruguay Round. Semi-finished
products and intermediate inputs have gained significant shares in trade. The pro-
duction chain is no longer vertically integrated and clustered in a few developed
countries. Multinational corporate, predominantly the US companies, dispersed the
production process across the globe based on various factors such as local labour
costs and transport costs.
Fischer (2018) added that, since the early 2000s, foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs)
quickly became dominant in the Chinese export portfolio. Up to 2011, exports
from the FFEs accounted for over 84 per cent of the trade surplus in merchandise.
When a US company (e.g. Apple and Walmart) makes a purchase order to its
subcontractor in China, there is no service export recorded on the US side, but the
finished product, iPhone in this case, appears to be a goods export in the Chinese
trade account. The considerable margin between the export price and market sales
price in the US contributes mostly to the growing profits of US-based multinational
companies. There is a close association between China’s trade surplus against the
US and the profitability of US companies. After the GFC, both the share of FFEs
exports and China’s current surplus as a percentage of GDP fell sharply due to the
weak global demand.
2.3.2. Global savings glut (GSG) and the GFC
“My conclusion was that a global excess of desired saving over desired
investment, emanating in large part from China and other Asian emerg-
ing market economies and oil producers like Saudi Arabia, was a major
reason for low global interest rates. I argued that the flow of global
saving into the United States helped to explain the ... persistently low
longer-term interest rates in the mid-2000’s while the Fed was raising
short-term rates. Strong capital inflows also pushed up the value of the
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dollar and helped create the very large US trade deficit of the time,
nearly 6 percent of US gross domestic product in 2006. The diversion
of 6 percent of domestic demand to imports provides an alternative ex-
planation ... for the failure of the US economy to overheat in the early
2000’s, despite the presence of a growing bubble in housing” (Bernanke,
2015)
After clarifying the link between the GSG hypothesis and the global imbalances that
existed before the financial crisis, this section further explores that link as the crisis
unfolded in 2008. Section 2.2.3 summarises four causes that are commonly found
across various episodes of systemic financial crises. Credit bubbles are at the top
of the list of the ten essential causes of such crises. The FCIC (2011) concluded
that the accumulated savings in trade surplus countries mostly flowed into the US
and Europe, which significantly lowered the cost of borrowing in those regions. An
extended period of low borrowing costs for risky investments may have misguided
investors about the actual level of risk and eventually led to the emergence of a
bubble mentality. As a result, the price of risky assets increased dramatically.
The analytical framework for the GSG hypothesis rests on the classical theory of
interest or real analysis, which deals only with the long run and when the economy is
in equilibrium. There is some confusion in the literature over the use of terminology.
Many economists, such as Mankiw (2015), refer to the loanable funds theory (LFT)
as the classical theory of interest. However, some early literature, such as Ohlin
(1937) and Hansen (1951), made a distinction between the two. The origins of the
LFT can be traced back to Knut Wicksell and the Stockholm School. The Stockholm
school LFT explicitly points out that the interest rate does not equalise planned
savings and planned investment due to the presence of the monetary system (banks
and the central bank) in the short run. For instance, in addition to saving, one
must take banking credits into account for investment financing, which is compatible
with the monetary analysis proposed by the critiques of the classical theory. The
monetary system can affect the pricing of credit and the level of commodity prices
through the relative positions of the market rate with reference to the natural rate of
interest, which is essentially a real rate25 (Rogers, 1989). However, in the long run,
the LFT coincides with the classical theory of interest as there is a market-clearing
25Under the assumption of full employment, if monetary rate is below the natural rate, then the
price level will rise due to higher demand for resources. Conversely, if the monetary rate is
above the natural rate, the price level will fall.
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natural rate of interest which is determined by the real factors, such as changes in
technology and labour supply. The loanable funds market can only be considered
as cleared, when there are no further changes in the balance sheet of the banking
sector26.
To avoid confusion, in this review we have used the classical theory of interest or
real analysis, instead of the loanable fund theory, as the name of the analytical
framework that underpins the GSG hypothesis. In real analysis, the market for
investments and savings is no different from any other goods market. There is a
standard commodity (e.g. corn) in the economy, which provides both consumption
goods and investment goods. The production of this commodity is either consumed
or saved. The saved commodities will then be used for investment purposes. Money
is no different from any other commodity and has a completely neutral role in the
economy. The natural interest rate acts as the equilibrating ‘price’, which balances
the planned savings and investment27. The global economy reaches its equilibrium
when planned saving equals planned investment. Graphically, this can be illustrated
as in Fig. 2.13. .
Unlike actual saving and actual investment, which are always equal when taking
the world economy as a closed economy, planned saving and investment are ex-ante
concepts that may differ. Preference shocks can lead to a higher propensity to save
(invest), which shifts the planned saving (investment) schedule to the right and vice
versa. When global planned saving exceeds planned investment, as suggested by the
GSG, the natural interest rate will fall in order to discourage savings and encourage
higher investment to bring the two back into equilibrium. Under the Wicksellian
framework, however, the initial excess of planned saving, in the short run, is reflected
by a surplus of loanable funds and the market rate remains above the market clearing
(natural rate) level. Thus, with less demand for financing from the banking system,
the price of credit (market rate) shall fall and converge to the new level of natural
rate in the long run. In effect, had the GSG hypothesis followed the Wichksellian
framework, then one must recognise that the excessive savings from China can only
lower the interest rate in the US with the help of the international banking system.
If one is applying the GSG framework to an open economy, then the ex-post savings
26The operation of the banking system during the post-gold standard period is drastically different
from Wicksell’s account. Under the fiat money framework, most of the money supply is created
through bank loans and credits. See sec. 2.4 for a detailed discussion.
27Some literature has used desired savings and desired investment.
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Figure 2.13.: Demand and supply of loanable funds
Source: created by the author
and investment can be different as well. As shown in equation (2.4), this difference
is reflected in the current account balance. Therefore, when planned savings fall
short of planned investment in the US domestic market, the economy has a current
account deficit. Under the real analysis framework, the flow of saving surpluses from
China to the US can be described as the Chinese central bank mobilising domestic
saving (through bond issuance) and then injecting these savings into the US economy
by acquiring US Treasury securities and other assets. This theory is only possible
when there is a standard commodity that can be used globally as described in real
analysis. The standard commodity, such as corn, that is left unconsumed or saved
in China, can also be used in the US for investment purposes (Bofinger and Ries,
2017).
Bernanke (2009; 2011) has asserted that the GSG was the fundamental cause of
the current episode of global imbalances, which consequently led to the GFC28,
through both quantity effects and price effects. Flows of savings from countries
where they are abundant to where they are deficient are like water seeking its level
(quantity effects). The US was attractive for foreign investment not only because
28See also Krugman (2009) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009).
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of technological innovations and rising productivity in the private sector but also
because US Treasury securities were regarded by investors as one of the safest and
most liquid assets in the world. Moreover, after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, there
was a reduction in borrowing in emerging market economies and an increasing desire
to accumulate foreign reserves, which contributed to the savings glut at some level.
Another claim of the GSG hypothesis is that the inflow of excess worldwide savings
to the US helps to explain Greenspan’s Conundrum. In other words, it can explain
why the yields of 10-year Treasury bonds did not respond to the Federal Reserve’s
increase of the Fed funds rate by 150-basis-point in 2005 (see Fig. 2.14). This argu-
ment fundamentally shifts the blame to the external forces. The mispricing of risk,
due to the steady decline in long-term interest rates, contributed significantly to the
formation of credit and asset bubbles, reduced risk premia and caused a deteriora-
tion in the quality of credit in the advanced economies. The capital inflows also
had secondary price effects through the exchange rate mechanism, because they ex-
erted appreciation pressure on the US dollar, which further worsened the US current
account position.
Figure 2.14.: US long-term and short-term interest rates
Sources: FRED and own calculation
Taylor (2009; 2018), on the other hand, argued that cheap credit alone cannot ex-
plain the increase in risky investment behaviour in 2002-06. It was the low monetary
policy rates that Taylor holds responsible for the housing boom. Had the Fed fol-
lowed the Taylor rule, the boom and bust cycle would have been much smaller.
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It was the late action of the Fed, in his opinion, that caused the housing bubble.
However, Bernanke (2013) rejected this argument using three pieces of evidence.
Firstly, the housing boom and bust cycle has weak linkage with domestic monetary
policy. There were other vital drivers behind the boom and bust in housing prices.
The dynamics of housing prices show very diverse patterns, even when they share
the same policy rate. For instance, monetary policy rates were the same across the
Eurozone countries, but housing market performances in Germany and Spain were
utterly different. There was a huge housing boom in the Spanish market but not
in Germany29. Secondly, although historical data suggests that there is a negative
statistical relationship between interest rates and house prices, changes in interest
rates and mortgage rates cannot explain the degree of housing price upswings in
the US in the early 2000s. Thirdly, Shiller (2005) considered the beginning of the
housing bubble to be in 1997 or 1998, which does not match the timing of the policy
rate cuts after the 2001 recession. It was irrational exuberance in the market as
well as changes in external sector policies in emerging market economies after the
1997 Asian financial crisis that pushed up housing prices in the US, according to
Bernanke (2013). The historical data (See Fig. 2.14) indeed confirms the standard
yield curve structure30 and the close correlation between the short rates and long
rates. However, as with housing prices, there are other factors that can affect the
dynamics of long-term interest rates, since there have been several periods that pre-
sented an inverse yield curve structure. Eichengreen (2015) argued that the ‘low’
level of long-term interest rates observed in Greenspan’s Conundrum was relative
to the 1980s. This view is problematic because interest rates in the 1980s were
abnormally high, and were outliers in the historical trend. The decline in long rates
should be regarded as a reversion back to the long-run mean (see Fig. 2.15).
Using the real analysis framework, Bean et al. (2015) concluded that the downward
trend in long-term interest rates around the world prior to the financial crisis was
mainly due to the increasing propensity to save, and that the declining propensity
to invest may have played a significant role in the post-crisis period. Between 1985
and 2013, global real interest rates declined from more than 4 per cent to nearly
zero. They claimed that structural shifts in global demographic features, such as
29Other factors, such as the home ownership rate, may be responsible for such difference. While
Spain has one of the highest home ownership rate (80.6 per cent in 2008) in Europe, the German
market is very rental heavy.
30Under normal circumstances, a yield curve is typically upward sloping, with the rate of return
positively correlated with maturity.
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Figure 2.15.: US nominal and real 10-year bond yield, 1800-2015
Source: Eichengreen (2015)
longevity and lower fertility, as well as the integration of China into the global
financial markets ran parallel with the observations of falling global real interest
rates and increasing savings rates before the crisis. However, what we observe are
ex-post variables, since the accounting identity shows that ex-post saving is always
equal to ex-post investment. To verify this theory, one needs to quantify the ex-ante
saving and investment, as well as the natural interest rate. These are not readily
observable.
According to Arora et al. (2015), the US 10-year bond yields are a good represen-
tative of the world’s unobserved natural interest rates31. Rachel and Smith (2015)
provided a quantitative account for the shifts in saving and investment schedules.
Since the 1980s, global real long-term interest rates have declined by approximately
450 basis points (bp). On the planned saving side, demographic forces account for
one-sixth of the fall, while rising income inequality within countries32 and the sav-
31An actual real rate is equal to the natural rate when it coincides with a zero output gap and
zero inflation. (Barksy et al., 2014)
32Saving patterns are quite different between the rich and the poor. The rich tend to save much
more than the poor. See Carroll (1998) for a theoretical explanation.
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ings glut in emerging markets account for a fall of 45bps and 25bps respectively. As
regards planned investment, there were also three factors at play. The most impor-
tant driver was the widening of the spread between the deposit rate and the lending
rate (70bps) across the world, thus discouraging desired investments. Rowthorn
(1999) showed that the empirically estimated elasticity of substitution between cap-
ital and labour appeared to be less than one in most countries. It implied that the
observed decline in the relative price of capital goods could not generate enough
increase in investment volumes to counter the falling price effects, as it is not easy
to substitute labour with capital goods. As a result, there was a shift of the income
distribution in favour of labour. It further shifted the desired investment schedule
to the left. There has also been a paradigm shift away from public investment since
the 1980s, which accounted for a decline of 20bps. In addition to the shifts in the
planned saving and investment schedules, poor trend growth prospects, especially
in the post-crisis periods, was mainly responsible for the rest of the decline in global
real long-term interest rates.
However, several claims of the GSG hypothesis become questionable after a closer
inspection of the international capital flow data. Gross international capital flows33
expanded much more rapidly than the increase in net flows in the run-up to the
crisis. Both financial outflows from US residents and inward financial flows from
foreigners grew substantially. Therefore, regardless of the US current account po-
sition34, there would have been a tremendous amount of overseas capital flowing
into the US financial markets. In evaluating the financial fragility and overall credit
conditions, Rey (2015) supported the idea that gross flows should be tracked so that
the balance sheets of the financial sector and the households sector can be better
monitored. This would also enable the identification of two significant risks that can
lead to financial instability — a currency mismatch and a maturity mismatch.
An origins break-down of the capital inflows into the US by global region before
the crisis shows that Europe accounted for the lion’s share of the total inflows, far
exceeding those from China, other emerging Asian economies and the oil exporters
(See Fig. 2.16 and Fig. 2.17). Although the advanced countries’ share of world trade
was declining continuously, capital flows between the advanced economies continued
33Gross capital flows refer to the gross capital inflows and gross capital outflows. The former
records the total acquisition of domestic assets by foreigners, while the latter is the total
purchase of foreign assets by domestic residents.
34According to the Balance of Payment statistics, the current account position reflects net capital
flows, that is, the difference between gross capital inflows and gross capital outflows.
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to account for most of the expansion in gross flows between 1998 and 2007 (Lane &
Milesi-Ferretti, 2008). Similarly, a tremendous level of gross outflows from the US to
Europe was observed. Shin (2012) described how US dollar liquidity was channelled
through European banks into the global economic system in the run-up to the crisis.
A significant amount of dollar funds was raised by foreign bank branches in the US
and transferred to offshore markets. As shown by Broner et al. (2013) and Bluedorn
et al. (2013), the reduction in gross capital flows during the crisis was substantially
higher than the decrease in net capital inflows. This was mainly due to retrenchment
inflows between the advanced economies. The continuous gross inflows from China
and Japan acted more like a stabiliser.
Figure 2.16.: Gross capital inflows and outflow and current account balance, US,
2003 - 2018
Source: BEA, created by the author
While the GSG hypothesis argues that the capital inflows (in fact, net capital flows)
mostly came from the accumulated reserves from surplus countries for the purchase
of US Treasury securities, much of the gross inflows into the United States went
to the private sector and was in the form of non-government securities35. The US
35See Fig. 3.11 for the foreign holdings of the US long-term securities.
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Figure 2.17.: Gross inflows by regions, US, 2003 - 2018
Source: BEA and author’s calculations
securities that were purchased by foreign investors and the ever-growing liabilities
of US banks towards overseas residents from the early 2000s onwards are strong
signals that the US was at the epicentre of the global credit bubble. As documented
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2009), while China and Japan held majority of the
US government debt securities prior to the crisis, the holders of private sector debt
securities, especially mortgage-backed securities, were mostly advanced economies
and offshore financial centres.
Also, there is little evidence to support the GSG hypothesis regarding the impact
of the dollar exchange rate on the US current account position. The hypothesis
argues that capital inflows from surplus countries put appreciation pressure on the
US dollar, which further worsens the US current account deficits before the GFC.
However, as shown in Fig. 2.18, the US dollar continuously depreciated against the
other major currencies of the world between 2000 and 2007, but no signs of im-
provement were evident in its current account position. Avdjiev et al. (2016) argued
that the analytical framework gave insufficient weight to the role of the US dollar
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Figure 2.18.: Exchange rates between major currencies and US dollar
Source: FRED and author’s calculations
as a funding currency that denominates the majority of the debt contracts globally.
A lot of dollar-debts are originated in off-shore markets, not the US. Many firms,
especially in emerging markets, accumulated a large share of liabilities denominated
in dollars through their overseas subsidiaries, while holding financial assets in do-
mestic currencies. The weakening of the US dollar thus becomes self-reinforcing, as
an initial depreciation would improve their credit-worthiness and enable the banking
sector to lend more.
Similarly, in line with the textbook model, the GSG hypothesis expects current
account deficits to shrink through currency depreciation. However, since the begin-
ning of the GFC, contrary to conventional wisdom, the US dollar has strengthened
sharply while the current account deficit was narrowing. The appreciation of dollar
can be attributed to the tightening of dollar-denominated credits after the GFC. The
situation is exacerbated by the currency mismatch observed in the corporate sector
balance sheets of many economies, such as South Korea. Dollar appreciation reduces
the credit-worthiness of the firms and leads to further tightening in credit-supply
conditions globally.
Since the GFC, an increasing trend of deleveraging by financial market participants
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outside the US, such as European banks, has also been observed. As the finan-
cial crash severely eroded the values of risky US mortgage bonds, institutions that
invested heavily in these bonds found themselves to be over-leveraged. Their in-
vestments were predominantly financed through short-term funding channels, such
as foreign exchange swaps (McCauley and McGuire, 2009). The maturity mis-
matches between long-term dollar assets and short-term dollar debts forced these
foreign banks to bid aggressively for US dollars to repay their dollar-dominated
debts, which eventually pushed up the dollar’s value. Krugman (2007) failed to
acknowledge the importance of the US dollar’s role as an international funding cur-
rency and predicted that the value of the dollar would depreciate drastically as
investors collectively rushed to sell the currency.
Bofinger and Ries (2017) further pointed out that an excess of global desired savings
over desired investment implies that the ex-post expenditure falls short of the ex-
pectation of the producers. Therefore, one would expect to see inventories to build
up, which results in weak growth performance to bring the economy back to equi-
librium. However, during the GSG period, the world economy recorded the fastest
economic growth of the last four decades (See Fig. 2.19) so there must be some other
key drivers that are not captured by the GSG hypothesis.
Before we turn to alternative theories for explanations, it would be useful to review
the literature on economic history to find out whether global trade imbalances in
the past had any correlations with financial crises. Section 2.3.3 mainly focuses on
case studies36.
2.3.3. Global imbalances in the past
“And by the lowest reckoning India, China and the Arabian peninsula
take from our empire 100 million sesterces37 every year - that is the sum
that our luxuries and our women cost us” - Pliny the Elder (Rackham
and Jones, 1975)
The global imbalance is not a new phenomenon. It can be traced back to the begin-
ning of international economic relations although the consequences of each episode
vary given the different historical and macroeconomic backgrounds. Considering its
history, a balanced global economy may only exist in theory.
36Chapter 3 includes a brief review of the empirical analysis in the economic history literature.
37Ancient Roman coins that are made of silver
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Figure 2.19.: World GDP growth, 1980-2018
Source: IMF and author’s calculations
In the first century CE, Pliny the Elder’s Natural History recorded one of the earli-
est global imbalances. The Roman author and naval commander criticised that the
Romans’ expensive tastes had led to a large number of luxury imports from the East
such as silks, precious stones, perfumes and spices. There was a great deal of debate
over the validity of Pliny’s figure, however, the finding from the document fragment
Muziris Papyrus in the Austrian National Library provides a direct monetary ac-
count of the scale of trade between the Mediterranean region and India. A ship
named ‘Hermapollon’ traded between an Egyptian port and Muziris on the South-
western coast of India. One side of the document records a loan contract between
a rich ship-owner and a merchant for a mission to acquire previous goods from the
far East; the other side provides details on the weights and the value of the Indian
cargo loaded at Muziris (Galli, 2017). One of the calculated shipments was worth
6,911,852 sesterces (before tax HS 9,215,803). According to the writing of the Greek
geographer - Strabo, by 27 or 26 BCE, the number of ships sailing from the port
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of Myos Hormos on the Red Sea to the Indian coasts has already increased to 120
per year (Wilson, 2015). The loss of specie was about 1 percent of Roman GDP,
estimated to be around HS10 billion, which appeared to be sustainable (Fitzpatrick,
2011).
The Roman Empire ended in the late fifth century and the rise of Islam followed
soon after. For the next thousand years, the trade routes that connect Eurasia
were segmented by the Arabs and Persians as they controlled major choke points
of the silk routes on both land and sea. During this period, trade imbalances were
relatively less persistent. In contrast, China alternated between deficit and surplus
positions throughout different dynasties (Cinar et al., 2015).
The Renaissance led to a resurgence of Europe and the age of discovery. Mercantil-
ism was particularly influential in pre-Smithian economics. The desire to accumulate
precious metals and more lucrative prospects to trade with the far East directly was
supported by many European monarchs. The Voyages to bypass the Muslim mer-
chants fundamentally changed both trade patterns and the world. (Allen, 2011)
Columbus’s discovery of the New World later became a steady source of raw materi-
als such as silver for Europe. Vasco da Gama’s trips to India helped the Portuguese
monopolise the Indian ocean. The enormous profits persuaded the Dutch and British
to join the Eurasian maritime trade later.
Figure 2.20.: Distribution of world manufacturing
Source: Allen (2011)
The industrial revolution caused a drastic re-structuring of the world economy.
While Western Europe was experiencing dramatic economic growth due to indus-
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trialisation, countries such as China and India went through an extensive period of
deindustrialisation (see Fig. 2.20). Although the monopolistic status of the British
and Dutch East India Company trading with the Far East allowed some merchants
to earn supernormal profits back home, these European countries continued to run
a persistent trade deficit against the Far East like the Romans did. According to
Frank (1998), since the fifteenth century China has held persistent, significant sur-
plus positions against the rest of the world for more than 250 years, which was
supported by most of the silver produced in the Americas and Japan.
The import demand for tea, silk, and porcelain remained strong, but Britain strug-
gled to export much to China apart from precious metals. The rising productivity in
the manufacturing sector in Europe, coupled with falling freight rates, significantly
lowered the price of manufactured goods. The manufacturers desperately needed
the overseas markets to achieve economies of scale to average out the initial high
fixed costs.
In 1793, George Macartney assembled a delegation to visit China in the hopes of
persuading the Qianlong Emperor to open up trade with Britain, but the immediate
outcome was not encouraging. In Qianlong’s letter to King George III, he wrote:
“Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks
no product within its borders. There is therefore no need to import the
manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce.”
China’s resistance to open up for trade38 led to two dramatic measures in an attempt
to reduce trade deficits. First, in order to reduce the reliance on importing tea from
China, the British began the import substitution strategy by experimenting with
tea plantations in the Indian subcontinent. This proved to be highly successful.
Tab. 2.1 shows that the share of tea exports from India grew from merely 0.2 per
cent in 1850 to 12 per cent in the early twentieth century. The second method was
more disturbing: the opium trade. British merchants grew opium in the Indian
sub-continent and proceeded to sell it to China to pay for its imports. Following
the defeat of the two subsequent opium wars, China was forced to open up for trade
and retreated into a trade deficit position (Keller et al., 2010).
India, as another surplus player and the world’s former manufacturing powerhouse,
38According to Keller et al. (2010), in the18th Century, China’s engagement in foreign trade was
limited to Canton port only. The restriction on international trade was due to the government’s
belief that potential risks of opening up trade might cause domestic disorders, which outweighed
any potential benefits.
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was systematically deindustrialised through various unjust industrial policies im-
posed by the British. Textile imports from India were discriminated with high
tariffs, while the British goods enjoyed much lower duties. At the same time, im-
porting machinery into India was prohibited so that new industrial techniques could
not be used (Nehru, 2008). Although India’s trade surplus position remained39,
the colonial rules had effectively downgraded the subcontinent to an agrarian econ-
omy that specialised in exporting raw materials. Unemployment and poverty were
widespread (Pal, 2014).
Table 2.1.: Composition of India’s exports, selected commodity
Source:Pal (2014)
Trade imbalances were not unique to Eurasia. They also existed in the trans-Atlantic
trade. Between 1870 and 1914, massive capital flows from Europe went to finance
long-term projects such as infrastructure construction and budget deficits in the
rapidly developing New World. Due to information asymmetry and potential agency
problems, much of the capitals flowed to the New World countries in the form of
portfolio investment instead of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The imbalances
adjusted smoothly through the price-specie-flow mechanism without resulting in a
crisis. The stable gold standard and institutional assurance under the rule of the
British Empire may have also contributed at some level as a stabilising force (Bordo
et al., 1998).
In contrast, De Cecco (2012) argued how the global imbalances between Britain
39The British government started issuing special Council Bills for anyone who wanted to trade
with India. These bills can only be acquired using precious metals. Therefore, the golds and
silvers that would have ended up in India now kept in London. According to the calculation
of Chakrabarti and Patnaik (2017), the total wealth being ‘stolen’ from India was estimated
around US$45 trillion.
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and the US after the First World War (WWI) might have led to a much more
disastrous result: the Great Depression. WWI exhausted most of the British capital
accumulated overseas during the pre-war period in exchange for war-time imports
and Britain gradually built up debts against the US government. At the end of the
war, the US became the new economic powerhouse in the world, and its current
account was in surplus. Britain, on the other hand, turned into a net debtor to the
rest of the world from a surplus position. In the 1920s, the dominance of sterling as
the primary world currency was weakened; both gold and dollars were favoured as
reserve currencies. However, Britain still wanted to maintain its leadership role in
the world economic order and keep the British pound as the dominant international
currency. The British government restored the gold standard and unrealistically
set it back to the pre–WWI parity. The post-war price level was still substantially
higher, despite some decline years after 1918. To maintain the peg between the
overvalued currency and gold, the Bank of England faced a tremendous amount
of pressure from speculative attacks. It had to rely on a tight monetary policy to
defend its gold reserves, which consequently led Britain into an economic recession.
Table 2.2.: Gold reserves of central banks and government, 1913-1935 (percentage
of total)
Source: Hardy (1936)
a. Less than 0.05 of 1 per cent
b. Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Guatemala
The US, as the main creditor and the largest holder of gold (see Tab. 2.2), was
unwilling to lower interest rates to endanger its domestic economy with inflation
and massive capital outflows. The US also did not recognise the importance of
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providing long term concessionary finance to the deficit countries and failed to make
external adjustments to allow domestic price to rise. A global shortage of the dollar
supply and the shifting interests of the US investment banks from Europe and
Latin America to the home stock market and the housing boom ultimately led
to recessions in deficit countries and the rest of the world. The system collapsed
with the onset of the Great Depression (Bordo, 2005). Countries that adopted
expansionary monetary policies, aiming to stablise domestic economies, were facing
pressures from speculative attacks. As a result, they were forced to abandon the
gold standard one after one (Eichengreen, 1992). The ideal solution would have
required coordinated efforts from all countries involved, however it was much harder
to materialise due to vested political and business interests among countries.
The next episode of global imbalance occurred after the Second World War (WWII).
This time the ‘Dollar Gap’ was even higher than the interwar period, but a more
effective solution was put into effect. Europe required dollars for imports to re-
vive their war-torn economies but had very little to export to the US as payment.
However, this time, the gap was closed by the concessionary bridging finance pro-
grammes: the Marshall Plan40 and the Mutual Security Agreements, which con-
tributed tremendously to the global recovery. If such measures had been in place
during the 1920s and 30s, the Great Depression could have been avoided.
After WWII, three defeated countries (Germany, Italy, and Japan), followed the US
advice, adopted the export-led strategy and significantly devalued their currencies
against the dollar (De Cecco, 1979). Since the 1980s, the US current account has
turned into deficits, except for a temporary return to a balanced position in the
early 1990s, and never regained its surplus.
The demise of the Bretton Woods was marked by the end of convertibility between
the dollar and gold during the Nixon regime. Both domestic and external factors
have contributed at some level. The US government was increasingly pressured by
the inflationary effects of its policies to finance the Vietnam War and the Great
Society programme (Bordo, 2005). At the same time, the dollar faced mounting
pressures from speculators to devaluate against the currencies of several surplus
40De Cecco (2012) argued that although the US realised that the imbalance between Europe and
US themselves during the immediate post-WWII period (1945-1950 to be more specific) was one
of the main causes of high unemployment in many European countries, especially in Germany
and Italy, the successful implementation of the Marshall Plan was still mainly driven by US
political interests. The Soviets’ decisive victory in Europe increased US government anxieties
about ‘losing’ Europe to Communism.
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countries, including France and Japan. These countries followed the export-led
strategy and continued to convert the accumulated dollar claims into gold. Dooley
et al. (2004) suggested that like France and Japan under the Bretton Woods system,
China and other emerging economies have been deliberately running undervalued
peg against the dollar. However, the trend of growing global imbalances did not
reverse after the end of Bretton Woods, as both authorities in the surplus and
deficit countries shared the ‘fear of floating’. The uncertainty of future exchange
rates and a large amount of hot money that aim for speculation seemed to be much
more of a concern than current account positions. The exchange rate speculation
adds more complexity to the analysis of the adjustments in global imbalances. A
trade deficit now would not necessarily attract capital inflows to balance the external
sector. Instead, massive capital outflows41 could occur and make the imbalance even
worse.
2.4. Alternative hypothesis
A review of the major episodes of global imbalance in the past seems to suggest that
there is no direct evidence to link current account imbalances and financial crises.
In fact, current accounts are rarely in balance even when free floating exchange rate
regime is in place. Some economies, such as the UK, are able to sustain a sizable
deficit for decades, while others, such as Thailand in 1997, have experienced severe
reversals as a result of a sudden stop of capital inflows (Ghosh and Ramakrishnan,
2012). The economic consequences primarily depend on whether the mismatches
between the planned investment and savings are caused by ‘natural’ factors (e.g.,
demographic transition and productivity catch-up) or due to reckless fiscal expen-
ditures or private sector consumption booms driven by credit bubbles. This section
reviews two alternative theories that challenge the GSG view: the endogenous money
creation theory and the global financing glut hypothesis.
The former places the focus on the money creation and generation process within the
domestic economy, while the latter argues that trans-Atlantic capital flows prior to
the crisis played a more critical role in financing the credit bubbles. The hypothesis
that capital flows from surplus countries stimulated credit booms in deficit nations
41Again, the outflow is narrowly defined here, which includes outward foreign direct investment,
outward portfolio investment, and various other outward investments. Changes in official re-
serves are excluded.
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by keeping long-term interest rates low seems questionable, because current account
balance positions cannot reflect the supply and use of funds. Moreover, Borio and
Disyatat (2011) argued that market interest rates result from the concerted impact
of policy rates, market expectations and risk premia, while the saving–investment
framework is best used to determine the natural equilibrium rate in an economy,
which cannot be observed in reality.
2.4.1. Endogenous money creation
The world economy can be seen as a single closed economy. In a closed economy,
ex-post saving and investment are counterparts of each other, but with the presence
of the financial sector, investment is not necessarily financed by saving. In national
accounting, saving is the net balance between the GDP at market price and total
final consumption expenditure (see Equation (2.6)).
S = Y − C −G = I (2.6)
Financing, however, is a cash-flow concept. It describes transactions in goods and
services with money or credit as a medium, so even when an economy has zero saving,
domestic production and its associated expenditures can still be financed through
a myriad of funding sources. These funding sources can come from borrowing or
credit42, for example, households can take mortgages to buy a property.
Changes in the value of financial assets and liabilities can be reflected in various com-
binations of financial flows, which are captured by the ‘flow of funds’ table in national
accounts, and net capital gains. Savings data cannot reveal financing patterns and
bears no relationship with such changes. For instance, financial deepening43 is often
observed during the economic development process. With increasingly better access
to financial services, such as credits and loans, increases in assets and liabilities are
very likely to exceed savings in any given period. The failure to recognise the differ-
ences between savings and financing may be due to three misinterpretations in the
current analytical framework.
42See Disyatat (2011) for a simple example.
43Financial deepening refers to the increased provision of financial services within an economy.
Broad money supply to GDP ratio is often used as an indicator.
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Firstly, the framework of real analysis, used by the GSG hypothesis, suffers from the
fallacy of composition44. That is, what is valid at the micro-level may not be valid
at the macro-level. The gross incomes of an individual agent are either consumed
or saved, while the savings are either converted into financial assets or real assets.
However, for an economy as a whole, an increase in deposits from one sector is
always matched by a decline of the same amount in the deposits account of another
sector (Borio and Disyatat, 2011). For example, if the households sector reduces its
aggregate consumption and saves more, company turnover will also fall. Changes
in gross financial assets and liabilities only occur when there is additional income
created through the issuance of financial claims and obligations.
Secondly, the framework assumes that without monetary factors, real investments
materialise through the transfer of real resources from saving units represented by
a standard commodity to investment units. Under real analysis, an investment is
‘financed’ by the funds that saved by savers. This is essentially a real transfer from
savers to investors, which is misleading in practice. In many economics textbooks,
banks take deposits from savers, some of which are kept as reserves while the rest
are lent out to borrowers. Under perfect competition, the banking sector is merely
an intermediary, allocating funds between alternative investment projects. Given
that savings are equal to investments, there can be no new investments without
additional savings.
The money multiplier theory is another misconception that is widely taught in eco-
nomics textbooks. The theory suggests that a Central Bank can directly or indirectly
manage the money stock (M) in the economy by manipulating the monetary base45
(H). The money multiplier is given as H+M
H
= 1 + 1
H/M
. The Central bank can
then manage the money supply using open market operations (OMO). OMO is the
policy instrument that influences the monetary base through the buying and selling
of government bonds. Although interest-rate targeting is more common today, it
is only conceptually different from targeting monetary aggregates. The underlying
44This is a built-in problem for many macroeconomic models using representative agent as micro-
foundations, which were widely used before the financial crisis and still remain popular today.
Caballero (1992) and Kaplan et al. (2018) recognised this problem, but argued to incorporate
more realistic micro-behaviours such as heterogeneous agents. Muellbauer (2016), however,
suggested macroeconomic policy models are better represented in a system of equations, which
incorporates sectoral balance sheets and structural breaks such as shift in credit conditions in
an economy.
45It consists of cash held by the public, cash in the bank vaults, and desposit reserves at central
bank
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mechanism is similar. The Central Bank manages the discount rate and federal
funds rate through OMO. When the target rate is lowered, there will be more
money supply in the system.
In contrast, the endogenous money creation theory argues that the banking sector
has an active role of its own. Banks do not need to attract deposits from savers in
order to lend. They can create credit by extending loans to either businesses for
production and investment purposes or households for consumption purposes. In-
vestment and consumption can generate saving through financing with money that
is created by banks. If the banking sector issues new loans to another sector of the
economy, the balance sheets of both sectors expand with additional assets and liabil-
ities. Money can be created in the economy through lending and destroyed through
repayments by borrowers (Bofinger and Ries, 2017). For example, in Fig. 2.21, there
are two balance sheets of the banking sector. The balance sheet on the left shows
the asset/liability positions of the banking sector at time t. On the asset side, there
are broadly two categories liquid assets (e.g., cash and marketable securities)
and long-term loans (e.g., household mortgages). The liability side mainly consists
of deposits from different sectors and net worth. By issuing new loans, net of repay-
ments, the balance sheets expand and credit money is created. The balance sheet
on the right shows the asset/liability position of the banking sector at time t + 1.
The balance sheet of the Central Bank, however, has no changes.
Figure 2.21.: Money creation through the banking system
Source: created by the author
If money creation is to facilitate a transaction of the existing assets (e.g., mortgages
issued for the purchase of an existing property), then it increases the loan-to-GDP
ratio in an economy, as the transaction of the existing assets is not counted in
GDP, which also exerts inflationary impact on asset prices (Bezemer, 2014). An
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asset price boom in turn leads to more demand for such assets and consequently
more credit creation. If the expected future growth of house prices continues to
exceed income or profits growth, then the demand for housing and credit will end
up in an upward spiral. Credit-fuelled price booms are not limited to residential
properties but also extend to commercial real estate. Muellbauer and Williams
(2011) argued that mortgage credit played an essential role in making sense of the
behaviour of house prices and consumption in advanced economies46. Financial
liberalisation and innovation can affect the real economy through three channels.
Firstly, they enable households to smooth consumption inter-temporally between
housing and non-housing. Secondly, falling mortgage down-payment constraints
increasingly extend coverage towards the younger population, especially first-time
buyers. Thirdly, households with existing housing assets can benefit from the capital
gains through either mortgage refinancing or equity withdrawals. The limit on
money creation through the banking system is discussed in detail in the following
paragraphs.
Knut Wicksell is generally acknowledged as one of the first economists to high-
light the role of commercial banks in money creation and the potential impact on
purchasing power. Turner (2013) summarised Wicksell’s ideas into three essential
points:
1. Credit is transferable, effectively having the same properties as money;
2. The banking sector can create credit, hence money and purchasing power;
3. Credit can be generated amongst businesses even in the absence of a banking
sector. Comparing to a pure-cash economy, business-generated credit also
creates greater purchasing power like banking credit.
However, the credit created by banks is different from government fiat money. It is
essentially a debt contract, and therefore the cycle of money creation and destruction
has significant implications for the stability of the overall economy. Minsky’s FIH
clearly illustrates how endogenous money creation, if not managed appropriately,
can lead to macroeconomic instability. (Minsky, 1986)
Can the banking sector create unlimited money? McLeay et al. (2014) suggested
three possible constraints. The first is a market constraint. Due to competition
from other banks, an individual bank has to remain profitable and control risks. At
46For example, the US in the 1970s, Japan in the 1980s, and South East Asia in the 1990s.
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the same time, regulatory bodies also impose certain external limits, such as reserve
requirement47 and capital adequacy ratios48. However, in the recent housing boom,
the banking sector has been increasingly engaged in the securitisation process. As a
result, originator banks no longer need to keep mortgages on their balance sheets and
are therefore not constrained by the capital adequacy ratio. With the risks passing
to other investors in the market, banks have a greater incentive to expand credit
and lower lending standards. Lavoie (2019) pointed out that banks can also lend to
non-bank financial institutions (the shadow banking sector) to purchase securitised
assets off their balance sheets. Secondly, the behaviour of money holders matters. If
lending is used to repay outstanding loans (e.g., refinancing a mortgage), then the
newly created money is soon destroyed. This is particularly true when considering
short-term credit, such as credit cards. Thirdly, monetary policy can influence the
spreads between different interest rates in the economy, and thus manage borrowers’
demand. Altavilla et al. (2018) argued that short-term policy interest management
may not be as effective as monetary policy authorities believe. The fall in net interest
income due to the low interest rate environment can be counterbalanced by gains
from loan loss provisions, non-interest income and rising stock prices.
It is essential to realise that with a modern banking system a financial crisis is still
possible both in a closed economy and in an open economy with a balanced current
account. International capital flows are not necessary conditions for a financial crisis.
Keen (2015) illustrated this using the Post-Keynesian sectoral balance approach49.
Assume there are only two sectors in a closed economy the private sector (p)
and government sector (g). The flow of money must be summed to zero, since the
inflow into a sector is an outflow from the other sector.
By the income approach, GDP is given by (2.7),
GDP = W + T = C + S + T (2.7)
47It is normally set by the central bank as a minimum requirement ratio of total deposit liabilities.
This policy concept is directly linked to the theory of money multiplier. According to Benes
and Kumhof (2012) and McLeay et al. (2014), it is no longer a binding constraint on money
supply in reality, as central banks would typically supply the reserves on demand. In fact, some
countries, such as the UK and Canada, there is no minimum reserve requirement.
48This is a ratio that reflects the relative position between a bank’s total capital and its risk-
weighted assets.
49Wynne Godley used it and successfully predicted the financial crisis in 2008. See Godley (1999)
and Godley and Zezza (2006) for a detailed analysis.
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where W represents wages and T represents tax revenues. Wages can be further
disaggregated into consumption (C) and savings (S). Bringing in (2.1)50, we get
C + S + T = C + I +G (2.8)
after rearranging, we get,
S − I = G− T (2.9)
Equation (2.9) suggests that, in a growing economy, the only plausible and sus-
tainable case is to let the government run deficits. As the economy grows, money
aggregates have to expand to meet the demand for money. The government sector
runs a surplus51 implies that tax revenue exceeds government spending. In other
words, the money destruction exceeds the money creation by the government sec-
tor. As the counterpart of the government sector in the closed economy, the private
sector must run a deficit, which means that there is a net outflow of money from
the private sector towards the government sector. To satisfy this condition, money
must be created in the banking sector. This implies that non-banking sub-sectors
(e.g., households and firms) will become increasingly indebted in order to sustain
the surplus in the government sector, as well as economic growth. Such a process
will lead to the unsustainable build-up of private debt and consequently a financial
crisis.
2.4.2. Global financing glut
This section reviews the Global Financing Glut (GFG) hypothesis—proposed by a
group of authors such as Borio and Disyatat (2011; 2015) and Avdjiev et al. (2016)
in greater detail. The GFG can be seen as an extension of the endogenous money
theory since they share the same analytical framework of monetary factors, but the
GFG gives a greater focus to the role of international capital flows in the run-up to
the GFC.
50In a closed economy X −M = 0
51This was indeed the case with the US government in the early 2000s.
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The GSG hypothesis not only fails to explain several stylised facts, it also has sig-
nificant shortcomings on its analytical side. The saving-investment framework that
underlies the GSG hypothesis has little to say about how global economic activi-
ties are financed and how market interest rates behave. Under the framework of the
GSG, there is no role for money that is endogenously created. Hence, the hypothesis
cannot capture the behaviours of the global financial market. The ongoing debates
on current account imbalances are diverting attention away from the major causes
(i.e., monetary and financial factors) of the crisis.
The difference between saving and financing can be best illustrated using the net
and gross capital flows52 in an open economy. According to the IMF’s Balance of
Payments (BoP) definition, in an ideal world the sum of the current account, capital
account53(KAB) and financial account (FAB) should be zero. These statistics come
from various sources and are always prone to errors, and therefore need a balancing
item to absorb the discrepancies (2.10).
CAB +KAB + FAB +Balancing item = 0 (2.10)
In BoP accounts, the current account is equal to gross capital inflow minus gross
outflows in the financial account. Therefore, it only captures net capital flows.
By focusing solely on the current account, the evolution of gross flows (especially
when cross-border transactions only involve financial assets) and their impact on
existing stocks of financial assets/liabilities are overlooked. To better illustrate this
point, let us consider a simple example presented by Al-Saffar et al. (2013). From
(2.11), we know that the current account balance is identical to the domestic saving-
investment gap (Eq. (2.4)). Deficits occur when investments exceed savings, which
can be financed by the issuance of either debt (D) or equity (E) or both.
CAB = S − I = ∆D + ∆E (2.11)
52In the Balance of Payment statistics, the net amount between residents’ purchases and sales
of foreign assets is taken as the gross outflow, while gross inflow is equal to the net amount
between non-residents’ purchases and sales of domestic assets.
53This records international capital transfers as well as transactions in non-financial non-produced
assets.
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Even a balanced current account does not guarantee that a country is free from large-
scale cross-border financial activities. With an open capital market, countries may
experience massive gross debt inflows, but the CAB cannot reflect the patterns of
such capital flows if the country also engages in massive equity investments abroad.
The gross inflows and outflows can offset each other (∆D = −∆E). If domestic
projects cannot generate cash flow in time to meet external debt obligations, then
the economy will be exposed to rollover risk on its foreign liabilities.
Gross financial flows between the advanced economies expanded rapidly in the run-
up to the 2007–09 crisis, as verified by both US BoP statistics (see Fig. 2.17) and
the BIS’s locational banking statistics (see Fig. 2.22). Although the Eurozone’s
current account was roughly in balance, it contributed more to gross capital inflows
into the US economy than any other region. We can conclude that, on balance,
economies with current account deficits (surpluses) draw on (release) resources from
(to) the rest of the world. However, deficit economies are not necessarily financed
by economies that are running surpluses.
Underlying expenditure for consumption (which determines the level of saving) and
investment can be financed in various ways. The sources of funds can be credit cre-
ation from the domestic banking sector or international capital flows. Consumption
can also be financed from current income and a reduction in assets. The current
account neither reveals whether a domestic investment is financed from abroad, nor
to what extent. For example, a US firm that imports Chinese goods can transfer its
US dollar deposits held in a UK bank to the Chinese firm. Although the UK was not
part of the trade transaction, the increased US current account deficit is matched by
a fall in its residents’ assets vis-a-vis the UK, while the increased Chinese surplus is
reflected by a decline in UK residents’ assets vis-a-vis China. Current account posi-
tions only reflect where the production and consumption have taken place, whereas
gross capital flows indicate where the financing is sourced and used.
Lindner (2015) provided a detailed account of international financial transactions
between Europe and the US. As the primary reserve currency, overseas demand for
the US dollar is immense. Other countries can acquire US dollars only in two ways.
The first is through international trade. Surplus countries accumulate dollar reserves
when exporters receive the currency as a means of payment from US importers. The
US counterpart can pay for its imports, through its bank, using its existing stock
of deposits or newly created credit money. The second channel is the US money
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Figure 2.22.: Gross capital flows among major regions, 2002 and 2007
Source: Avdjiev et al. (2016)
markets. US dollars can be raised either through borrowing or from selling other
financial assets.
Most European countries run nearly balanced current accounts (or in some cases
deficits) against the US. Therefore, the massive gross capital flows between the US
and Europe are mainly through the second channel. A typical financial transac-
tion prior to the financial crisis was a two-step process (see Tab. 2.3). In the first
step, European banks would sell some Euro-denominated short-term liquid financial
assets, such as asset-backed commercial papers (ABCPs)54 to US mutual funds in
the money markets in exchange for their US dollars. This type of transaction is
essentially an asset swap. Although the overall size of the balance sheets would
not change, the composition of assets for the US mutual funds and European banks
would change. On the liability side, the dollars raised by the European banks would
increase US liabilities vis-a-vis Europe. In the second step, the European banks’
dollar holdings would then be used to purchase CDOs from US investment banks.
These investment banks would use the dollars to acquire more and more securitised
mortgages off the balance sheets of the US banking sector.
The entire process would have no overall impact on the current account, since the
liability position between the US and Europe would be restored, despite liabilities
54These are essentially a short-term money market security.
66
2.4 Alternative hypothesis
Table 2.3.: Balance sheet positions with capital flows between the US and Europe
Source: Lindner (2015)
and assets changing hands between different players within the two economies. How-
ever, the mismatch of different maturities played a critical role in the financial crisis.
The maturity for ABCPs is no more than 270 days, but mortgages can have matu-
rities lasting decades. When the housing bubble in the US eventually burst, money
markets lost confidence in ABCPs, which in turn led to refinancing difficulties for
European banks.
This framework is in line with empirical observations. Avdjiev et al. (2016) rightly
pointed out that it was European banks that first felt the pain at the beginning of
the financial crisis, not Chinese banks. These round-trip transactions between the
US and Europe were one of the crucial sources of funding prior to the crisis. These
capital flows had a relatively small impact on current account positions since the
outflows to Europe were mostly channelled back to the US at a later stage.
Obstfeld (2012) presented two scenarios in which current accounts may not matter
in the analysis of international capital flows. The first scenario is highly idealistic.
Capital movements are entirely free from any friction and restrictions. Therefore,
countries can diversify away all their idiosyncratic, country-specific risks by investing
globally. For example, countries can freely trade shares in each other’s securities
markets. Net asset trades, as recorded by the current account position, reflect the
wealth transfers between countries. Perfect international financial markets would
enable countries to be fully insured, and therefore wealth transfers would no longer
exist. The recent high-speed growth in gross asset flows has made the real world a
better approximation of this imaginary world.
In contrast to perfect capital movements, his second scenario focused on rapid two-
way asset trading, which reflects regulatory arbitrage, tax avoidance and distorted
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incentives more generally. Countries that build up significant currency and maturity
mismatches are exposed to huge risks, which may not be accurately reflected in the
net transactions recorded by the current account. For example, most US financial
institutions appeared to be doing well on a flow basis in the years leading up to
the financial crisis. The income statements of these institutions showed that they
were making record profits. However, if their balance sheets had been scrutinised
more carefully, they would have revealed substantial risk exposures. This paradox
means that at the country level, just looking at current account balances can be
highly misleading. Compared to a country’s balance sheet, the current account is
relatively unimportant.
Obstfeld was more supportive of the second scenario. However, he did not agree
that the growing importance of two-way asset trading made the current account ir-
relevant. Current account positions are vitally important because they signal wealth
transfers and serve as a vehicle by which world demand gets reallocated between
countries. Policymakers and regulators have to pay more attention to financial fac-
tors (e.g., national balance sheets and the flow of funds) if they are to be able to
spot future financial risks.
Avdjiev et al. (2016) further identified a broader set of limitations in the prevailing
models used to analyse the global financial system. They argued that the current
analytical framework relies on a triple coincidence: a GDP area, decision-making
units55, and a currency area56. Such a framework is over-simplified and overlooks
the importance of financial flows. The widely used representative agent approach
in macroeconomic models obscures the differences between decision-making units
at the macro-level. For example, Korea’s current account was in a surplus position
before the 2008 crisis, and its net external asset position appeared to be positive
against the rest of the world. An appreciating dollar, it was supposed, would benefit
the country.
Nevertheless, the Korean economy was severely damaged by the crisis. The positive
net external asset position at the aggregate level obscured the fact that the Ko-
rean corporate sector accumulated substantial amounts of dollar-debts. As Korea’s
growth engine, the losses in the corporate sector considerably due to the appre-
55All sectors (firms, households, government) in the economy are summed into one representative
decision-maker.
56Each economy or currency union has its own currency, and the use of that currency is largely
confined to areas under its jurisdiction.
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ciation of the US dollars completely outweighed the net gains from the positive
investment position of the government sector (see Fig. 2.23). Borio and Disyatat
(2015) also pointed out that the prevailing models in international finance (i.e.,
the inter-temporal approach57) have significant deficiencies. Based on the house-
holds’ consumption-smoothing decisions and firms’ inter-temporal maximisation of
expected profits, the current account balance is effectively the vehicle for transferring
savings and investments. Such models also overlook the role of banks in endoge-
nously creating purchasing power and financing. Therefore, inter-temporal models
are ill-suited for promoting the understanding and forecasting of financial crises.
Figure 2.23.: The Korean case
Source:Avdjiev et al. (2016)
Bofinger and Ries (2017) added an alternative monetary framework based on the
flow of funds. The ‘flow of funds’ table records the supply and use of funds. Hence,
financing is clearly distinguished from saving. Apart from making saving deposits,
the sources of funds can be from bank loans, the issuance of government bonds
or stock market equities. Funds can end up financing new investment, buying an
existing real asset or financing the government deficits.
With a recognition of the importance of monetary analysis and the failings of real
57See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) for examples
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analysis in understanding financial crises, it becomes clearer why the GSG and GFG
hypotheses were formed. The GSG emphasises the capital inflows from current
account surplus countries. However, without acquiring US dollars in the first place,
the Chinese central bank, for example, would not be able to mobilise domestic saving
and invest in the US. These inflows from surplus countries rely on the willingness
of those countries to continue investing their dollar reserves, gained through foreign
trade, in long-term US treasury bonds (the official sector).
In contrast, the GFG stresses the importance of capital inflows from Europe. These
inflows rely on the ability of European banks to raise short-term liquidity from
the US money markets and provide financing for the mortgage-backed securities
market (the private sector). Under the real analysis framework, high Chinese savings
are exogenous to US domestic economic policies, but the GFG framework suggests
otherwise. In the run-up to the crisis, the high level of Chinese savings was due to
the US consumers’ high propensity to consume. Over-consumption in the US was
the result of the housing boom, domestic credit creation and loose monetary policy
from the Fed, with the trans-Atlantic capital flows accelerating credit creation in the
US. In models that feature endogenous money creation, the same exogenous shock
can cause a much larger disturbance in bank lending and can have a more significant
impact on the real economy. (Jakab and Kumhof, 2015)
Using the GFG analytical framework, Borio and Disyatat (2015) further challenged
two of the most enduring puzzles in international finance: the Lucas paradox and
the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. The classical theory claims that in a world with per-
fect capital mobility, rational agents will invest in countries that offer the highest
marginal returns on capital. Therefore, the savings of any country will flow to
countries that offer the most productive investment opportunities, and this flow will
gradually equalise marginal returns on capital across countries. However, Lucas
(1990) observed that the scale of capital flows from capital-rich developed countries
to capital-scarce developing countries was minimal, despite the effects of diminish-
ing returns on capital in economies with abundant capital. The current episode of
imbalances presents an even more interesting pattern, with a massive amount of
capital flowing from developing countries to advanced countries (IMF, 2015). In
a similar vein, Feldstein and Horioka (1979) argued that if the classical theory is
correct and capital moves freely, a low correlation between domestic investment
and savings should be observed, because greater domestic savings will always seek
higher returns on investment, which may not necessarily be domestic. However,
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their empirical findings suggested otherwise.
Once the limitations of current accounts analysis are acknowledged, both puzzles
disappear. Despite current account surpluses in capital-scarce developing countries,
investments may still be financed from abroad, given the higher potential yields for
foreign investors. Hence, the Lucas paradox may not hold. Similarly, an economy
that engages actively in international capital movements, such as the Eurozone prior
to the GFC, may still run a balanced current account. A high correlation between
domestic saving and investment does not necessarily mean that there are minor
capital movements either. Therefore, the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle also disappears.
2.4.3. Discussion on long-term interest rates
The data of gross capital flows and endogenous money theory demonstrate con-
vincingly that surplus countries such as China had limited contributions in direct
financing the US private sector credit boom. Capital inflows from China mostly
ended up in the official sector, not the private sector. However, to fully reject the
GSG hypothesis, one also needs to break the assumed linkage between the high
demand of US treasury securities from surplus countries and the persistent decline
of US long-term real interest rates. The GSG hypothesis explains the movements
of interest rates through the saving-investment framework in classical economics
underpinned by purely real factors, which is better at describing the Wicksellian
natural rate of interest - an equilibrium concept58.
Borio and Disyatat (2011) argued that what we observed were long-term market
rates. They are the result of the interplay among monetary factors such as the pol-
icy rates, expected inflation and future policy rates, and the term premium. These
factors will impact on the portfolio choice of financial asset holders in the economy
and the risk perceptions and preferences of investors. When all the markets (e.g.
credit and goods market, and labour market) in the economy are in equilibrium, the
market rate can coincide with the natural rate, and there are no inflationary pres-
sures. The two rates can differ when there is a disequilibrium in the market. When
the market rate is lower than the natural rate, the excessive investment demand has
to be financed by the creation of credits. As the endogenous money theory suggests,
the banking system is not always constrained by savings or banks’ reserves at the
58According to classical economics, prices are flexible enough to bring all markets, including labour
market, back to equilibrium.
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Central Bank. In fact, credits create deposits. In a pure credit economy, there are
hardly any auto-stabilisers to bring the market rate back to the natural rate. Wick-
sell argued that the deviation between the two rates was a result of capital market
failure due to lack of incentive and information.
The GSG hypothesis is only valid if the market rates trend towards the natural
rate over the relevant observation period, but the natural rate is an unobservable
theoretical construct (see Barksy et al. (2014)). According to Wicksell, the discrep-
ancy between the market rate and natural rate, hence the relative movement of the
natural rate, is reflected by the level of inflation in an economy. If the market rate
is below (above) the natural rate, then the price level will rise (fall). The price level
will tend to stabilise when the two rates are converging. Although based on the dif-
ferent underlying mechanisms, both Wicksellians and the New Keynesian models,
rely on nominal rigidity, and take inflation as the signal that there is a deviation
between the two rates (Woodford, 2011). Therefore, during the Great Moderation59,
when inflation remained low and stable60, the GSG view could be regarded as valid.
However, the unsustainable expansion in credit and asset prices prior to the crisis
seems to suggest that the market rate is significantly and persistently below the
natural rate. The New Keynesian models predict inflation to rise under such unsus-
tainable asset booms, which is contrary to what was observed, and partly explains
why most economists failed to foresee the crash. According to Hayek (1933), it is
not general consumer price inflation, but relative price distortion that is a signal
for the deviation of two rates. The Central Banks was misled by inflation targeting
models and failed to raise the interest rates when it was below the equilibrium level,
which ultimately contributed to the financial turmoil in the US.
On the contrary, Post-Keynesian (PK) economists such as Pilkington (2014) or
Bofinger and Ries (2017) either suggest the natural rate takes multiple values instead
of one equilibrium rate or reject the concept of the natural rate altogether (see
Lavoie (2014)). Market interest rates are not directly influenced by the real factors
as proposed in the GSG framework, which echoes Keynes’s view that interest rates
are the results of the interplay between the relative demand and supply of money
stocks. According to Keynesian liquidity preference theory, a higher level of income
59It refers to the period between the mid-1980s and the outbreak of the recent financial crash in
2008 as the Great Moderation. During this period, the volatility of business cycle fluctuations
of the world economy was mild, economy and employment grew with inflation tamed at a
relatively low levels.
60This implies that the output gaps also remained low
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increases the demand for liquidity. With a vertical money supply curve, a rise in
income will lead to an increase in interest rate, which results in an upward-sloping
LM curve. The Horizontalists61 argue that central banks set a policy target rate
rather than the stock of money. The money supply expands when the income level
rises. Therefore, the LM curve is horizontal, not vertical. Lavoie (2014) added that
the horizontalism is no longer a distinct feature of Post-Keynesian analyses. The
horizontalists mainly rejected the monetarists’ vertical (exogenous) money supply,
and the concept is widely accepted by New-Keynesian economists such as Romer
(2000). However, the debate shifted from money supply to the existence of a single
equilibrium natural rate to serve as the policy target for full employment and price
stability, which is an implicit assumption of the Taylor Rule.
Keynes (1936) argued that, instead of having only one unique natural rate of interest
at the full employment level with zero output gap, for every level of employment,
there is a ‘natural’ rate of interest to ensure the system is in equilibrium. In Chapter
17, he wrote,
“...for every rate of interest there is a level of employment for which
that rate is the ‘natural rate’, in the sense that the system will be in
equilibrium with that rate of interest and that level of employment. Thus
it was a mistake to speak of the natural rate of interest or to suggest that
the above definition would yield a unique value for the rate of interest
irrespective of the level of employment. I had not then understood that,
in certain conditions, the system could be in equilibrium with less than
full employment. I am now no longer of the opinion that the concept
of a ‘natural’ rate of interest, which previously seemed to me a most
promising idea, has anything very useful or significant to contribute to
our analysis. It is merely the rate of interest which will preserve the
status quo...”
According to Pilkington (2014), the level of employment is in turn determined by the
level of investment. In Chapter 11, Keynes (1936) used marginal efficiency of capital
for investment decisions to distinguish from the marginal returns. While the former
61Moore (1988) coined the term to describe a group of economists who believe that the credits are
supplied on demand, hence both the supply curves for bank reserves and credits are horizontal
at a given rate. Unlike the money multiplier theory, reserve requirements place no constraint
over the money creation by the banking sector. This view is supported by BoE economists such
as McLeay et al. (2014).
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is a subjective judgment62, the latter requires rational mathematical calculations.
Bofinger and Ries (2017) thus suggested that the IS/LM-AS/AD framework is fully
compatible with Keynes’s propositions of multiple values, that is, for each given
level of income and employment, there is an equilibrium level of (natural) rate of
interest at the intersection between the IS and LM curves. Hamilton et al. (2016)
provided empirical supports to the multiple values view.
If one rejects the mainstream view on natural rate of interest, then the GSG’s claim
on the excessive savings caused the persistent low level of long-term interest rate
does not hold any more. The PK theory of interest rate suggests that the long-term
interest rates are fundamentally determined by the policy rate set by the Fed and
real economy must adjust to the policy-determined interest rate environment than
vice versa.
Figure 2.24.: The dynamics of gross investment rate versus net investment rate
Source: BEA data, created by the author
Moreover, under the monetary framework, savings are created/determined by invest-
ment demand. A fall in long-term interest rates is more likely to reflect the falling
62It depends on whether the expected rate of return exceeds the rate of interest offered by poten-
tially the safest assets. It is better known as the animal spirits.
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propensity to invest63 and consequently, a downward shift of the IS-curve. A steady
declining trend for both the net investment rate and saving rate since the 1980s was
observed in all G7 countries (see Fig. 2.24 for an US example). This downward trend
was offset by an increasing trend in the emerging markets, but the world as a whole
has witnessed a relatively stable saving rate. It contradicts the GSG claim that the
increasing propensity to save is the root cause of the persistent low global interest
rate. To have a falling net investment rate and increasing propensity to save at the
same time, there must be an extreme decline in the propensity to invest.
Figure 2.25.: Post-Keynesian theory of interest rates and endogenous money
Source: Lavoie (2014)
Lavoie (2014) provided a complete framework to accommodate the PK theory of
interest rates and the endogenous money theory. In Fig. 2.25, the central bank has
the autonomy to set the policy rate at iCB. The policy rate serves as the base rate
in the economy. The market rate (iB) is derived by adding a mark-up (σB), which
reflects both market expectations and term premium, to the base rate64. According
to the endogenous money theory, credits can be supplied on demand at any given
level of the market rate. Therefore, the level of bank credits is essentially driven
by the effective demand for credit. Bank lending creates deposits, but the amount
63This led to lower level of income and saving.
64This is consistent with Borio and Disyatat (2011) and Bernanke (2015)
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of bank deposits depends on the liquidity preference of the public and the spread
between the deposit rate and market rate, which reflected by the slope of the BD
curve. In the lower-left quadrant, some of the bank deposits are kept as a reserve at
the Central Bank either due to the regulatory requirement or precautionary purpose.
The policy rate has little impacts on the amount of bank reserves in the central bank.
This view is fully consistent with McLeay et al. (2014) at the Bank of England.
2.5. Conclusion
Understanding the underlying causes of the GFC is vitally important. Financial
crises can result in severe and prolonged economic recessions that impose tremen-
dous socioeconomic costs on society. In the increasingly globalised world of today,
the economic prosperity of every country is inevitably dependent on a healthy and
sustainable global economy. Incorrect theories and cause–effect analyses can lead
policies astray. Moreover, anti-globalisation movements have been on the rise in
recent years, and President Trump has ascribed the US domestic imbalances and
income inequality to the actions of foreign partners rather than to a host of complex
factors .
Given that global economic imbalances have been identified as one of the main causes
of the GFC, re-balancing the global economy has been seen as a top priority for the
global economic reform agenda. The GSG hypothesis, proposed by Ben Bernanke,
is one of the most influential theories in this regard, and attempts to explain the
global imbalances and how they are linked to the GFC.
After a thorough review of the GSG hypothesis, we find that its critical claims are not
consistent with some of the facts that were observed before the GFC. Theoretically
speaking, global imbalances can indeed pose threats to the sustainability of the
global economy, but no clear evidence exists to suggest that there was a strong link
between such imbalances and the GFC. From a historical perspective, it can be seen
that previous episodes of global imbalances did not necessarily result in financial
crashes (19th century America being a good example). The US and many advanced
economies went through decades of financial liberalisation after the end of Bretton
Woods. This significantly changed the nature of international capital flows across
the Atlantic. Before the GFC, massive gross capital flows were observed. Certain
economists, such as Borio and Disyatat (2011) and Shin (2012) therefore came up
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with the GFG hypothesis to counter the GSG hypothesis. Proponents of the global
imbalances argument focus solely on the current account imbalances of the period,
which reflects the scale of net capital flows. However, patterns within those gross
capital flows are not given enough attention. Unlike the trans-Pacific inflows into the
US, which mainly went into purchasing Treasury bonds, most of the trans-Atlantic
capital flows resulted in the purchase of private-sector/corporate bonds, which were
at the epicentre of the GFC. Therefore, to understand the GFC, one has to shift the
research focus away from net capital flows and towards gross capital flows.
On the theoretical side, the endogenous money theory challenges the underlying
analytical framework of the GSG hypothesis, i.e., real analysis. The banking sector
plays an important role in money creation in a modern capitalist economy. Once
the concepts of saving and financing are made clear, the GSG argument no longer
provides a feasible justification to its claims that it was the excessive savings from
surplus countries that fuelled the credit and asset bubbles in the US before the GFC.
Thus, according to the EM and GFG hypotheses, the international banking sector
is the missing link in understanding the GFC.
However, in order to entirely reject the GSG argument, one needs to investigate the
indirect effect of trans-Pacific capital flows on the US credit and asset boom through
the downward pressure on long-term interest rates. A review of the theoretical
debates reveals a further weakness in the framework of real analysis and its reliance
on the concept of a natural rate of interest. Whilst the low level of inflation before
the GFC suggests that the market rate was trending towards the natural rate of
interest, the credit/asset boom seems to suggest that the market rate had been
constantly below the natural rate. Alternatively, the PK economists argue that the
concept of a natural rate of interest cannot offer either meaningful or consistent
results under monetary analysis. The most influential tool is thus the policy rate,
which is set exogenously by the Federal Reserve and influences the whole spectrum
of interest rates in the market. This approach agrees, at least partially, with the
position of Taylor (2018) , namely that the Fed should be held responsible for the
GFC because it raised the policy rate too little, too late.
Following the review of the theoretical debate, the next chapter provides an empirical
analysis of the GFC and comprehensively investigates all the logical links presented
in this chapter.
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3. The Global Financial Crisis - an
empirical analysis
3.1. Introduction
Godley (1999) famously diagnosed — through empirical observation of sectoral fi-
nancial balances1 — that the growth trajectory of the US economy was unsustain-
able. In his analysis, Godley noted that the private sector expenditure to income
ratio had been worsening since the end of 1991. In Fig. 3.1, the net lending positions
of households and non-financial corporate (NFC) businesses were in constant decline
during the 1990s, in contrast to previous decades. The positions of financial corpo-
rate (FC) and non-financial non-corporate businesses (NFNC) were roughly at zero
per cent of US GDP. According to Godley and Wray (2000), private enterprises are
profit-driven, and deficit positions never last long, because when firms experience a
loss, they will engage in cost-cutting activities.
In contrast, the federal government tightened its fiscal position over an extended
period of time. By the late 1990s, it had turned its position into a surplus, and
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) even projected that the position would last
for the next 10 years. The external sector was also unlikely to improve, given the
structural shifts in the global production chain that had taken place in the 1980s
(see Section 2.3.1), and one-third of the world economy was still affected by the
Asian financial crisis. An economic recession was inevitable if the private sector’s
deficit continued. Godley’s prediction was confirmed by the bursting of the dot-com
bubble in 2001.
1Godley’s analysis is deeply rooted in national accounting. In this particular paper, his focus was
on the net lending/borrowing positions (i.e., financial balances) of the three broad sectors of
the US economy — the private, the public, and the external sector (2.5). He further developed
this type of analysis into a full stock-flow consistent modelling framework in Godley and Lavoie
(2007), which is explained in detail in the next chapter.
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Using the same approach, Godley and Zezza (2006) also foresaw the 2007–09 fi-
nancial crisis. The net lending/borrowing position of the private sector as a whole
experienced a temporary bounce back after the dot-com bubble, and soon fell into
a deficit position. This time it was households, not firms, that went into deficit.
The ever-increasing ratio of private debt to disposable income after the 1980s would
eventually slow down. A relatively small change in the debt stock to income ratio
can have significant effects on the net lending (flow of debt) to income ratio. It can
result in sustained recessions, because debt-financed consumption cannot sustain
a negative household financial balance for long. Therefore, in the medium term,
Godley and Zezza (2006) expected that there would be an improvement in the fi-
nancial balances of both households and the external sector, due to the slowdown in
domestic consumption. Moreover, the fiscal stance had to be biased towards much
larger deficits so that recessionary pressures can be countered. This prediction later
proved to be correct. Fig. 3.1 shows that the net lending positions of the households
sector, the external sector, and the federal government were the dominating forces
of the US sectoral balance dynamics prior to the crisis.
The sectoral financial balances are accounting identities, which cannot offer impli-
cations for causation. It is the interpretation of the causal factors behind the move-
ment in financial balances that is essential in identifying the unsustainable growth
path. Controlling for reverse causation requires more careful statistical inferences.
Following the theoretical review of the global savings glut (GSG) hypothesis, the
endogenous money (EM) hypothesis, and the global financing glut (GFG) hypoth-
esis in the previous chapter, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the internal
logic of each hypothesis using US data.
The logic chains of the three hypothesis are inter-related in nature, which is better
presented in Fig. 3.2. The methodology section details the pros and cons of several
empirical strategies. A single equation Error Correction Model (ECM) is selected
after comparing the other primary econometric models in the time-series analysis.
The rest of the sections investigate logic chains in Fig. 3.2.
The behaviour of households (as regards consumption) is critical to Godley’s finan-
cial balances narrative in terms of understanding the financial crisis. Section 3.3
inquires into the determinants of US household consumption, which was responsi-
ble for falling private sector savings and the deterioration in the external balance.
Three important channels that can affect household consumption are identified in
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Figure 3.1.: The sectoral net lending/borrowing positions of the US economy, %
of GDP, 1960-2018
Source: National Income and Product Accounts, BEA, own calculation
this study. The first is the wealth effect, which is attributable to the specific impact
of net financial wealth on household consumption. The second channel is the housing
wealth effect. As the dominant component of households’ non-financial assets, an
increase in house prices enables households to access more lending secured against
their properties. The third channel is debt-financed consumption, which captures
both the effects of short-term credit and the possible linkage to mortgages.
Section 3.4 focuses on the determinants of the credit and housing boom, one must
recognise the self-reinforcing cycle between the two. If credit issuance (mainly mort-
gages) exceeds the newly built properties and the supply of existing housing stock, it
will inevitably exert upward pressure on housing prices. This, in turn, will increase
demand for ever-larger mortgages. Fixed assets, such as housing and other property,
can also be used as collateral for borrowing. Therefore, rising property prices enable
property owners to take out larger and larger loans. As profits in the banking sector
continue to grow, default risks also diminish, which encourages yet more lending
(Ryan-Collins et al., 2017). To control the value effects, the number of mortgages
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Figure 3.2.: Chains of logic reasoning for empirical analysis
Source: created by the author
(rather than their cumulative value) is used to conduct statistical inference. The
volume effects can also be seen as a proxy for credit standards, which are mostly set
by banks exogenously.
As regards the capital inflows into the US, two groups of countries stand out as
the primary focus of the empirical investigation (see sec. 3.5): the current-account-
surplus countries across the Pacific2 and certain European countries, such as the
UK and the Eurozone members across the Atlantic. Unlike the surplus countries
in Asia, the UK’s current account has been running a deficit for decades (since the
mid-1980s), while the current account of the Eurozone was roughly balanced prior
to the 2007–09 financial crisis. The current account balance only reveals net capital
2Although Germany is one of the world’s major surplus countries, the pattern of German cap-
ital inflows into the US is more similar to other Euro Area economies than to Asian surplus
countries. (See Fig. 3.11)
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flows between two countries, which are responsible for the long-term changes in
the net international investment position of an economy. Macroeconomic stability
is at stake when an economy experiences a sudden stop in capital inflows. The
capital inflows into the US from the Asian surplus countries mainly ended up in
US Treasury securities and US government agency bonds, in accordance with the
reserve management demands of those countries’ officials. Investments in private-
sector securities were limited. McCauley (2019) estimated the size of such inflows
amounted to US$1.7 trillion. In contrast, the capital inflows from Europe, estimated
at US$0.7 trillion, were essentially disguised as current account balance positions,
since the gross capital inflows into the US were netted out by the large outflows to
Europe from the US (Avdjiev et al., 2016). In fact, European commercial banks
(which are not official institutions) were heavily engaged in the purchase of US
corporate bonds3 and equities.
Although the GSG hypothesis has theoretical flaws4, we still need empirical evidence
to challenge its external validity. Therefore, the investigation has focused on two
central claims of the GSG hypothesis. The first concerns the direct effect of capital
inflows from GSG countries on credit creation and the housing boom in the US. The
second is the impact of the GSG on US long-term interest rates. The persistently low
level of long-term interest rates was responsible for the increasing appetite amongst
institutional investors in the US for high-yielding safe assets (Lysandrou and Sha-
bani, 2018). If the massive purchase of Treasury securities by the surplus countries
exerted downward pressure on long-term interest rates, then such capital inflows also
contributed indirectly to the boom in asset-backed securities in the US private sec-
tor. This hypothesis mainly focuses on the demand side, whilst the EM hypothesis
suggests that—given the presence of the shadow banking sector prior to the financial
crisis—the regulatory framework cannot effectively limit the credit creation process
(Lavoie, 2019). Therefore, it is the supply side, which significantly lowered credit
standards (especially for mortgages), that should be regarded as the primary cause
of the credit boom. By exploring the determinants of US long-term interest rates,
the empirical analysis also contributes to the understanding of Greenspan’s Conun-
3Bertaut et al. (2012) showed that, between the late 1990s and 2007, nearly half of the purchase
of asset-backed securities was recorded under ‘corporate bonds’ in the Treasury’s International
Capital (TIC) database. These bonds were purchased by French or German banks, such as
BNP Paribas and Deutsche Bank, through the international financial market. However, TIC
data are only available at the country level, no bank level data are provided. See sec. 3.5.2 for
a detailed description of capital flow data.
4See sec. 2.4 for a detailed explanation.
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drum5. Similarly, keeping the credit/housing boom and long-term interest rates as
the dependent variables, the GFG hypothesis requires further empirical evidence on
the impact of capital inflows from European countries.
3.2. Methodology
Judging by the statistical relationships of interests and data format, the statisti-
cal estimations in this chapter mostly rely on time series analysis6. This section
provides a brief account of the rationale behind our model selection. The proper-
ties of time series data, such as trend, seasonality, and stationarity, are essential in
deciding which model to use in the analysis. The inappropriate specification will
result in biased and misleading estimates. For instance, using a simple Ordinary
Least Square (OLS) regression between two non-stationary time series can result in
spurious correlations, that is, two or more totally unrelated variables may appear
to show strong statistical relationships. This could be due to the presence of an
omitted variable or the presence of common trends or merely a pure coincidence.
Therefore, it is vital to observe the data before conducting any further statistical
analysis.
In most of the time series analysis, the first step is to conduct unit root tests for
all data series to identify their likelihoods of stationarity. A data series is said to
be stationary (I(0)) when its probability distribution remains unchanged over time
(Pesaran, 2015). If a data series follows a unit root process (i.e. non-stationary),
then it cannot converge to a long-run value as its mean, variance, and co-variance
are all changing over time. Considering a data generating process (DGP),
yt = µ+ yt−1 + εt, εt ∼ IID(0, σ2) (3.1)
where µ is a constant, also known as the drift parameter, yt−1 is the past value of
the dependent variable yt, and εt is a stationary error term with mean zero and
5See section 2.3.2 for more detail.
6As we only interested in examining the macroeconomic dynamics of the US economy, panel
analysis is not discussed in this section.
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constant variance σ2. Given y0 is the starting value of yt, we get,
yt = y0 + µt+ ε0 + · · ·+ εt (3.2)
This DGP is also known as a random walk process. In this simple model, it is clear
that the mean value, variance, and co-variance are all dependent on t. Therefore,
without having a long-run relationship, it is entirely unpredictable.
Based on the unit root tests, we have three scenarios in the analysis: all variables
of interests are either stationary or non-stationary, and both stationary and non-
stationary time series co-exist in the data collection. In the first scenario, when
all the variables are stationary, either OLS estimation if using a single equation
or vector autoregressive (VAR) models if using a system of equations can produce
unbiased estimation. If all the variables are non-stationary, then they are subject
to cointegration tests. Only those that present cointegration relationships can lead
to meaningful statistical inference. The existence of a cointegration relationship
implies that there is a linear combination of two or more non-stationary variables,
which is stationary. This concept was first proposed by Granger (1986) and further
advanced by Engle and Granger (1987). More formally, assuming there are m I(1)7
variables, which is given by (3.3),
yit ∼ I(1), i = 1, 2, ...,m (3.3)
Vector matrix8 yt = (y1t, y2t,..., ymt)′ is cointegrated when there exists a parameter
matrix β that can transform it into a I(0) vector matrix (ξt),
β′t yt = ξt ∼ I(0)
(r ×m) (m× 1) (r × 1) (3.4)
7I is the order of integration. I(d) represents the successive number (d) of differences that
are necessary to result a stationary time series. A variable (Xt) is integrated with an order
d, can be represented by (1 − L)dXt, where L is the lag operator. Therefore, I(I) gives
(1− L)Xt = Xt −Xt−1 = 4Xt.
8The bold font indicates that the variable is under matrix form.
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where the number of cointegration relationships, also known as the dimension of the
co-integration space, r must be greater than one. These cointegration relationships
represent long-run relationships (Pesaran, 2015).
The Johansen test is commonly used in identifying cointegration relationships, which
was first proposed by Johansen (1988). Unlike the residual-based tests9, which test
the null hypothesis r = 0 against the alternative r > 0, the Johansen test focuses
on the rank condition of the parameter matrix, which is applicable to identify more
than one cointegration relationship. A generalised model with m variables is given
by Shrestha and Bhatta (2018),
xt = A xt−1 + εt, t = 1, 2, ..., T
(m× 1) (m×m) (m× 1) (m× 1) (3.5)
where A is a parameter matrix. Subtracting xt−1 on both sides, we get
4xt = (A− I)xt−1 + εt
= Πxt−1 + εt (3.6)
the null hypothesis is the rank of Π, r, is less than full rankm and against the alterna-
tive Rank(Π) = r+ 1, r = 0, 1, ...,m− 1 , if the test uses the maximum eigenvalue
approach or Rank(Π) = m, if it follows the trace approach. Both tests rely on
the log-likelihood ratio statistics10. The DGP has a unit root when Rank(Π) = 0.
The number of cointegration relationships is then the highest non-rejected value
of r. When there is a full rank condition (Rank(Π) = m), then all variables are
stationary (I(0)), both OLS and VAR models in levels are appropriate.
Traditional cointegration methods, such as the Johansen test and residual-based
tests, require all the variables are of the same order of integration, usually I(1).
When there is a mixed order of integration, that is, some series are I(0) while
others are I(1), then it fails the preconditions of cointegration and has a risk of
9These tests, proposed by Engle and Granger (1987), requires two steps. The first step is to
estimate the parameter using standard OLS regression and obtain the estimated residual from
the equation. Then, in the second step, a unit root test is conducted to confirm the stationarity
of the estimated residual. If it is stationary, then there is a cointegration relationship between
the dependent and the independent variables.
10For technical details, please see Johansen (1991).
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Figure 3.3.: Method selection for time series data
Source: Shrestha and Bhatta (2018)
misspecification. Another shortcoming of the Johansen test is that it is subject
to asymptotic properties. Therefore, when the sample size is not sufficient, it will
generate unreliable results. An AutoRegressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) model11
has proven to be advantageous under both situations (Pesaran et al., 2001; Pesaran
and Shin, 1998). A standard ARDL model is an OLS based time series regression
model. Equation (3.7) provides a general form of ARDL model,
yt = λ0 + λ1t+
p∑
i=1
ψiyt−i+
k∑
j=1
qj∑
lj=0
βj,ljxj,t−lj + εt (3.7)
where ψi and βj,ljare the parameters assigned for lagged dependent variable yt and
the k independent variables as well as their lagged variables respectively. εt assumes
to be an independent and identically distributed (IID) random variable. The term
AutoRegressive highlights another key feature of time series data, that is, the current
11Notice that there should not have any data series with an order of integration above one, which
will invalidate the methodology (Pesaran, 2015).
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value of dependent variable is determined by its own lagged values12. Therefore,
given the number of lags for both the dependent variable (p) and the regressors (q),
Equation (3.7) is known as the ARDL(p, q) model.
An Error Correction Model (ECM) is a general transformation of the ARDL model.
When all variables of interest are of the same order of integration (often I(1)) and co-
integrated13, ECM and ARDL model are technically the same. Engle and Granger
(1987) demonstrated that cointegrated time series are well represented by an ECM.
The logic of the cointegration relationship between two or more variables implies
that there is an equilibrium relationship connecting them. The residual estimated
by the OLS regression measures the level of deviations that these variables are away
from the equilibrium. In a dynamic model, the change in the current value of the
dependent variable is not only determined by the changes in the current value of
regressors, but also by the level of disequilibrium effect of the previous period, which
is a typical ECM setup.
While the AutoRegressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) and VAR models
are often accused of having little support from economic theories, the ECM offers
a way to combine the long-term co-integration relationship based on established
theories and the flexibility to specify the lagged structure that best fits the data.
Economic theories have two critical functions in the use of ECM. The first is to help
select explanatory variables and the second is to identify cointegration relationships
(Kennedy, 2003). Therefore, the ECM is used to model equilibrium relationships
involving stationary time series as well as cointegrated time series. Like ARDL
models, ECM contains both short-term (changes) and long-term (levels) equilibrium
relationships and provides stability to the system (Bryman et al., 2004).
A simplified two-variable ECM example is given by (3.8),
4yt = λ0 + λ14xt + γ1yt−1 + γ2xt−1 + εt (3.8)
where γ1 is the error correction rate. It is the rate at which disequilibrium between
yt−1 and βxt−1 (β = γ2/γ1) is corrected. It is essential for the absolute value of γ1
12An AR(p) process is given by yt = λ0 + λ1yt−1 + · · ·+ λpyt−p + t.
13Considering a case of two variables. If one of the data series is I(0), which means it’s roughly
constant over time, while the I(1) variable is increasing over time, then it seems impossible to
have co-integration relationship.
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to stay within the range of [−1, 0) to ensure convergence. λ1 is the coefficient for
short-term effects. Under the first difference, both ∆yt and ∆xt become I(0).
To ensure an unbiased estimation of λ1, the contemporaneous element (xt) within
regressor variable, ∆xt, should also be exogenous to the contemporaneous distur-
bance term εt. This is known as the weak exogeneity assumption14. The assumption
can be tested using the instrumental variable approach with lagged variable ∆xt−1
as the instrumental variable (IV) for ∆xt. If the two-stage least squared (2SLS)
estimator (λˆ2SLS) is not statistically significantly different from the OLS estimator
(λˆOLS), then the weak exogeneity assumption holds true. If the assumption is vio-
lated, that is when the two estimators are statistically different, then λˆ2SLS should
be the preferred estimator. The endogeneity test15 results are given in Appendix-A.
In addition, if the theory successfully specifies the long-term relationship, then the
error term εt−1 = yt−1 − βxt−1 should be stationary. Therefore, (3.8) can be esti-
mated using simple OLS regression16.
For example, assuming that households consumption is positively associated with
the level of credit access, that is, easy access to credits is associated with higher
levels of households consumption. It is a long-run equilibrium relationship between
the two variables. If the financial sector decides to tighten the supply of credits,
due to a temporary financial retrenchment, the aggregate consumption is likely to
fall in the short run. In this case, the two series deviate away from their long-run
equilibrium, and we would expect the supply of credits to return to the pre-crisis
level. ARDL or ECM models are suitable to capture such relationships. However,
the correction rate γ can only be estimated under the ECM set-up as shown in the
equation above.
In addition to the simple OLS estimation, the Engle-Granger two-step method is
often used under cointegration. Before the first step estimation, it is important
to identify the order of integration for both variables. If they are of the same
integration order (usually I(1)), then we can proceed to the first-step regression
that estimates the long-run relationship only. The estimated residual is subject to
unit root tests to confirm whether it is indeed stationary, given the assumption that
14The strict exogeneity condition requires the disturbance term to be independent from all the
dependent variables at all periods, E(ut|X) = 0, t = 1, ..., T .
15Under the null hypothesis, the short-term change variables that contain the contemporaneous
elements are exogenous.
16The specification does not identify the parameter β, unless the lagged y and x are separately
estimated. The estimated parameter for xt−1 is γβ.
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the two variable are cointegrated. If the disequilibrium residual term is I(0), then it
enters the second-stage error correction equation in (3.8) by replacing yt−1 − βxt−1.
According to Kennedy (2003), the two-step estimation is subject to bias when the
sample size is small. Joint estimation of both long-run relationship and short-run
dynamics (e.g. Equation (3.8)) performs better than the Engle-Granger two-step
method under Monte Carlo studies.
One limitation of using a single-equation ECM is that the independent variables
are implicitly assumed to be exogenous. As Sims (1980) pointed out, in macroeco-
nomics, the dependent variables and independent variables are endogenous to each
other, which led to the development and popularity of VAR analysis to solve this si-
multaneity problem. Another limitation is that when the estimation has more than
two variables, then there is a possibility that more than one cointegrating relation-
ship exists. Then specifying the equations in simultaneous systems such as VAR17
and Vector Error Correction Model (VECM)18 could be advantageous. The number
of cointegration relationships can be identified using the Johansen test.
However, the VAR models are also not free from criticism. According to Asteriou
and Hall (2007), the VAR models are typically atheoretical. There are no restric-
tions on estimated parameters as all variables are mostly endogenous to each other.
Therefore, interpreting the coefficients can be difficult. Granger causality tests are
often conducted to make statistical inference on the coefficients. After dropping out
the coefficients that are not statistically significant, it may result in a VAR model
that is consistent with economic theories.
Moreover, having a large number of lags and variables suggested by different theo-
ries in a model is extremely data consuming and massively reduces the degrees of
freedom. When the sample size is not large enough, the estimation can even be
misleading
Based on the pros and cons of each estimation strategy stated above and the data
availability, this chapter chooses single-equation ECM as the preferred estimation
strategy. Firstly, the study aims to examine established hypotheses. With single-
equation setup, it is able include numerous explanatory variables based on different
claims made by each theory. Secondly, some explanatory variables of interest (e.g.
the number of mortgages issued in the US before financial crisis) are subject to
17VAR is essentially a system of ARDL equations
18VECM is a generalisation of VAR. Adding multiple long-run relationships (error correction
terms) to the short-term dynamics in the system.
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availability issue, which could lead to biased results when using VAR or VECM.
The choice of lag structure is also relatively flexible under single-equation ECM.
Another limitation of the single-equation ECM is that the specification may not
capture all the other possible co-integration relationships, especially when it involves
more than two variables19. Pesaran and Pesaran (2009) demonstrated how a bounds
test can be used to examine the number of long-run cointegration relationships
and direction of causality for a single-equation ECM under such situations. For
illustrative purpose, we introduce a third long-run variable zt−1 into (3.8),
4yt = λ0 + λ14xt + λ24zt + γ1yt−1 + γ2xt−1 + γ3zt−1 + εt (3.9)
The null hypothesis of the bounds test assumes γ1 = γ2 = γ3 = 0, that is, there are
no long-run relationships between y, x and z. If the F-statistic (F (y|x, z)) exceeds
the upper bound of the critical value band at 95 per cent level20, we can reject the
null hypothesis. On the other hand, if the F-statistic falls below the lower bound
of the critical value band, we cannot conclude that there is long-run relationship
among the three variables. The same diagnostic procedure can be applied when
more variables are introduced to the ECM model.
To test whether x and z are the long-run forcing variables for the explanation of y
or not, we need to rearrange (3.9) into the following forms and conduct two more
F-tests:
4xt = λ0 + λ14yt + λ24zt + γ1yt−1 + γ2xt−1 + γ3zt−1 + εt (3.10)
4zt = λ0 + λ14xt + λ24yt + γ1yt−1 + γ2xt−1 + γ3zt−1 + εt (3.11)
where ∆xt is the dependent variable and γ2 is the error correction rate in (3.10) and
∆zt is the dependent variable and γ3 is the error correction rate in (3.11). If F (x|y, z)
19When we have only two variables, the Granger test can be used to examine pairwise causality.
20For technical details and computed critical value bounds, please refer to Pesaran et al. (2001).
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and F (z|y, x) both fail to reject the null hypothesis, we can now conclude that x and
z have a direct impact on y and the co-integration relationship is unique. However,
if one of the F-statistic or even both F-statistics exceed the upper bound of the
critical value band at 95 per cent level, then there are more than one co-integration
relationships among the three variables and the direction of causality is not certain.
Appendix-A presents the results of bounds test for a selection of equations from each
ECM model for demonstrative purpose. Given the complexity of the macroeconomy,
a unique co-integration relationship and one-way causation are rarely the case when
there are more than three macroeconomic variables involved. Ultimately, the ECM
model specifications and lag structures are selected based on economic theories and
variables of research interest.
3.3. Understanding US household consumption
Household consumption21 is the most significant component of US GDP. Personal
consumption expenditure as a percentage of US GDP increased steadily from 61
per cent in 1980 to 68 per cent just before the onset of the financial crisis. This
share remains high even today. As Fig. 3.4 shows, the US personal saving (i.e. the
households income left unconsumed) as a percentage of disposable income has been
in decline for more than three decades since the breakdown of Bretton Woods system
in 1971. During the same period, the US house price together with households net
worth and debt has increased significantly. The 2007-09 financial crisis ended this
trend with a structural break. Given its importance, the empirical literature that
examines the determinants of households consumption is vast. The literature review
of this section only focuses on the three likely channels that may have significantly
contributed to the US households consumption boom prior to the financial crisis:
the financial wealth effect, the housing wealth effect, and debt-financing effect.
3.3.1. Literature review
Ando and Modigliani (1963) were amongst the very first to quantify wealth effects
on household consumption. However, their consumption equation was based on the
21Empirical data also includes nonprofit institutions serving households (NPISH).
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Figure 3.4.: Stylised facts, US households sector, 1970-2017
Source: BEA, IMF, and OECD. Created by the author
life-cycle hypothesis22 which is closely related to the permanent income hypothesis
at a micro-level. The hypothesis is consistent with the theoretical foundations of
the Euler equation (see Hall (1978)) and the rational expectations hypothesis, which
was widely applied in mainstream Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
models before the crisis. It assumes that individual agents maximise their utilities
resulting in consumption smoothing behaviour and by having rational expectations
regarding their life-time earnings. Therefore, their current level of consumption (c)
should be proportional to their total wealth23 (w), which is given by c = mpcww.
mpcw is the individual agent’s marginal propensity to consume (MPC). Assuming
that this individual agent is representative of the entire economy, the aggregate
consumption function follows the exact form of his/her consumption function24:
22In the life-cycle hypothesis, the propensity to consume of the agent changes with the his/her
age. Aggregation across the age structure of the population of households gives the aggregate
consumption. Households only borrow or save passively to achieve the optimum degree of
smoothing of expected future labour income, i.e. non-property income.
23Some papers, such as Davis et al. (2001), include the human wealth, tangible assets, and financial
assets. Human wealth measures the present value of life-time earnings. The tangible assets and
financial assets often refer to the net worth.
24See Altissimo et al. (2005) for a detailed discussion on micro theories.
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C = mpcwW . Poterba (2000) estimated mpcw for US households to be between 2.7
and 10.3 cents; that is, for every dollar increase in the wealth of a household, its
consumption will increase by 2.7 to 10.3 cents.
Altissimo et al. (2005) along with many others, showed that the marginal propensity
(mpcwi) to consume out of wealth can differ significantly across different assets. Non-
equity financial wealth appears to have the highest MPC. There is no clear indication
as to the MPC that is generated by equity financial wealth or housing wealth.
According to the life-cycle and permanent income hypotheses, like with other assets,
a negative shock to the value of housing lowers the permanent income of households,
which affects their consumption/saving decisions over the life-cycle. However, there
is still no consensus regarding housing wealth effects in the empirical literature.
Sousa (2009) found that households responded more to positive changes in currency
and deposits (between 3.7 cents and 5.8 cents25) than in share values (between 0.73
cents and 1.2 cents). In addition, although mortgage loans are financial liabilities
for households, the estimated MPC is both positive (between 3.4 cent and 7.3 cents)
and statistically significant. Overall, the net housing wealth effect is close to zero.
Barrell et al. (2015) confirmed the significance of financial wealth effects in Italy and
the UK.
Interestingly, even though the authors found no housing effects in Italy, they found
that UK household consumption appeared to respond to housing wealth even more
than financial wealth. Their results are consistent with Carroll et al. (2011). Girouard
(2010) showed that, within the OECD countries, the different results as regards hous-
ing effects could be due to country-specific features in mortgage markets. Countries
with higher mortgage-to-GDP ratios or higher housing equity withdrawal (HEW)26
over disposable income27 are also associated with higher MPC generated by housing
wealth. Therefore, it is sensible to have housing wealth included in our model.
According to Muellbauer (2016) and Deaton (1992), both representative agents and
rational expectations are highly unrealistic at the micro-level, and the Euler equation
fails to find support from aggregate consumption data. For example, the life-cycle
25The different results were due to the use of different econometric technique. The IV/GMM
estimates were consistently lower than the Dynamic OLS estimates.
26HEW refers to the change in housing equity stock, which is the net value between the stock of
housing wealth and stock of lending secured on housing. A positive value of HEW implies a
decline of the stock of housing equity. A negative value is a housing equity injection, which
adds onto the stock of housing equity. (Reinold, 2011)
27These countries are Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US
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hypothesis suggests a strong positive correlation between housing prices and house-
hold savings, which is clearly inconsistent with the data in Fig. 3.4. Such a view fails
to reflect the endogenous money-creation process in the modern banking sector and
does not recognise the essential role played by housing and mortgages in influenc-
ing macroeconomic dynamics in the long-run (Ryan-Collins et al., 2017). Housing
is different from other non-financial assets in that it is deeply entangled with the
credit markets in a modern economy such as the US’. Aron et al. (2012) argued that
the housing–credit interaction process can impact on household consumption in two
ways - the down payment effect and the collateral effect, which may account for the
higher housing wealth effects observed in the US.
The down payment effect is closely related to the structural shifts that have taken
place in the domestic credit market in the US. As one of the indicators of financial
liberalisation, a relaxation of the down payment requirement has enabled households
to acquire a mortgage of the same size with fewer deposit savings. It has thus in-
creased households’ consumption-to-income ratio (Muellbauer and Williams, 2011).
The consumption-to-income ratio can also decrease (or increase by less) if the house
price-to-income ratio grows too fast (Muellbauer, 2016). In fact, the US economy
has experienced two major structural shifts in its credit markets (see Fig. 3.5): the
total credit-to-GDP ratio rose significantly in the early 1980s and again in the early
2000s. In the 1980s, this was mainly due to credit expansion towards the government
sector. In the early 2000s, however, it was household credit, which exploded from
70 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 96.6 per cent in 2009. According to Mian (2019), this
trend was not unique to the US; in fact, the global credit-to-GDP ratio increased
from 150 per cent of global GDP in 1980 to over 250 per cent in 2016. A large
share of the increase was due to the expansion of private bank credit in advanced
countries. Jordà et al. (2016) showed that, after the Second World War (WWII),
real estate lending as a share of total bank lending in advanced economies doubled
from 30 per cent in the 1950s to nearly 60 per cent in 2013.
The collateral effect of housing, meanwhile, has also been amplified since the 1980s,
not only through rising house prices but also because of the significantly wider
access to credit by households in the US. According to Jordà et al. (2016), the loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio surged from 28 per cent in 1980 to 50 per cent in 2013. Klyuev
and Mills (2007) argued that HEW improved the liquidity of housing assets and
provided a critical link between the amplified collateral effect and household con-
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Figure 3.5.: Credit to non-financial sector as a percentage of GDP, US, 1952-2018
Source: BIS, created by the author
sumption. Belsky (2004) constructed a simple HEW proxy for the US28, calculated
using the difference between the net change in households’ mortgage liabilities and
their expenditure on new residential houses. This proxy thus reflects the amount
of lending that is secured on housing properties which does not add to the stock
of housing wealth. This amount can be used to finance household spending and
investment. They noticed that cash-out mortgage refinancing surged in the early
2000s. Reinold (2011) demonstrated various ways in which households can draw on
housing equity. For example, if a multiple-property owner sells an existing house to
a first-time mortgage taker without buying a new one, then part of the proceeds re-
leased from the housing market can end up in household consumption. Ryan-Collins
et al. (2017) argued that HEW is an essential driver of consumer demand, and that
it supported the fast economic growth in the UK before the financial crisis.
28For a more sophisticated version, see Greenspan and Kennedy (2008).
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3.3.2. Model and data
Based on the literature review, the ECM equation for US household consumption
(ch) is given by (3.12).
∆cht = β0 + β1cht−1 + β2nw
fin
t−2 + β3wht−2 + β5cst−1 (3.12)
+ β6ydt−1 + β
′
icontrolit−1 +α
′
i∆sr
c
it + ε
c
t
where nwfin is the net financial wealth of US households, wh is the housing wealth,
cs is the real value of consumer credit liability and yd stands for household disposable
income. ∆src is a vector (in bold) that contains the first difference of all the long-run
variables of interest and other variables such as the the net increase in households’
mortgage liability, 4mortl, which may have short-run effects. All the variables
are deflated using the consumption deflator, and hence represent real values (in
lower cases). Having only one lag for the short-term variables in the model is a
choice based on the rule of thumb. Although econometric software such as Eviews
can select the optimal number of lags in the model29 based on various information
criteria (e.g., Akaike Information Criteria), there is generally less economic meaning
in the coefficients of the second lag and beyond. The net financial wealth and
housing wealth are in second lags because they are the opening balance value for
period t− 1.
Real household consumption is the real personal consumption expenditure series
in the National Income and Product Account (NIPA), which measures consumer
expenditure on goods and services. Household disposable income is also from the
NIPA, and is after-tax real personal income. US household assets are divided into
two broad categories financial and non-financial assets. Both the total financial
assets and the net financial assets30 of households are tested in the model (see
Tab. 3.1). This data can be found in the US Financial Account (Z.1), which provides
detailed flows of funds as well as sectoral balance sheet data. As the financial
liabilities of the households sector, both consumer credit and mortgages are also
included in the Financial Account. Non-financial assets, such as housing wealth
29The model that offers the best goodness of fits in statistical sense.
30Net financial assets = total financial assets - total financial liabilities
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data31, are from the balance sheet under non-financial assets in the BEA’s national
accounts. All the variables are annual data and are measured in millions of US
dollars.
3.3.3. Results
Table 3.1.: Estimated results from the US households consumption equation
31To be more specific, it is the dwellings of the households’ tangible fixed assets. Non-residential
buildings and machinery are not included.
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The empirical findings are broadly in line with the literature and fit the data quite
well. Regressions (1_1) and (1_2) estimate the same equation but in two different
periods. Notice that the error correction rate is given by the coefficient of the
first-lag of household consumption. The coefficients of the long-run co-integration
relationship have to be derived by dividing the coefficient error correction rate.
For example, the long-run MPC for households disposable income is 92.5 cents in
regression (1_1) using data between 1971 and 2007. It is the quotient between the
coefficient of disposable income (0.883) and the absolute value of the error correction
coefficient (0.955).
In regressions (1_1) and (1_2), no long-run effect is identified for net financial
wealth. The long-run effect of housing wealth also appears to be statistically in-
significant. However, housing wealth and net financial wealth seem to contribute to
the households’ consumption in the short-run, as the coefficients for changes appear
to be positive and statistically significant in regression (1_1) and (1_2) respectively.
Considering the housing price and mortgage lending have reinforcing impacts on
each other, there might be some interaction effects with mortgages. The inclusion
of the changes in mortgage liabilities indeed diminishes the housing wealth effects
and the statistical significance in the short run in both regressions. The short-term
effect of mortgage liabilities becomes highly significant when the post-crisis period
is included.
Consumer credit is the largest component (more than 80 per cent) of households’
short-term liabilities. However, its contribution to household consumption does not
show any statistical significance in both periods in the long-run. Counter-intuitively,
the coefficients suggest that there is a negative relationship between total consumer
credit liabilities and household consumption, but the same result was found for the
UK by Gudgin et al. (2015), where the negative relationship may have captured
the crowding-out effects of repayments. Consumer credits appear to be positively
correlated with households consumption in the short-run dynamics.
Regressions (2_1) and (2_2) estimate an alternative model to test the robustness
of our results. The same two periods are used in the model for comparison. The
equation replaces households’ net financial assets with total financial assets, and
uses a simple HEW proxy, derived using the method proposed by Belsky (2004), to
capture the interaction effect between the housing wealth and credit issuance. Both
are highly significant in the short-run dynamics. The calculated HEW index is gen-
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Figure 3.6.: Housing Equity Withdrawal indexes compared, US, 1991-2008
Source: Greenspan and Kennedy (2008) and own calculation
erally in line with the HEW data estimated by Greenspan and Kennedy (2008) (see
Fig. 3.6), which offers quality assurance for the estimation method. In addition, our
HEW index can easily be extended to cover the entire estimation period (1970–2017)
using publicly available data, while the Greenspan and Kennedy (2008) method re-
quires data at a more granular level. The MPCs for the HEW index are as high
as 27.83 cents and 58.83 cents in regressions (2_1) and (2_2) respectively. The
change in the structure of the estimation equation did not alter or undermine the
main results identified by regressions (1_1) and (1_2), but they are outperformed
by regressions (2_1) and (2_2) in terms of both statistical significance for estimated
coefficients and explanatory power.
The high HEW effect suggests that the interaction between the US credit and hous-
ing markets indeed requires further investigation. The next section intends to test
the EM hypothesis, and provides a detailed review of the domestic factors for each
market.
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3.4. The domestic determinants of the US credit and
housing boom
The credit market and the housing market together played a critical role in bringing
about the US 2007–09 financial crisis (see sec. 2.2.3). The two markets reinforced
each other and created a feedback loop that led to a joint boom–bust cycle, which
also resulted in significant cycles for other macroeconomic variables (see sec. 3.3
for a detailed discussion on the impact on household consumption). A relaxation
in lending standards enabled previously financially-constrained borrowers to access
credit, such as a mortgage, which increased the demand for housing and fuelled the
housing boom. An asset price boom can itself lead to more demand for such assets
and consequently, more credit disbursements. If the expected future growth in house
prices continues to exceed income growth, then the demand for housing and credit
will end up in an upward spiral.
The EM hypothesis argues that when a mortgage is issued, an equal amount of bank
deposits will be credited to the home buyer’s bank account and end up in the home
seller’s account. Money is thus created through lending, which does not necessarily
reduce the volume of money in circulation or economic activity somewhere else.
Money destruction works in a reverse process. When a loan is repaid by the borrower,
the balance sheet of the bank will shrink as money supply contracts. According to
McLeay et al. (2014), the majority of the money supply in a modern economy is
created by the banking system via lending, with the remaining coming from the
central bank32.
The empirical literature on the determinants of the housing market is vast. The
literature review in this section only focuses on the empirical evidence regarding
the domestic factors that may have caused the boom in the US credit and housing
markets in the run-up to the financial crisis. The effects of international capital
flows will be discussed in the next section.
3.4.1. Literature review
House price
32Ryan-Collins et al. (2017) argued that 97 per cent of the money supply in the UK is created by
bank lending.
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Muellbauer (2012) claimed that there are two widely used house price models that
can serve as the basis for empirical estimation: the inverted demand curve approach,
and the rent arbitrage approach. Both models are derived from economic theory,
and all the variables are in log-linearised form. The inverted demand curve model
(3.13) is derived from the partial equilibrium analysis of the housing market. The
price of housing is the result of the interplay between the housing supply curve
and the demand curve. A downward-sloping demand curve implies that the price
of housing (hp) is negatively correlated with housing demand (hd). Other demand
curve shifters, such as real household income (y), can also be included in the model.
The coefficient α is the elasticity of house price to income.
ln(hpt) = αln(yt)− βln(hdt ) (3.13)
In the long run, the price of housing brings supply and demand into equilibrium.
Short-term price fluctuations occur mainly due to changes in the demand side. For
example, Guerrieri and Uhlig (2016) described how a bubble mentality and irrational
beliefs can cause housing demand to deviate from the economic fundamentals. The
responsiveness of house prices to demand is also subject to the price elasticity of
supply. According to Caldera and Johansson (2013), housing stock cannot respond
to demand swiftly, because there are a time lag and physical constraints to building
new houses, and also depreciation happens slowly. The elasticity of supply in the US
is the highest amongst OECD countries, estimated to be at around 2, which is four
times higher than in countries such as France or Germany. Therefore, compared
with other countries, the same demand shock will result in a smaller price increase
in the US.
Institutional factors can also help explain heterogeneity in housing supply across
countries. For example, urban planning and land policies, such as the greenbelt
policy in the UK and Hong Kong, can limit land supply for housing development.
(Ryan-Collins et al., 2017). In contrast, German local authorities have much greater
regional autonomy over planning. Therefore, other things being equal, UK house
prices can be expected to grow faster than in Germany in the face of the same
demand shock (Muellbauer, 2018).
Geng (2018) pointed out that if the price of housing deviates too much from the
economic fundamentals for an extended period of time, then the inevitable price
correction (in the long run) can pose a severe threat to macroeconomic stability.
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A debt-financed boom in housing demand can be particularly harmful, which was
indeed the case with the housing boom in early 2000. In Fig. 3.7, the cyclical patterns
for the real price of housing and the household debt proxies are highly correlated.
Figure 3.7.: HP filtered real house price, number of mortgages, and household debt
to GDP ratio in the US, 1970-2018
Source: BIS, OECD, and own calculation
The rent-arbitrage model (3.14) suggests that the house prices to rent (HTR) ratio
should, in the long run, be equal to the real user cost of housing 33 (uch) in a
frictionless housing market due to arbitrage behaviour between owning and renting
a property. Given that in the US housing rents are highly market-driven, the model
seems appropriate for modelling US house prices. For countries that have more
policy interventions34, the model is thus less useful.
ln(hpt) = ln(rentt)− ln(ucht ) (3.14)
Muellbauer and Williams (2011) controlled for a wide range of other variables to
test the validity of the theory. In their model for Australia, the credit condition
index captures the structural shifts in the economy due to financial liberalisation
and explains a significant part of the increase in house prices over the long-run.
The model developed by Duca et al. (2011) shows that lower interest rates and easy
access to credit were the two critical drivers of the housing boom between 2000–07.
33It is a similar concept as the user cost of capital, which is the unit cost of capital asset use for
a single period.
34For example, in Ontario, Canada, the Residential Tenancies Act 2006 clearly states that the
annual increase in rent cannot exceed 2.5 per cent.
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They argued that the LTV for first-time buyers, who are typically more sensitive
to down-payment constraints, should be included in the house price equation as a
proxy for access to credit. Christensen et al. (2011) showed that a policy ceiling
on the LTV for residential mortgages can effectively mitigate the pro-cyclicality
of the housing price and the mortgage financing activities. A relaxation in credit
standards can pull up the price of housing by creating demand from previously
non-qualified borrowers (see Andre (2016)). Fuster and Zafar (2015) found that the
number of poorer households that are willing to buy a home increases when there is a
relaxation in the down-payment requirement. Similarly, Cerutti et al. (2017) showed
that credit conditions (according to various measures) improved the predictability
of cross-country variations in house prices by an additional 10 per cent.
Apart from credit conditions, Droes et al. (2016) examined the validity of seven
fundamental determinants of the housing market using historical data going back to
1900. The demand factors were GDP per capita, interest rates, population growth,
the unemployment rate, and the share of the working-age population. On the supply
side were new housing supply and construction costs. They found that the relative
importance and statistical significance of these determinants changed from being
more construction cost-led to being more income/credit-driven from the 1970s on-
wards. According to Andre (2016), a shock to the fundamental determinants, such
as easier access to mortgages, can lead to an overshooting in house prices over an
extended period. Caldera and Johansson (2013) argued that, in the long run, hous-
ing demand is mainly driven by the expected permanent income, demographics, and
the user cost of housing.
Mortgage debt
Schularick and Taylor (2012) created a database which traces the credit and money
data between 1870 and 2008 for 14 developed countries. They found that, the
trends for money and credit gradually decoupled after 1945. A rising trend for the
credit-to-money ratio in many countries was witnessed. Using a probabilistic model,
they concluded that the lagged domestic credit growth, after controlling various
explanatory variables such as the broad money growth, was the best predictor for
financial instability.
In most developed economies, mortgage debt is the most significant component on
the liability side of the household balance sheet. In Fig. 3.8, the household mortgage
level as a percentage of GDP went through two structural shifts — one in the early
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1980s and another one in the early 2000s. These shifts are also well recorded by
the credit conditions index35 on the right. Credit standards have consistently been
below the historical average since the mid-1980s. They tightened temporarily in the
early 1990s, early 2000s and again in 2008 as a result of the economic recessions.
According to Muellbauer and Williams (2011), time-series analyses of household
debt remained relatively limited up until the financial crisis. The literature has only
begun to flourish in recent years.
Figure 3.8.: Household liability for home purchase as a percentage of GDP (left)
and credit condition index (right), US, 1970-2018
Source: BEA and OECD, own calculation
Wolswijk (2006) and Coletta et al. (2014) summarised a range of possible variables to
explain the dynamics of household mortgage debt. The determinants often impact
on the household debt position through various channels. Hence, the theory cannot
give definitive coefficient signs for these variables. For instance, on the demand side,
a higher disposable income can either increase or decrease the demand for mortgage
debt. The net effect depends on whether the increase in income is used to repay
debt or improve leverage.
Similarly, Geiger et al. (2016) argued that the coefficient sign for the price of housing
is likely to be time-variant depending on the down-payment requirement. When
the requirement is low, perhaps due to credit relaxation, the collateral effect of
the housing asset dominates, and an increase in house prices increases household
demand for mortgages. In contrast, when the requirement is high, households can
be deterred from borrowing.
As a sign of the ability of households to contract new debt, their level of financial
35See next subsection for a detailed description on the financial conditions index of Chicago Fed.
Negative and positive values represent loose and tight credit conditions comparing with histor-
ical average respectively.
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wealth can be positively associated with their mortgage debt level. However, when a
house purchase is based on the investment motive, then the coefficient sign will again
become ambiguous due to the substitution effect on holding other financial assets.
Other factors, such as the cost of financing (i.e., interest rates) and demographics,
may also affect household mortgage demand.
Figure 3.9.: Terms on conventional single-family mortgages, annual national aver-
ages, 1970-2018
Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), created by the author
On the supply side, the banking system has enough autonomy to determine the
supply of mortgages both in the short and long run. Therefore, credit standards
are the most critical factor in this regard. Cerutti et al. (2017) summarised several
features of the US house finance market36 as predictors of a credit boom. According
to IMF (2011), the US housing finance market is among the least regulated in
the world. Fixed-rate mortgages with a maturity of up to 30 years are the most
common type of mortgage in the market. The dominance of Government Sponsored
Enterprises (GSE), such as Fannie May and Freddie Mac, in the market, acts as a
36See Fig. 3.9 for the dynamics of various terms on conventional single-family mortgages in the US.
The effective mortgage rate is the sum of the contract interest rate and the fees and charges
amortized over a 10-year period.
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significant hedge against interest risks. Additionally, the US is the only country that
does not attach prepayment penalties37 to fixed-rate mortgages, and the maximum
LTV exceeds 100 per cent — amongst the highest in the world. The term to maturity
is also five years above the world median level. As regards funding, the US is highly
reliant on securitisation. The ratio between MBS and total residential loans has
been as high as 64.1 per cent, whereas the second-highest—in the UK—is about
31.2 per cent.
Disney et al. (2009) studied the impact of house prices on the dynamics of household
debt in both the US and the UK. Their data showed that households that have high
LTV ratios (80–90 per cent) for mortgages are also likely to hold more unsecured and
secured debt. However, a decline in outstanding mortgage liabilities was witnessed
in the case of households with lower LTV ratios. The difference in the recourse
agreement38 between the two countries implies that US borrowers are more likely
to have higher leverage positions during a house price boom. Similarly, when house
prices fall, US borrowers are more prone to defaulting than their UK counterparts.
3.4.2. Model and data
As housing rents in the US are mainly market-driven, the rent-arbitrage model
should closely reflect house price development (Muellbauer, 2012).
A range of control variables were introduced into the model based on the literature
review. According to Oxford Economics (2016), various economic fundamentals
affect house prices. In particular, rent and the user cost of housing are identified as
key drivers.
The house price model is thus given by (3.15),
∆ln(hpt) = β0 + β1ln(hpt−1) + β2ln(ucht−1) + β3ln(rentt−1) + β4ln(yt−1)
(3.15)
+ β5cst−1 + βicontrolit−1 + αi∆srit + εhpt
37It is a fee that deters the borrowers from early repayments and provides some guarantee for the
lenders to cover the related risks and the costs of processing the loan.
38Conforming mortgage borrowers in the US have non-recourse clauses, which effectively limit the
down-side risks of falling house prices, as borrowers can end their debt obligation by walking
away from their properties. Such benefits do not apply to UK mortgage borrowers.
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where the long-run variables are in level with coefficients β and the short-run dy-
namics have α coefficients. The vector of short-run variables contains the same
explanatory variables as specified for the long-run equation. All the variables are
in real values using the consumption price deflator. The OECD provides the real
house price index between 1970 and 2018 for all member countries. The base year
is 2015, which is indexed at 100.
Oxford Economics (2016) explained how the rent-arbitrage model works in great
detail. The ucht−1 term is the real user cost of housing. The data is the sum of the
mortgage interest rate, adjusted for inflation and income tax, the depreciation rate,
and the marginal property tax rate. The demand and supply of housing services
are reflected by the changes in real rent (rentt). Hence the stock of housing is not
explicitly included in the model. The real user cost and the real rent data both
come from the Federal Reserve’s FRB/US model39.
Although part of the income effects are captured by the development of housing
rent, household income (yt) can directly affect housing prices as well. With higher
income, the household is expected to demand more housing service as well as higher
rate of owner occupation. In the regression, the income data are either real GDP
per capita or real household disposable income40.
cst represents the US credit condition. There are various measures/indices available
that measure the level of US mortgage lending standards. According to Li and
Goodman (2015), four measures are frequently used: the Senior Loan Officer Survey
(SLOS); the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) mortgage application denial
rate; the Mortgage Bankers Association’s (MBA) Credit Availability Index; and the
median borrower’s credit score. However, unfortunately none of the four measures
can adequately test the effects of credit conditions prior to the GFC using a model
with annual data. For example, the SLOS is unsuitable, because, although it has the
most extended time series which dates back to 1990, between 2007 and 2015 the index
was dis-aggregated into several mortgage categories. Without the relative weights, it
is difficult to meaningfully synchronise the post-crisis data with the previous levels.
In terms of the other three measures, they only became available from either the
late 1990s or the early 2000s so they provide insufficient data to support the analysis
of credit conditions prior to the crisis.
39It is a large-scale estimated general equilibrium model. See Brayton et al. (2014) for a brief
introduction to the model.
40Both series are from the OECD household accounts
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Given the drawbacks relating to the four measures identified by Li and Goodman
(2015) in terms of their ability to support the necessary analysis of pre and post-
crisis data, this chapter will use two alternative measures. One is the Chicago
Fed’s Adjusted National Financial Condition Index (ANFCI)41 and the other one
is the number of mortgages from the HMDA database. The former is a composite
index of 105 indicators that cover the entire financial market between 1971 and
2018. The credit sub-component measures the willingness to lend and borrow. It is
the weighted result of 35 indicators, which consists of the SLOS data, various yield
spreads, and money supply measures. Therefore, it reflects the credit standard of the
broader financial market not just the mortgage market. A zero value represents the
historical average level. A negative value signals that the credit standard is below
the historical average, while a positive value implies a higher-than-average credit
standard. The construct inevitably results in a I(0) time series. For it to satisfy the
I(1) requirement for the ECM estimation, a cumulative index is calculated so that
the tightening and loosening of the credit standard follows the trend of the time
series.
The number of newly issued mortgages for home purchases, as suggested by Gudgin
et al. (2015), is a more direct measure of the credit standard of the mortgage market.
The data records the number of mortgages originated for the purchase of one-to-
four-family owner-occupied properties. The mortgage volume data between 1994
and 2017 are readily available from the HMDA database and the Federal Reserve
Bulletin. The data can be extended further back to 1988 by applying the same
percentage of conventional mortgage financed sales of newly built houses to the
existing home sales data from the National Association of Realtors.
The mortgage liability model is given by (3.16),
∆mortlt = β0 + β1mortlt−1 + β2yt−1 + β3hpt−1 + β4cst−1
+ β5Rt−1 + βicontrolit−1 + αi∆srit + εmortlt (3.16)
where the dependent variable is the real household mortgage liability, which is the
nominal value adjusted by the consumption price deflator. The long-run relationship
at levels contains real income (yt), the real house price (hpt), the credit standard
41ANFCI further reduces the degree of correlation between the financial measures and other eco-
nomic activities in the NFCI.
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index (cst) and the measures of various nominal interest rates (R). Additional
explanatory variables, such as the working-age population and household financial
assets, are included as control variables. The change of these variables is also tested
for short-run dynamics.
The sign of β2 is difficult to predict. The literature review suggests that an increase
in real income can either result in a rise or a decline of household mortgage liability.
It depends on whether the larger share of additional income is used for leveraging
new debt or to pay off the outstanding mortgage liability.
β3, however, is expected to reflect the positive feedback cycle effect between house
prices and the outstanding mortgages described by Ryan-Collins et al. (2017). When
the growth of mortgage lending exceeds the growth of supply in the housing market,
then it is likely to produce demand-led inflation in house prices. At the same time,
if house prices increase as a result of higher demand arising from a demographic
shock42, then a more substantial amount of mortgages must be issued to reflect this
increase. When the rise in lending leads to higher profitability for banks, then it will
enable the banking system to issue mortgages to more home buyers. Therefore, the
two variables are endogenous to each other and will be simulated in a simultaneous
equation system in sec. 3.6. The household mortgage liability data at current prices
is sourced from the US Z.1 financial accounts.
The coefficient for the credit standard is expected to be negative. The credit stan-
dard sub-component of the ANFCI index reveals the lending standard in general.
Relaxed lending practices in the mortgage market can be reflected either by the LTV
ratio or the level of mortgage supply in the market. Hence the LTV ratio43 is added
as a control variable. A higher LTV ratio, which implies a lower down-payment
requirement, enables households to borrow at a higher amount for each newly is-
sued mortgage loan. The volume effect, on the other hand, is captured directly by
the data on the number of new mortgages. With a higher volume of newly issued
mortgages, the outstanding mortgage liability is likely to increase as well.
Apart from the leverage and volume effects, the cost of financing can also influence
households’ decisions on debt bearing. The nominal interest rate in the model
is either measured by long-term interest rates or the effective mortgage interest
42For example, baby boomers after World War II were likely to purchase their first home between
ages of 20 and 40.
43The data comes from the Monthly Interest Survey (MIRS) of the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (FHFA) and Duca et al. (2016)
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rate. The long-term interest rate is determined by the trading prices for 10-year US
government bonds in the financial market as reported by OECD, while the effective
mortgage rate comes from the FHFA, and is the sum of the contract interest rate
and the fees and charges amortised over 10 years.
3.4.3. Results
In Tab. 3.2, the rent-arbitrage model44 of house prices appears to provide highly
significant results in the baseline regression - (1). Given the mortgage interest rate45
is the predominant component of the real user cost, a negative coefficient between
the user cost and house prices is in line with what the theory predicts. As a measure
of the relative demand for housing services, the real rent is thus positively correlated
with house prices. This holds true for both the short-run and long-run dynamics.
Control variables are introduced in regression (2)-(5). They are real household in-
come and three credit condition measures: LTV ratio in regression (3), the total
outstanding of non-agency mortgage-backed securities46 in regression (4), and the
number of mortgages in (5). Real disposable income per capita and real compensa-
tion per household are included as the measure for real household income. Neither
is statistically significant.
Similarly, neither the average LTV nor the maximum LTV ratio for first-time buyers
suggested by Duca et al. (2016) suggested by shows statistical significance for the
period leading up to the crisis. The non-agency MBS, however, does indicate a
positive impact on house prices in the short-run dynamics, but the size of the effect is
relatively small. A 10 per cent increase in the outstanding amount is only associated
with 0.3 per cent increase in house prices. The trans-Atlantic capital flows (see
sec. 3.5) have strong preferences for these non-agency MBS compared to the surplus
countries.
Having the number of mortgages as the credit standard measures further improves
the adjusted R-square and the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic. A DW value of 1.64
shows there is capacity to introduce other explanatory variables into the model. By
44All variables are in logarithm. Therefore the coefficients are elasticity measures.
45The mortgage rate closely correlates to the long-term interest rate, therefore, the long-term
interest rate can impact house prices through the channel of the real user cost in the rent-
arbitrage model.
46These are private-label MBS without guarantees from Government-sponsored enterprises such
as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.
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including the number of mortgages, the real rent becomes statistically insignificant,
although its coefficient sign remains positive. This seems to suggest that the relative
demand for housing services is better represented by the tightening or loosening of
credit availability in the domestic banking system. For a 10 per cent increase in the
number of newly issued mortgages, house prices will increase by 1.8 per cent in the
short-run and 5.4 per cent47 in the long run.
Given the limited availability of mortgage volume data in the 1980s, the non-agency
MBS is chosen as the credit standard measure in regression (6). The equation also
explicitly spells out the factors that can potentially influence the supply (housing
stock48) and demand (real income and demography) of housing services so that the
real rent variable can then be replaced. On the supply side, that an increase in the
total housing stock variable exerts downward pressure on house prices seems logical,
and the negative relationships are statistically significant in both the short-run and
long-run. On the demand side, real income is represented by the real compensation
per household49 and demography is represented by the number of households50 as
suggested by Oxford Economics (2016). As expected, both demand measures are
not only positively correlated with house prices, but also significantly at a 1 per
cent level in the co-integration equation. The estimated coefficients for the credit
condition measures are consistent with the regression (4) with the growth of non-
agency MBS positively associated with house prices, but the size of the impact is
relatively trivial compared with the other independent variables.
The negative error correction coefficients across all the model specifications indicate
convergence to the long-run equilibrium over time. The speed of adjustment ranges
from -0.09 to as high as -0.3. The dummy variable is intended to account for
the structural shift in the macroeconomic environment after 2008. It captures the
impact of all the other macroeconomic variables that are not explicitly listed in
the regression, such as the low interest rate environment, more scrutiny on banking
regulation and shadow banking.
No statistically significant relationships were identified after replacing the real user
47The coefficients for the variables in levels need to be calculated by dividing the coefficient of the
error correction term. For example, in this case, β˜5(0.54) = β5(0.07)|β1(−0.13)|
48The data are from the US Census. Houses that are off the market are not included in the
regression.
49The coefficient sign and statistical significance remain when the per capita real disposable income
is used as an alternative.
50As a measure of housing demand, the number of households makes better sense than the general
population level.
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costs with the short-term and long-term interest rates, which implies that factors
such as expected inflation and the depreciation rate also played a role in affecting
house prices. This result is in line with the claims of Bernanke (2013) and Glaeser
et al. (2012). While Bernanke (2013) argued that the US policy rates had little
impact on rising house prices in the US before the crisis, Glaeser et al. (2012) found
neither robust nor substantial effects from the long-term interest rate51.
In Tab. 3.3, there are four regression models for the real value of the household
mortgage liability and each model is tested under two separate periods. 2007 is a
natural cut-off point as the US economy entered a full-blown financial crisis in 2008.
Regression (1) provides a baseline result for comparison. Although the variables of
interests mostly give the correct coefficient signs, the error correction term is not
significant for the pre-crisis period, which makes it difficult to confirm convergence
towards the long-run equilibrium. Three explanatory variables are included. The
real house price is highly substantial across all four model specifications. Hence it
reinforces the positive feedback effects between house prices and mortgage lending.
The real house price index is provided by the OECD52, with the 2015 price (100)
used as the base year. For the period between 1972 and 2017, a one unit rise in the
real house price index was estimated to increase the mortgage debt liability by more
than US$234 million in the long-run and more than US$522 million in the short-run.
51It only accounts for less than one-fifth of the rise in US house prices between 1996 and 2006.
52The average and median real house price in dollar terms is about 20 to 30 times the unit index
value.
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Table 3.3.: Mortgage liability model with domestic factors only
The ANFCI credit subindex was negatively correlated with house prices before 2008,
suggesting that a relaxation on credit access in the financial market, in general, leads
to a more substantial accumulation of household mortgage debt. The unit measure
is the standard deviation away from the historical average level. After including the
post-crisis period, the index remains significant for the long-run relationship, but
the significance level no longer exists once the structural shift dummy variable is
introduced into the equation (see regression (2)). As an index for general financial
market credit access, the ANFCI may not best reflect the development of the mort-
gage market, especially during the post-crisis period, when interest rates are low
but access to mortgage lending is limited either due to a lack of confidence among
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borrowers or the implicit deterrence by the banking sector.
The coefficients for the long-term interest rate, which is closely aligned to the ac-
tual mortgage rate, are primarily negative. However, most of the coefficients are
statistically insignificant. One possible explanation is that the ANFCI credit index
comprises various measures on bond spreads, so there might be an overlap with the
effects of the long-term interest rate. No statistical significance was found for the
long-term rate during the pre-crisis period.
The real income variable does not show any statistically significant or substantial
impact on mortgage liability. For this reason, it was excluded from the regression
(3) and (4). In regression (3), two alternative explanatory variables are added: the
mortgage repayment rate and the maximum LTV ratio for first-time buyers. The
mortgage repayment rate is calculated as the ratio between the mortgage service
payments and the previous period mortgage liability. Therefore, a higher mort-
gage repayment rate inevitably exerts downward pressure on the total outstanding
amount, as confirmed by the regression results in (3).
The LTV data for first-time buyers is from Duca et al. (2016)53. It is consistently
above the average LTV ratio in the US mortgage market. Using the quarterly
data and the rent-arbitrage framework, Duca et al. (2011) shows the maximum
LTV ratio for first-time buyers had a significant and positive impact on US house
prices before the crisis. However, such effects are not present in our house price
model using the annual data. The LTV data appears to be positively correlated
with mortgage lending instead, which will indirectly affect house prices through the
positive feedback loop. The dummy variable is for the year 2008 only, but it neither
adds much to the value of adjusted R-square nor makes any changes to the other
explanatory variables.
Regression (4) introduces two additional control variables: real household financial
wealth and the unemployment rate. They add limited explanatory power to the
equation. Interestingly, the significance of the ANFCI credit index is proven to be
time-variant. Since the 1980s, the credit access standard has been consistently below
its historical average, while at the same time the level of outstanding mortgages
gradually built up to its peak level in 2007. A tightening of the credit standard was
also observed between 2007 and 2012. There has been strong correlation between
53The data is only available for a period between 1979 and 2013. An annual average is calculated
using their quarterly LTV data. It thus satisfies our purpose to test its impacts on the US
mortgage liability before the financial crisis.
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the two measures since the early 1980s when the Reagan administration in the US,
and the Thatcher government in the UK, both initiated a process of rapid financial
liberalisation.
Figure 3.10.: Credit standard (left axis) versus mortgage outstanding (right axis),
1970 - 2018
3.5. The cause of the financial crisis: GSG or GFG?
3.5.1. Literature review
There are two differing hypotheses for the pre-crisis US mortgage backed securities
boom – the trans-Pacific GSG hypothesis and the trans-Atlantic GFG hypothesis
and the relative contribution of each phenomenon has been the subject of significant
debate.
According to Bernanke (2013), after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, many emerging
economies actively searched for safe global financial assets. The result led to the
mass purchase of US agency bonds, which contained a significant proportion of the
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Apart
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from the direct purchase of safe long-term US assets, the GSG story also emphasises
the role of falling interest rates and net capital inflows from abroad to explain
the housing boom. Borio and Disyatat (2011) and McCauley (2019) argued that
the rapid growth of two-way capital flows across the Atlantic was the key driver of
private-label MBS54. Therefore, under this hypothesis the gross inflows from Europe
should be seen as the primary suspect for the pre-crisis boom in MBS.
Historical studies of global imbalances55 tend to present mixed evidence on the
linkages between the current account position/net capital flows, as emphasised by
the GSG hypothesis, and financial crises. The situation witnessed in the US in the
19th century serves as an excellent example to counter the key claims of the GSG
story. Although Catão (2006) and Bordo et al. (2010) provide quantitative evidence
for the negative economic consequences associated with the sudden cessation of
capital inflows and external debt positions, it is still challenging to infer the impact
of the gross flows using historical data. According to Bordo (2005), the pattern
and the scale of gross flows and net flows among the developed economies were
very similar before 1914. The two-way flows only became dominant from the 1980s
onwards.
The empirical findings on the GSG and GFG hypotheses using data from the 1980s
are also ambiguous. Bracke and Fidora (2008) used a structural VAR approach
to underpin their investigation of this issue. They concluded that instead of the
saving preference shock, the liquidity glut created by the positive monetary policy
shock appears to be the more critical factor responsible for the worsening of the US
current account position and the decline of long-term yields in the 1980s and the
early 2000s.
Bertaut et al. (2012) noticed that the portfolio positions of international capital
inflows into the US before 2008 were quite different across countries. While the
GSG countries bought the majority of Treasury and agency bonds (trans-Pacific
flows), the GFG countries tended to favour corporate bonds (trans-Atlantic flows),
which consisted of most of the asset-backed securities (ABS) from the US private
sector (see Fig. 3.11). The capital inflows from the GSG countries alone are not
sufficient to explain the extent of the decline of the long-term rate and the bond
yield spreads.
54These are securitised mortgages that do not conform to the same criteria set by the Government
Sponsored Enterprises (GSE), such as the Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.
55See section 2.3.3 for a detailed discussion on the economic history literature.
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Figure 3.11.: Foreign holdings of the US long-term debt securities by countries
and regions
Source: Bertaut and Judson (2014), created by the author
Favilukis et al. (2012) also agreed that while the drastic increase of foreign holdings
of US Treasury and Agency bonds were responsible for the decline of the US long-
term interest rate which coincided with the housing boom, the same low-interest
rate environment also remained during the bust period. Having included both pe-
riods in their analysis, no significant empirical relationships between capital inflows
from the GSG countries and house prices were identified. Instead they have shown
that financial market liberalisation in the US made access to mortgage credit much
easier for American households and this led to the decline of the risk premium for
speculative housing investment.
Shin (2012) built a model to capture the role of international banks in financing
the housing boom in the US. In the model, the increasing amount of capital flows
intermediated through international banks repressed the risk premium of the ABS in
the market and resulted in a lending and housing boom. Due to the bilateral nature
of the trans-Atlantic capital flows between the US and Europe, the scale of the
gross flows was disguised by the bilateral current account position. Unlike the US,
the current account deficits in Spain and Ireland were more likely to be associated
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with the housing boom in the domestic market, given there were less netting effects
on banking flows. Kneer and Raabe (2019) studied how international capital flows
affected the UK economy through the banking system. The foreign capital inflows
into the UK led to more substantial credit growth to the corporate sector, mainly
the construction sector, and other non-bank financial institutions before the GFC.
No direct effects were identified for the UK household sector.
Justiniano et al. (2013) constructed a DSGE model to simulate both hypotheses.
The model suggests that the combined gross inflows from the GSG and GFG led
to a significant increase in house prices and household mortgage debt before the
crisis. However, the GSG flow appears to be the more influential channel. The
fall in spreads between borrowing and saving due to the rising intermediation by
international banks (GFG flows) encouraged more borrowing and consumption from
impatient agents but postponed the consumption of savers. The GSG flows, on the
other hand, resulted in lower interest rates, which stimulated demand from both
borrowers and lenders (savers).
Using the panel data analysis with 36 countries, robust relationships can be iden-
tified between the increase in real house prices and various indicators (Aizenman
and Jinjarak, 2014). The panel data shows one standard deviation shock to the
lagged current account to GDP ratio and the lagged domestic credit to GDP growth
would result in a 5 per cent and 3 per cent appreciation in real house prices respec-
tively. The same shock to the lagged value of house prices, as an indicator for the
expectation formation, would result in a 10 per cent increase. These results seem
to support the GSG and EM hypotheses. Punzi and Kauko (2015) used VAR anal-
ysis and discovered that foreign funding, in terms of both net and gross measures,
had a positive impact on housing prices as well as the stock of domestic mortgages.
Therefore, both the GSG and GFG stories are valid.
Yu et al. (2015) firstly adjusted periods of the data used by Bernanke (2010)56
in the regression and confirmed the negative relationship between the monetary
policy rate and house prices across OECD members countries was indeed statistically
significant. They then focused on analysing the relationships between the level of
foreign reserves in surplus countries and the policy rate and long-term rate in the
US. Although the foreign reserves accumulated in East Asia seem to have impacted
56By having the dependent variable lagged behind the explanatory variables by one quarter,
Bernanke was able to show a regression between the monetary rate and house prices with
a R-sqaure of only 4.6 per cent and statistically insignificant estimator for the policy rate.
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the long-term interest rate, no such statistical relationship was found with the policy
rate.
After controlling the US monetary policy rate, Arora et al. (2015) still found the
long-run negative relationship between excessive savings in the current account sur-
plus countries and the US long-term interest rate (represented by the 10-year bond
yield) using a VECM with quarterly data between 1982 and 2013.
Milcheva and Zhu (2016) found that the co-movement of house prices in developed
countries were strongly associated with the level of exposure to cross-border capital
flows. Capital inflows were channelled through international banks and contributed
to credit growth in the domestic market. However, countries with relatively less-
developed domestic mortgage markets, which are characterised by a high percentage
of fixed-rate mortgage contracts, low maximum LTV and housing equity withdrawal
(HEW), experienced much lower degrees of co-movement in the housing market.
For example, given that HEW is not possible in Germany, although German banks
are highly integrated with global capital markets, there was no housing boom in
Germany similar to those in the US and the UK.
Apart from international capital flows, the long-term interest rate could be affected
by other variables, which need to be included as control variables in the model.
Howe and Pigott (1991) listed three fundamental determinants of the real long-term
interest rate in the long-run from analysing US data from the mid-1970s to the
early 1990s. The first determinant is the rate of return to capital derived from the
production function. Higher productivity implies a higher rental price. The second
and third determinants are market risk and regulation. A higher level of market
risk or restrictions on lending (e.g. credit rationing policy) can raise the long-term
interest rate. Idier et al. (2007) extended the analytical time horizon to the onset
of the GFC. In the long-run equilibrium, the long-term rate follows the short-term
rate and the government deficit variable, measured by gross debt to GDP ratio. In
the short-run, the Purchasing Managers Index (PMI)57 is used to reflect the general
economic conditions of the US economy. Ciocyte et al. (2016) further extended the
time series and proposed adding the potential GDP growth rate and a demographic
variable into the analysis. The potential GDP growth rate serves as an indicator
for the return of alternative investment, but it could be negatively associated with
the risk premium. Therefore, the anticipated sign is ambiguous. The share of
57It is a composite index for the manufacturing sector, which is derived from the Institute for
Supply Management survey data.
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population aged between 20-39 was identified to be positively correlated with long-
term bond yields and statistically significant. It is consistent with the predictions of
the life-cycle theory, which suggests that the young working-age population is likely
to borrow more than older age groups. Given the dependent variable is the nominal
yields of the 10-year bonds, inflation measures were also included in the estimation.
3.5.2. Model and data
Gross capital flows
In order to examine the GSG and the GFG hypotheses, it is critical to have reliable
sources for statistics on gross capital inflows into the US by different countries. To
the best of our knowledge, there are three data sources which can provide such
information. The first is the financial account data in the US Balance of Payments
(BoP) statistics. The bilateral BoP data is available from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) under the US Department of Commerce. Both annual data and
quarterly (not seasonally adjusted) data are available for use from 2003 onwards.
Most of the countries and the economic regions of interest, namely, OPEC members,
China and Japan for the trans-Pacific flows and the UK and the Eurozone for the
trans-Atlantic flows, are well covered.
Avdjiev et al. (2018) highlighted that, in theory, gross flows should represent one-
way capital flows. In practice, however, such data are not readily available. Most
of the analyses on gross flows are actually net values of the US acquisition of liabili-
ties58 (gross inflows) and the acquisition of financial assets59 (gross outflows), while
the net capital flow is the difference of the two, which is reflected by the current
account statistics. The net US incurrence of liabilities is the difference between the
gross US acquisition of liabilities and repayments, while the net US acquisition of
financial assets is the difference between the gross acquisition of financial assets and
disinvestment. Therefore, ‘gross’ capital inflows and outflows can be either positive
or negative.
Given the financial crisis began in 2007 and the bilateral BoP data is only available
from the 1st quarter of 2003, it is difficult to generate any meaningful inferences for
58For example, securities that are issued by US residents and owned by non-residents will be
recorded as a positive figure under the subcategory of portfolio investment liabilities.
59Similar to the net inccurence of liability, acquiring new inssuance of securities from non-US
residents and owned by US residents, will then be counted as a positive figure under the
subcategory of portfolio investment assets.
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the causes of the 2007 - 2009 financial crisis, even with quarterly data. Based on
the BoP data and various other data sources, Avdjiev et al. (2018) constructed a
gross capital inflow database that provides quarterly data between 1996 and 2014
for 85 countries. However, their data is not yet published for public use. Although
the panel data format is useful for analysing the impact of gross capital flows, the
US data remains the focus of this chapter.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has two databases that track interna-
tional banking flows: the locational banking statistics (LBS) and the consolidated
banking statistics (CBS). Both databases provide outstanding liabilities and claims
positions of the counterparty banking sector against other reporting banks across
the globe.
The LBS records international banking transactions based on the residence of counter-
party and reporting banking offices, which is consistent with the BoP statistics and
captures around 95 per cent of all cross-border banking activity. For example, when
a US bank (the counter-party bank) lends to a borrower with a UK bank account,
this adds to the outstanding claim position of the US banking system against the
UK. Similarly, if a Chinese bank lends to US residents, it counts as the liability
of US banks against Chinese banks. It should be noted that transactions among
different offices in the world of the same banking group are not consolidated in the
LBS database. It is the primary data source for cross-border bank credits that is
widely used by GFG literature such as Avdjiev et al. (2016), Borio and Disyatat
(2011), and Shin (2012).
Given the importance of banks’ head-offices in decision making, focusing on the
nationality of a banking group, instead of the location, can be useful in understand-
ing the origin of financial instability. The CBS database consolidates intra-group
transaction flows based on the residence of the banking group headquarters. The
CBS statistics only report the claims and liabilities positions of the banks and their
off-shore affiliates against borrowers or lenders that reside outside the bank’s home-
country economic territory. The intragroup transactions, regardless of the location
of the offices, are excluded. For example, because HSBC is headquartered in London,
the transaction flows between the head-office and its US subsidiaries are included
in the cross-border transactions in the LBS, but consolidated in the CBS under UK
banks. Therefore, the CBS data is more useful when analysing the international
exposure of banks. The foreign claims of a particular bank could be cross-border
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credits or local credits through its overseas branch (BIS, 2015).
The CBS statistics are reported under two different categories: the immediate coun-
terparty approach and the ultimate risk approach. The difference can be best il-
lustrated using an example. Assuming that there is a loan issued by an American
bank to a Chinese multinational company, but the loan is actually guaranteed by a
UK bank, in circumstances where the Chinese firm defaults on this debt obligation,
the UK bank is liable to the American bank. Under the immediate counterparty
approach, the loan adds to the US claims on China, while under the ultimate risk
approach the US claims are placed on the UK instead.
There are no CBS statistics for China or OPEC members, which are crucial actors
in the GSG hypothesis. Given this, use of the LBS data for our purposes seems
more appropriate. LBS offers quarterly Chinese banking data going back to 1978.
Although it should be noted that information for OPEC countries such as Saudi
Arabia is only available until 2012.
The third data source for international capital flows is the US Treasury International
Capital (TIC) System. Compared with the other two sources, the TIC database of-
fers by far the most detailed picture of the US international portfolio investment data
between the US and other countries. The data are available in annual, quarterly,
or monthly formats. The TIC keeps tracks of the gross foreign (US) purchases of
US (foreign) securities, derivatives, cross-border positions for banks, other financial
institutions and non-financial institutions. The TIC serves as one of the primary
sources for the international transaction statistics published by BEA.
The total securities can be grouped into two types: long-term securities (including
equity and debt) and short-term securities (debt only). Both long-term and short-
term debt securities can be further divided into treasury debt, government agency
debt, and corporate debt. The long-term securities are recorded in greater detail un-
der the “US Transactions with Foreigners in Long-Term Securities” database (FLTS
henceforth), which provides monthly data on gross foreign purchases and sales of the
US domestic and international long-term securities by country from January 1977.
The net transactions of each type of security (i.e., gross purchases less gross sales
of US securities by foreigners) are usually used for analytical purposes. The short-
term securities are recorded by US banking data60. Inflows into the US by country
60The data include the cross-border positions of deposits, loans, and repo agreements reported by
banks and other financial institutions.
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and type, such as Treasury bills and negotiable certificates of deposits (CDs), are
recorded under the liabilities to foreign-residents section (Bertaut et al., 2009).
Cross-border positions of non-financial institutions are collected quarterly by coun-
try on the TIC C forms. These forms distinguish between ‘financial’ claims and
liabilities (such as deposits, short-term securities and loans) and ‘commercial’ claims
and liabilities (such as accounts receivable or payable arising from import or export
activities).
Furthermore, TIC offers comprehensive annual survey data on the cross-border po-
sitions of portfolio holdings of US securities from 2002 onwards. Before 2002, the
surveys were conducted six times, in 1974, 1978, 1984, 1989, 1994 and 2000. Because
the annual survey data are collected at the individual security level, the surveys pro-
vide important additional information on cross-border securities holdings, including
greater detail on the types of securities held, their maturity structure and the face
and market values of the individual securities (Cova and Natoli, 2019).
The capital flow data in our analysis mainly comes from the estimated TIC annual
survey data provided by Bertaut and Judson at the Federal Reserve. They have
estimated the monthly foreign residents’ portfolio holdings of US securities by types
and by countries/regions between 1985 and 2016. These data are still regularly
updated by Bertaut et al. (2019). Majority of the capital flows in and out of the US
are recorded under the portfolio investment61. To the best of our knowledge, the
TIC annual survey is the most comprehensive and consistent source that is publicly
available at the time of writing.
Long-term interest rate
The ECM model for long-term interest is given by (3.17),
∆Rlt = β0 + β1Rlt−1 + β2Rst−1 + β3ln(Bit−1)
+ βicontrolit−1 + αi∆srit + εR
l
t (3.17)
where B represents foreign holdings of bonds and i = {agency, corporate, treasury}
indicates the type of bonds. For example, Btreasury represents the foreign holdings
of the US Treasury bonds. Both the short-term interest rate (Rs) and the long-term
61The bank loans are under the other investment, which are better captured by BIS data.
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interest rate (Rl) are in nominal values. Although the long-term rate of interest is
widely regarded as a critical determinant for business investment, the continuous
decline of the long-term rate since the 1980s cannot explain the boom and bust
episodes seen in the US. The short-term rate refers to the money market rate. It is
the market traded rate for the 91-day Treasury bills. The short-term rate is strongly
influenced by the Federal Reserve and it is treated as an exogenous policy variable
in the model. This assumption is also in line with the PK theory of interest rates
(see Chapter 2 for more details).
The primary focus is β3, which represents the impact of the total foreign holding of
US bonds on the long-term interest rate. Given the trade surplus, surplus countries
and European countries are distinct in terms of portfolio investment. The trade
surplus countries became significant holders of Treasury bonds and agency bonds,
whereas European countries focused on holding corporate bonds and stocks. The
selection of control variables is based on the literature review.
3.5.3. Results
In Tab. 3.4, three measures of international capital flows are included into the house
price regressions (1), (4) and (5) presented in Tab. 3.2 in order to identify any po-
tential direct impacts.
The first measure is the current account to GDP ratio62, which is a net capital flow
measure. It is also the focal point of the GSG hypothesis. It is negatively associated
with the real house price across all three regressions and presents statistical signifi-
cance in three different periods: 1971-2006 (1_1), 1986-2006 (4_1)63, and 1971-2018
(1_1). However, the size of impact is almost negligible. For example, between 1971
and 2006, 10 per cent decrease in the current account to GDP ratio results in a 0.8
per cent increase in house prices. It should be noted that the current account to
GDP ratio in the US is a negative figure for most of the periods. Therefore, a 10 per
cent decrease implies that the current account deficit widens and net capital inflows
increases. This relationship fails to show robustness in regression (4_1) and (5_1)
when measures on credit conditions are included.
62This is not in log form due to the presence of current account deficits (negative values).
63The starting date is chosen based on the availability of the portfolio holding data. It is useful
to compare the impact on different capital flows by holding the period constant.
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Foreign holding of agency bonds and corporate bonds are chosen as measures of
portfolio flows into the US. Given that the trans-Atlantic and the trans-Pacific flows
have very distinct patterns, the foreign holding of agency bonds mainly reflects the
capital inflows from countries like China and Korea while the holding of corpo-
rate bonds largely represents capital inflows from Europe. Both variables are stock
variables. Hence a positive coefficient for log form data implies that a percentage
increase in the stock-holding of US bonds (i.e., an inflow of foreign capital) has
a positive impact on house prices. Compared with the net flow measures, neither
variables show the expected signs nor are they statistically significant in all of the re-
gressions. Therefore, based on the portfolio positions, no direct impact from foreign
capital inflows on house prices are identified.
Similarly, Tab. 3.5 adds three types of foreign bond holdings64 to the regression
(3) and (4) in Tab. 3.3. Coefficients for the holdings of all three types of bonds
are ambiguous and are not statistically significant in either short-run or long-run
relationships. In regression (3_1-3_3), the LTV ratio for first-time buyers seems to
have interactions with these capital flow measures and becomes insignificant.
The estimated results for the long-term interest rates are given by Tab. 3.6. Regres-
sions (1) to (5) focus on domestic factors only. Foreign holdings of three different
bonds enter into the equation in regressions (6) to (9).
The short-term interest rate is positively associated with the long-run interest rate
across all specifications. The short-term interest rate can be treated as an exogenous
policy variable determined mainly by the Federal Reserve. The estimated results
indicate that a 100 basis points (bps) increase in the short-term rate will lead to a
rise, between 19 and 39 bps, in the long-term interest rate.
Like the rent-arbitrage model of house prices, the user cost of capital will be close
to the real return of capital so that it has a significant positive correlation with
the long-term interest rate in the short-run dynamics. The PMI, as an indicator of
overall economic conditions, also shows the expected positive relationship with the
long-term interest rate. However, its marginal impact is relatively small, ranging
from 4 to 6 bps. There is no sound evidence for government debt and deficit variables
to have significant effects over the long-term rate.
64Agency bonds contain large amounts of the MBS issued by Government-Sponsored Enterprises,
such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Corporate bonds include the private-label MBS. US
Treasury bonds are predominantly government bonds that have a maturity over a year.
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The ANFCI credit index is used to capture the dynamics of credit conditions over
time. The positive coefficients imply that a tightening of credit conditions will see
an increase in the long-term rate. This measure only loses its statistical significance
when the foreign holdings of agency bonds (7) and corporate bonds (8) are added
into the equation. Given that a good share of corporate bonds are private labelled
MBS, they have a close relationship with the credit index.
The foreign holding of the US bonds provides support to both the GSG and the
GFG hypotheses. Using regression (6) as an example, a 10 per cent increase in the
foreign holding reduces the long-term rate by 8.3 bps. In regression (9), the same
size increase in the foreign holding of corporate bonds can result in a fall of 13.7 bps.
However, the holding of corporate bonds only shows significance in the short-run
dynamics. The data proves that both inflows from Asia and Europe contributed to
the downward trend in the US long-term interest rate. Thus it can be concluded
that international capital flows into the US have an indirect effect on house prices,
mortgage lending and household consumption.
To sum up, the statistical significance of the domestic determinants in the housing
price model and mortgage liability model remain robust after controlling the capital
inflow measures. These portfolio inflows do not appear to have direct impacts on the
housing price and mortgage liabilities in the US. However, both trans-Atlantic and
trans-Pacific capital inflows appear to exert downward pressures on the US long-
term interest rate. The trans-Pacific capital flows, mainly ended up in purchasing
the US Treasury bonds, are found to have long-term effects as suggested by the GSG
hypothesis. The negative effects of the trans-Atlantic capital inflows on the US long-
term interest rate are estimated to be twice as large as the effects of the trans-Pacific
capital inflows, but they are short-lived, which seems to be more consistent with the
GFG story.
128
3.5 The cause of the financial crisis: GSG or GFG?
Ta
bl
e
3.
4.
:H
ou
se
pr
ic
e
m
od
el
w
ith
in
te
rn
at
io
na
lc
ap
ita
lfl
ow
s
129
Chapter 3 The Global Financial Crisis - an empirical analysis
Table
3.5.:M
ortgage
liability
m
odelw
ith
internationalcapitalflow
s
130
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Table 3.6.: Long-term interest rate model with international capital flow
3.6. A partial equilibrium model - USMOD
Based on the empirical observations, a partial equilibrium model, USMOD, is formu-
lated to simulate different scenarios for the US economy by shocking both exogenous
variables such as the capital inflows and monetary policy rate. A simplified model
structure65 is given by Fig. 3.12. The dynamics of the four variables of interest,
namely the real household consumption, real house prices, the long-term interest
65Double-headed arrows indicate two-way interactions. The variables that have no arrows pointing
to them are exogenous variables in the model, which are subject to shocks for scenario analysis.
For example, the short-term interest rate (SR) is an exogenous variable by design, as it only
links to long-term interest rate (LR), but no other variables in USMOD would cause the SR to
change.
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rate and mortgage liabilities, are endogenous to each other. The two-way interac-
tions cause difficulty in measuring their relative importance in terms of economic
impacts. The partial equilibrium model is thus useful in capturing both direct and
indirect effects from these variables.
Figure 3.12.: Model structure of USMOD
Source: created by the author
In the model, there are four core equations, which correspond to the four variables
that have been discussed extensively in previous sections:
1. Household consumption - Equation 2_2 from Tab. 3.1 is chosen without
any modifications. Two additional equations are added for household con-
sumption. The first is for HEW, equation (3.20), to establish the linkage with
mortgage liabilities and the second is for household disposable income to reflect
the circular flows between consumption and income.
2. House price - Equation 4 in Tab. 3.2 is modified by including mortgage liabil-
ities as an explanatory variable to reflect the reinforcing effects between house
price and mortgage lending as described by Ryan-Collins et al. (2017). The
credit condition variable is replaced by the ANFCI credit index, which is also
important to the dynamics of long-term interest rate and mortgage liabilities.
It is estimated using data between 1970 and 2017.
3. Mortgage liabilities - Equation 4 from Tab. 3.3 is included to model the
dynamics estimated using data between 1980 and 2017. Given the mortgage
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repayment rate is one of the explanatory variables in the mortgage liabilities
equation. An equation for the mortgage repayment (3.19) is added to capture
the two-way interaction.
4. Long-term interest rate - Equation 2 from Tab. 3.6 is modified by adding
both foreign holdings of the Treasury bonds and corporate bonds. The es-
timation shows that the foreign holdings of Treasury bonds appear to have
long-run effects and the holdings of corporate bonds only have short-run ef-
fects. Also, the long-term rate is now linked to the real user cost of housing
in (3.18), which provides one more indirect channel66 for the capital flows to
influence house price.
The following paragraphs provide more information on the newly added equations
in the baseline model. They are estimated using simple regressions, but have very
high explanatory power in general during the sample periods. Their role is not to
establish causation, but to provide vital linkages among the four core variables in
the model.
The USMOD features the main findings in the empirical analysis. International
capital flows, neither the trans-Pacific nor the trans-Atlantic flows, had a significant
direct impact on US house price and the accumulation of mortgage liabilities. How-
ever, the findings did show there is an indirect channel. In particular, both sources
of capital inflows, in the form of foreign holdings of US securities, exerted downward
pressure on the US long-term interest rate (Rl). The US data suggest that there is
a strong co-movement between Rl and mortgage rate Rmort during the period under
consideration in this study (see Fig. 3.13) and the mark-up between the two rates
also remains reasonably stable.
For simplicity, we replace Rmort with Rl, in (3.18) of the real user cost of housing,
uch to establish the endogenous relationship between international capital flows and
house prices. It is a simplified version of the US/FRB equation without explicitly
spelling out the marginal federal income tax rate67. The uch is thus the sum of
the depreciation rate (Rdelta), the real long-term interest rate, and the marginal
property tax rate (TRprop). The real long-term interest rate is represented by two
66The other channel comes from the reinforcing effect from the mortgage liabilities. The mortgage
liabilities are influenced by repayment rate and that is indirectly determined by long-term
interest rate.
67It is implicitly captured by the coefficients of the long-term interest rate and the marginal
property tax rate.
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Figure 3.13.: US mortgage rate and long-term interest rate, 1970 - 2018
Source: OECD
components: the nominal rate Rl and expected consumer price inflation, piex.
uch = 1.74 Rdelta +0.79 Rl −1.11 piex +0.69 TRprop
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(3.18)
Using data between 1970 and 2017, the estimated equation has an adjusted R-square
of 95.2 per cent and all four coefficients are highly significant, base on the p-values
in the brackets68.
As expected, by holding the other explanatory variables unchanged, a decline of 100
bps in the long-term interest rate would result in a drop of 79 bps in the real user
cost of housing. It, in turn, increases the demand for housing as investment.
The US mortgage liability, MORTL, model finds no direct linkages with either
the US long-term interest rate or international capital flows. However, mortgage
liabilities can be influenced by both factors through the circular causation with house
68The resulted p-values appear to be even less than 0.0000, hence they are limited to two decimals
only. The same principle applies to the other reported p-values.
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prices and the repayment rate. Before the GFC, the housing boom not only required
a higher average mortgage amount but also increased the demand for mortgages to
meet the rising investment demand for housing.
At the same time, the persistent decline in the long-term interest rate also lowered
the mortgage repayment rate, which further accelerated the accumulation of mort-
gage liabilities. The mortgage repayment rate in the mortgage liability model is
the ratio between mortgage debt service payment and the total mortgage liability.
The debt service payment is estimated using the US long-term interest rate, a proxy
of the mortgage rate, and the previous level of household mortgage liability. The
log-linearised equation (3.19) offers a good representation of the mortgage payment
data.
ln(MORT payment) = 0.16 ln(Rl) +0.82 ln(MORTL−1)
(0.00) (0.00)
(3.19)
Using data between 1980 and 2017, the estimated equation has an adjusted R-square
of 98.8 per cent and both coefficients are significant at 1 per cent level, base on the
p-values in the brackets.
Both house prices and household mortgages strongly influence HEW, which in turn
has a significant impact on household consumption and GDP. As mentioned in
sec. 3.3, the HEW proxy is derived using the method proposed by Belsky (2004).
It is the difference between the changes in total mortgage liability and the newly
added housing wealth valued at the current level of average house prices,
HEW = 4MORTL− (hsales ×HP average) (3.20)
where hsales is the house sales and HP average is the nominal average house price,
which is linked to the real house price through the consumer price deflator in the
model.
In (3.21), the household real disposable income69 is also endogenous to real house-
hold consumption, the previous level of financial assets, and real weekly earnings.
69A trend variable and a dummy variable for the year 2012 are also included to provide a better
fit with the data.
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It enables the model to capture the feedback effect on household income due to
consumption-led GDP growth.
ydhh = 0.55 chh +2.86 fahh−1 +64.17 wagewk
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
(3.21)
Using data between 1979 and 2017, the estimated equation has an adjusted R-square
of 99.9 per cent and all coefficients are significant at 1 per cent level, based on the
p-value in the brackets. It should be noted that ydhh will also be influenced by other
expenditures based on the national accounting identity70.
After solving the baseline model, four exogenous variables that are critical in verify-
ing the claims of the three hypotheses discussed extensively in the previous chapter
are selected to provide further quantitative evidence for our analysis. The four ex-
ogenous variables are the foreign holding of US Treasury bonds, the foreign holding
of US corporate bonds, credit condition index and short-term interest rate.
We first conduct an external shock of US$100 billion on the foreign holding of US
Treasury bonds and corporate bonds, respectively between 2003 and 2016. The
simulation enables us to explore the transmission mechanisms of the trans-Atlantic
capital inflows and trans-Pacific capital inflows within the US economy.
In Fig. 3.15, the charts in blue are the simulations for a US$100 billion lower foreign
holding (mainly by GSG countries) of US Treasury bonds compared with the baseline
model, while the charts in red are the results for a US$100 billion fall in the foreign
holding (mainly GFG countries) of corporate bonds. The resulting patterns are
quite distinctive between the GSG scenario and GFG scenario.
In the GSG scenario (in blue), capital inflows come through the holding of Treasury
bonds. By holding less Treasury bonds, the long-term interest rate increases above
the baseline level throughout the simulation periods. As discussed, the rise in the
long-term interest rate has an indirect impact on house prices and mortgage liabil-
ities. Relative to the baseline, house prices are lowered due to the increase in the
real user cost of housing. Mortgage liabilities also decline as a result of the higher
repayment rate required to service the debt. Both house prices and mortgage liabili-
ties are the two crucial factors that determine HEW, which in turn exerts downward
70This exogenous linkage is represented by OTH_EXPEND in Fig. 3.12.
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pressure on real household consumption.
The GFG scenario (in red) focuses on corporate bonds. The fall in the holding
of corporate bonds has a more substantial immediate impact on the US long-term
interest rate, but the effect is short-lived. The long-term interest rate quickly returns
to the baseline level. While the house price recovers relatively quickly after the
initial decline, it remains below the baseline level even in 2016. Comparing to the
GSG scenario, the decline in household consumption is relatively mild, but shows
little sign of recovery over the medium term. The response of mortgage liabilities
seems more sluggish due to the simultaneous effects with the repayment rate. The
dynamics of the repayment rate closely follow the long-term interest rate, as the
relative position between 2007 and 2013 has been relatively stable, the mortgage
liability stays below the baseline level for an extensive period.
Figure 3.14.: Foreign holding of the US Treasury bonds and Corporate bonds,
1985-2016, US$ millions
Source: Federal Reserve and Bertaut and Judson (2014), created by the author
Combining the simulation results and the empirical data observed in Fig. 3.14, we
find that the foreign holding of corporate bonds was consistently higher than Trea-
sury bonds and it increased particularly quickly before the GFC. Between 2007 and
2008, there was a reduction of over US$400 billion in the holding of US corporate
bonds, which would have a similar but much more substantial impact as shown by
the GFG scenario. The result is evident in the household real consumption data.
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The holding of US Treasury bonds works in the opposite direction. As the GSG
countries continued to purchase more US Treasury bonds, even during the crisis
period, the capital inflows actually mitigated the negative impacts from the collapse
in the holdings of corporate bonds.
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Figure 3.15.: US$100 billion less treasury bonds (in blue) and corporate bonds (in
red) versus baseline
However, both the GFG and GSG countries were responsible for the persistent fall
in long-term bond yields, which facilitated the credit and housing boom observed in
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the US during the pre-crisis period.
In Fig. 3.16, we engineered a supply-side shock on mortgage lending which adds
0.05 to the accumulated ANFCI credit index71 between 2003 and 2016. It implies
that the credit conditions are relatively tighter by an average of 4 per cent during
the simulation period comparing to the baseline scenario. Fig. 3.12 shows that the
index can impact house prices and mortgage liabilities through two channels: a
direct impact and a secondary impact through Rl.
In the model, the credit index is negatively correlated with house prices in the short-
term dynamics and is negatively correlated with mortgage liabilities in the long-run
cointegration relationship. Therefore, a tightening in mortgage lending (e.g. lower
LTV ratio or less issuance of new loans) will unambiguously result in a fall in house
prices and mortgage liabilities.
Figure 3.16.: Credit shock, tightening standards on mortgage loan, 2003-2016
Given that a higher long-term interest rate usually indicates tighter credit condi-
71A positive/negative value in the original ANFCI credit index indicates a tighter/looser than his-
torical average condition in terms of credit access. It is measured as weighted sample standard
deviations. Its average value between 2000 and 2007 was -0.13. After the transformation, the
variations around the historical mean (0) are accumulated, the signs of the index are no longer
indicative regarding the dynamics of credit condition. Therefore, a downward/upward trend
in the index indicates a relaxation/tightening of credit standard comparing with the previous
period.
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tions, there is a positive correlation between the two in the long-run relationship.
This is why the real house price constantly remains below the baseline level, after the
initial fall. Together with the direct impact on house prices and mortgage liabilities,
a lower level of household consumption is observed.
As a result, according to Fig. 3.10, a continuous relaxation of credit standards since
the 1980s in the US also contributed significantly to the formation of the housing
and credit bubbles before the GFC. Consequently, following a sharp tightening of
credit standards during the crisis, the US entered an economic recession. The credit
index reached its turning point again in 2012, consistent with the boom in other
forms of debt such as student loans and auto loans (Haughwout et al., 2019).
The final simulation concerns the role of US monetary policy in the financial crisis.
As an exogenous policy variable, we assume the Federal Reserve raised the short-
term interest rate by 100 bps through open market operation (OMO) from 2003 (see
Fig. 3.17) so that it returned to the early 2000 level before the crisis. This is in line
with Taylor’s (2018) proposal - the Fed failed to follow Taylor rule and raised the
policy rate too little, too late.
Figure 3.17.: Monetary policy shock, 100 basis points, 2003-2016
As the benchmark for all other interest rates in the market, an increase in short-
term interest rates would lead to a rise in the long-term interest rate. As presented
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in Fig. 3.18, the long-term interest rate would have been 40 bps higher than the
baseline scenario. During the simulation period, the real house price and mortgage
liabilities, compared with the baseline, decline by around 8 per cent and 12 per
cent respectively. These together contributed to a 0.8 per cent deviation from the
baseline level of real household consumption.
Figure 3.18.: Monetary policy shock, 100 basis points, 2003-2016
3.7. Conclusion
In the previous chapter, we conducted an extensive literature review on three influ-
ential hypotheses regarding the underlying causes of the GFC. These are the GSG,
GFG and EM hypotheses. Like all scientific research, a hypothesis can only become
a theory when there is sufficient accumulation of empirical evidence to support the
key claims of the hypothesis. This essay has sought further evidence for the three
hypotheses by investigating the most up-to-date US data, given the importance of
the US economy in all three stories.
It has been over a decade since the onset of the GFC. As the theoretical debate
continues, the empirical literature also presents mixed results on the validity of each
hypothesis. This chapter contributes to this strand of the literature by investigating
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four critical yet interconnected empirical questions after mapping out the logic links
from all three hypotheses.
The first question relates to the role of credit access and house prices in determining
US domestic consumption. Our ECM consumption model confirms that mortgage
lending and housing wealth are indeed positively correlated with US household con-
sumption, but the statistical significance of these relationships do not appear to be
robust when time periods are used. However, the interaction effects between mort-
gage lending and housing wealth, captured by housing equity withdrawal, is highly
significant and positively correlated to household consumption both in the pre-crisis
and post-crisis periods.
The second question focuses on identifying the domestic determinants of the boom
and bust cycles in the US housing and credit markets. For the housing market, the
rent-arbitrage model appears to be consistent with the empirical findings. Various
measures of credit conditions are used, but only short-term effects are identified. In
terms of the mortgage liability model, the data suggests the real house price has
a strong positive correlation with mortgage liabilities in both the long-run and the
short-run. Credit condition measures have also played a role in the mortgage credit
boom, but only in relation to long-run effects. The data confirm the reinforcing
cycle between mortgage lending and house prices and the observed effects from
credit measures do seem to support the EM hypothesis.
The third question is at the core of the GSG and GFG debate. It is about the
relative importance of trans-Pacific capital flows and trans-Atlantic capital flows
in causing the GFC. To answer this question, we investigated the data on foreign
holdings of US long-term securities in the housing and mortgage liability models
and found no direct linkages between foreign capital inflows and the US credit and
housing boom before the crisis. Other major structural shifts in the macroeconomic
environment after 2008 (e.g., unconventional monetary policy such as QE) appear
to be important in explaining the movements of house prices during the post-crisis
period. The statistical significance of the credit standard measures is robust even
after controlling for international capital flows.
The fourth question is a direct extension of the third, as there might be an indi-
rect channel for international capital flows to influence the US domestic economy
through the long-term interest rate. Because the long-term interest rate is implicitly
correlated with the real user cost, credit conditions and the repayment rate, it has
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proved to be crucial in explaining the housing and credit boom. The housing and
credit boom are in turn responsible for the consumption boom in the US before the
GFC. From the data analysis, we find both the foreign purchase of Treasury bonds
and corporate bonds indeed exert downward pressure on the long-term interest rate.
While the former has long-term effects, only short-term effects are observed for the
latter. Therefore evidence for both GSG and GFG hypotheses is identified.
Due to the two-way interactions among the four variables of interest, a partial
equilibrium model - USMOD is built to take account of both direct and indirect
effects from these variables. The results are very revealing. Although both trans-
Pacific and trans-Atlantic capital flows played a role in lowering the US long-term
interest rate, during the GFC it was the foreign purchase of the corporate bonds
that fell and which had a negative impact on the US housing and credit markets
and ultimately household consumption. The foreign holding of US Treasury bonds
continued even after the GFC, which acted as a stabiliser for the economy. Should
its trend have followed corporate bonds, the economic recession could have been
worse.
The simulation results further suggest that both domestic credit standards and loose
monetary policy were responsible for the GFC. In the next Chapter, a large scale
empirical model for the UK, a country that was also severely hit by the GFC, will be
constructed to further study the effects of domestic credit creation in the banking
sector.
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model for the financial crisis
4.1. Introduction
The GFC has acted as a wake-up call for many economists and has stimulated vig-
orous debate about how we should model the economy. The previous two chapters
have discussed the theoretical and the empirical validity of the endogenous money
theory in explaining the GFC. The banking sector is much more than just a sub-
missive financial intermediary that simply channels resources efficiently from savers
to borrowers, as it is often characterised in textbooks. Instead, it has a life-cycle
of its own. Banks do not need to attract deposits from savers to lend. Money can
be created in the economy through lending and destroyed through repayments from
borrowers. For example, when a mortgage is issued to purchase a house, an equal
amount of bank deposits will be credited to the borrower’s bank account automat-
ically, and the deposits are subsequently destroyed once the mortgage is repaid in
full. The feedback cycle between house (asset) prices and mortgage lending is ev-
ident not only in theory but also in the empirical chapter. As shown by Minsky’s
FIH, the boom-bust cycle of asset prices and credit reinforce one another and this
feature is inherently endogenous to the modern capitalist economy.
A failure of mainstream macroeconomic models to recognise the importance of this
characteristic of the modern capitalist economy was one of the essential contributory
factors of the GFC. Given this failure, certain key questions arise. In particular,
will there be a paradigm shift in macroeconomics, similar to the ones after the
Great Depression (GD) in the 1930s and the Great Inflation (GI) in the 1970s?
Furthermore, should the discipline of macroeconomics embrace pluralism? In an
attempt to make a contribution to these important debates, this essay firstly provides
a brief review of mainstream macroeconomic models before the crisis and then looks
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to the possible future of macroeconomic models.
The Stock-Flow Consistent model (SFCM) has attracted a considerable amount of
interest from both academic researchers and policymakers since the onset of the
financial crisis in 2008. SFCM is a type of accounting-based macroeconomic model
that emphasises the integration of all the flows (e.g., GDP) and the stocks (e.g.,
wealth) within an economy. A typical SFCM has two major components: an ac-
counting framework and a set of behavioural assumptions. The accounting frame-
work describes all economic activities in three matrices: (1) a stock matrix records
the physical and financial wealth of an economy at a given period, (2) a flow matrix
depicts all the economic transactions within a period, and (3) a revaluation matrix
details the net capital gains from assets. The integration of these three matrices
can capture all the economic dynamics of any country at a given period. The be-
havioural assumptions, based on established economic theories, provide economic
meanings among variables that are not explicitly revealed by accounting relation-
ships.
Several features of the SFC approach make it suitable as a tool to analyse the fi-
nancial crisis. Firstly, the comprehensive accounting framework ensures everything
comes from somewhere and goes somewhere. Hence there are no black holes in the
system. Bezemer (2011) saw the 2008 financial crisis as a natural experiment in test-
ing the validity of economic models and found that accounting models offered more
promising forecasting results than their mainstream counterparts. Secondly, the SFC
modelling approach provides an integrated approach to analyse the real and finan-
cial sides of the economy. For example, credit creation, banking behaviours, saving
and financing decisions and capital gains, which were mostly ignored by mainstream
models, can all be included in the analytical framework. Hence, accounting-based
models are well-equipped for issues, such as the financial crisis, which come about as
a result of a large number of complex and interrelated factors arising from different
sides of the economy. As described in the previous chapter, the accounting-based
methods helped Godley (1999) and Godley and Zezza (2006) successfully predict
both the financial crisis in the early 2000s and the GFC. While the debate about
how to fix mainstream macroeconomic models is on-going, Godley and Lavoie (2012;
2007) have suggested one practical way forward.
This essay comprises three crucial building blocks. The first is the methodology sec-
tion, which reviews the development of the SFCM approach and the methodological
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debates on the future of macroeconomic models ignited by the financial crisis in
2008. The second focuses on Chapter 11 of Godley and Lavoie (2012) as a start-
ing point to demonstrate how a single economy with a financial sector works in a
theoretical SFC model. The third then focuses on an empirical SFCM and how it
can be applied to a particular economy, in this case, the UK. As another economy
severely affected by the GFC, a credit creation scenario is simulated in the UK to
better understand the interactions between the financial sector and the economy at
the macro-level before the crisis.
4.2. Literature review
4.2.1. The development of macroeconomic models: before and
after the GFC
Over the past hundred years, the development of macroeconomics has experienced
two paradigm shifts. Each was accompanied by, or was a direct consequence of, an
extreme economic event, such as the GFC. The first was the Great Depression (GD),
which led to the birth of Keynesian macroeconomics. Before the GD, the dominant
approach of economic modelling was the partial equilibrium analysis following the
Marshallian tradition. Even Keynes himself, a student of Marshall at Cambridge,
was trained using this tradition. Under the Marshallian framework, unemployment
only occurs when wages persist above the clearing level due to the presence of some
factor (e.g., trade unions) that is externally imposed on the market operation. As a
result, removing the obstacles that prevent wage reduction seems to be the apparent
solution for unemployment. A similar partial equilibrium analysis can be applied to
saving and investment with interest rates acting as the ‘price’ in the capital market.
An interest rate that is higher than the market-clearing level will cause an excess
of savings over investment. Under such an analytical framework, it is impossible to
establish linkages among investment, output and the mass unemployment observed
in developed countries during the GD.
The GD stimulated intellectual debates in the 1930s. Keynes (1936) focussed on
seeking an explanation and a solution for one of the worst economic recessions in
modern history. Keynes’s General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money
(General Theory hereafter), as a response to the GD, was widely accepted by up-
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and-coming economists across the Atlantic (Temin and Vines, 2014). The General
Theory challenged the partial equilibrium analysis by providing an alternative an-
alytical framework. Keynes was the first to link unemployment in the GD, under
the principle of effective demand, to the failure in the production market. To do so,
one must abandon the partial equilibrium approach. Some workers become jobless
because of the shortage in job supply created by the Paradox of Thrift1, not the
oversupply of labour at higher than market-clearing wages. Such unemployment is
now known as involuntary unemployment as opposed to voluntary unemployment.
Following Keynes’s analysis, policies to fix mass unemployment should focus on how
to raise the equilibrium level of employment through demand management rather
than removing obstacles that prevent employment returning to its equilibrium level
(Skidelsky, 2010). The golden period of Keynesian economics, when it reached its
height of influence, occured between the 1940s and 1960s.
For theoretical models, the IS-LM framework, advanced by Hicks (1937) and Hansen
(1953), provided a simplified structure to convey the essential messages of Keynes
in a closed economy setting. It has made Keynes’s work more accessible to students
(Temin and Vines, 2014). Based on this framework, Mundell (1963) and Fleming
(1962) developed the Mundell-Fleming model2, which became the workhorse model
in the open economy. On the empirical side, macroeconometric models that are
grounded in Keynesian economics, such as the Wharton Econometric Forecasting
model3 (see Evans and Klein (1967)), also gained popularity in both academia and
policy institutions.
The Great Inflation (GI) of the 1970s followed by stagflation in many advanced
economies was another turning point in the development of macroeconomics. It oc-
curred against a backdrop of Keynesian economics coming under sustained criticism
from Chicago School economists such as Lucas and Sargent (1979). They argued
that econometric policy evaluation procedures failed to recognise that optimal deci-
sion rules of economic agents vary systematically with changes in policy. Therefore,
the parameters in the model are dynamic, not static. Relationships in the past can-
not be used to make inferences concerning the future. This is known as the Lucas
critique.
1An attempt to increase saving at the micro-level could result in a fall in aggregate saving at the
macro-level, due to the decline of aggregate household consumption and income.
2It is also known as the IS-LM-BP model.
3The Klein-Goldberger model developed by Goldberger and Klein (1955) for the US economy was
the first generation of such a model.
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Moreover, Sims (1980) focused on the identification methods used by the large-scale
structural econometric models (SEM) and the severe endogeneity problems they suf-
fer from, suggested Vector Autoregression (VAR) analysis as a way forward. As all
aggregated models, both theoretical and empirical, inevitably suffer from the Lu-
cas critique, it led to the decline of using large-scale structural econometric models
(SEM) at the aggregate level in academia and to the rise of micro-founded macroeco-
nomic models4 such as the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models,
which place greater emphasis on internal consistency. Wren-Lewis (2018) coined the
term New Classical Counter-Revolution (NCCR) to describe the second paradigm
shift in macroeconomics. According to Gali and Gertler (2007), the NCCR took
place because the widely used macroeconomic models such as the Wharton model
were unable to predict structural breaks such as the GI in the 1970s.
However, unlike the first paradigm shift after the GD, when Keynesianism provided
a coherent explanation and solution for the problems revealed by the crisis, the
NCCR did not offer a sound alternative explanation and solution for stagflation.
The first-generation DSGE model - the Real Business Cycle (RBC) model placed
considerable emphasis on internal consistencies, that is, all aggregated behaviours
in the model are derived from inter-temporal optimising micro-behaviours based on
the rational expectations hypothesis. It considered neither inflation nor monetary
factors. The external consistency5 of such models is thus considerably compromised
(Christiano et al., 2018). In fact, the predictive ability of the traditional SEMs
can be significantly improved by augmenting expectations into the Philips curve
(Wren-Lewis, 2018). Despite the dominance of micro-founded models in academia,
aggregated models remain widely used in professional and policy institutions (in-
cluding central banks and international organisations such as the IMF), due to their
better performance in terms of external consistency and forecasting.
The second-generation DSGEmodels, namely the New-Keynesian DSGE (NK-DSGE),
were designed to improve the frictionless RBC models by incorporating more Keyne-
sian elements, such as sticky wages, into their analysis. Arestis (2019) summarised
the main features of such models using six equations. Given the assumption of ra-
tional expectations, the inter-temporal optimising behaviour of the representative
agent and firm results in the aggregate demand function for the output gap and the
4Representative agents have rational expectations and optimise decisions based on intertemporal
budget constraints. The influence from both schools diminished as funding was directed towards
micro-founded macroeconomic models in the 1980s. (Wren-Lewis, 2018)
5That is the ability to match dynamics of real data.
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Philips curve respectively. The current level of the output gap is jointly determined
by the past and the expectation of future values of the output gap. The real interest
rate and the real exchange rate can also influence it. The Philips curve describes
the dynamics of the current price level. It is determined by the output gap, both
its past and expected future levels, expected world prices and changes in the nomi-
nal exchange rate. The NK model normally introduces short-term rigidity through
Calvo pricing6.
It is then followed by a Taylor rule type equation for the monetary policy rate.
It is derived from minimising the loss function of the Central Bank. The nominal
monetary rate is determined by the real equilibrium interest rate7. The real ex-
change rate, the current account position, and the nominal exchange rate govern
the dynamics of the external sector. The real exchange rate and current account are
endogenous to each other. The other drivers for the real exchange rate are the con-
ventional interest differentials between the domestic and the world economy and the
expected value of the future real exchange rate, while the current account position
is influenced by the domestic and world output gap. The nominal exchange rate is
a log-linearised equation which contains the real exchange rate and differentials of
price levels between the domestic and world economy.
There is no active role for the banking sector and money in the model. Instead, the
banking sector is seen merely as a financial intermediary that efficiently allocates
resources between savers and borrowers. The transversality condition8 ensures that
an inter-temporal optimising agent will always honour his/her debts in full by im-
posing a non-negative condition for wealth or the present discounted value of wealth
at infinity. Therefore, the agent is not subject to any liquidity constraints. Unlike
the monetary policy rate, which can influence real activities through market expec-
tations of the future policy rate and the yield curve, the movements of money supply
are only responsive to money demand at the desired interest rate. The supply of
money thus only serves as a unit of account (Gali and Gertler, 2007).
After the GFC, the DSGE models without an active banking sector came under se-
6Calvo pricing relies on monopolistic competitive firms at the micro-level. These firms only
re-optimise their prices after a fixed period of time.
7See Section 2.4.3 for a detailed discussion.
8According to Kamihigashi (2008), the transversality condition is a necessary condition to single
out the optimal path in a optimal control problem by providing a constraint to the end point.
It is also known as the non-Ponzi-game condition. Apart from the ever increasing debt level,
it is also used to rule out optimal paths, such as an asset bubble.
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rious criticism like the SEM did in the 1970s. Vines and Wills (2018) thus initiated
a project of rebuilding macroeconomics at Oxford which sparked further discussions
on the future of macroeconomic models. Wren-Lewis (2016; 2018) argued that the
NCCR went too far in pursuing theoretical purity at the cost of external consistency.
Given this, SEM, as a hybrid approach between DSGE and VAR, could be seen to
offer a reasonable compromise for policy analysis. Pilkington (2013) demonstrated
that the widely used representative agent macroeconomic models inevitably suffer
from the fallacy of composition9. In Wren-Lewis’s view, the GFC will not result in
another paradigm shift such as occurred with the GD and GI, as the DSGE models
are flexible enough to develop along with other changes such as incorporating the fi-
nancial sector and heterogeneous agents. Wieland et al. (2016) offered a comprehen-
sive review of the development of macro-financial models after the GFC. According
to the review, Diamond and Dybvig (1983)10 and Bernanke et al. (1999)11 became
the basis for mainstream macroeconomists to incorporate financial frictions into the
model, but this line of research remains in its infancy. Hendry and Muellbauer
(2018) further pointed out that the reliance on Euler equations heavily constrains
the dynamics of consumption behaviour in the DSGE models. Other common as-
sumptions in these models, such as representative agents, perfect information, zero
transactions costs and efficient markets, leave no essential roles for money, asset
prices and credit cycles.
Blanchard (2018), however, suggests a greater tolerance for pluralism in macroeco-
nomic modelling. He advocates a suite of five kinds of models for different purposes
(see Fig. 4.1). For example, he asserts overlapping generation (OLG) models can
serve as a foundational model that satisfies theoretical purity; DSGE models are
useful for understanding macroeconomic implications as a response to market dis-
tortions; and SEM, which Blanchard refers to as the policy model, is suited to
simulating the dynamic effects under different policy scenarios.
9It says that the behavioural relationships that held true at the micro-level might not necessarily
hold true at the macro-level.
10Using game theory, the model offers two equilibria in the banking sector: a good equilibrium
during normal times and a bank run equilibrium during crisis.
11They emphasised the financial accelerator effects generated by the presence of costly state veri-
fication in dealing with the contracts with borrower - enterprises.
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Figure 4.1.: Theoretical and empirical coherence frontier for mainstream macroe-
conomic models
Source: Passarella (2019)
There are two extreme cases: toy models and forecasting models. The IS-LM model
is one example of a toy model. These models could serve as a pedagogical device
to answer specific theoretical questions. The forecasting models, on the other hand,
are solely responsible for producing the best possible economic forecasts regardless
of whether there is a theoretical foundation or not. A useful lesson of the GFC is
that economists and policymakers should not expect a model to produce reliable
answers for questions that are beyond the purposes they were originally designed
for.
4.2.2. The development of SFC models
While mainstream macroeconomic modellers have shifted their focus to adding fi-
nancial frictions, heterogeneous agents and other more realistic assumptions into the
DSGE models after the GFC, the SFC modelling approach has also drawn increasing
attention in recent years. This section provides a brief account of the development of
the SFC modelling approach  a la Godley and Lavoie (2007) to demonstrate why it is
the preferred method for analysis of financial crises. Caverzasi and Godin (2013) and
152
4.2 Literature review
Nikiforos and Zezza (2017) offer comprehensive surveys on the recent development
of SFCMs.
The roots of SFC models can be traced back to the work of Morris Copeland, the
father of the flow of funds, in 1949. At that time, Copeland (1949) intended to study
the interaction between the money flows (sources/uses of funds) and fluctuations in
aggregate expenditures on national product. His analysis was the first attempt to
bring both the real and financial sides of the economy together under a single ana-
lytical framework. It then took the efforts of two leading scholars, James Tobin (the
Yale school) and Wynne Godley and his co-authors (the New Cambridge School), to
develop it into its current form. Tobin (1982) in his Nobel Prize lecture listed five
features that differentiate his work from the standard IS-LM Keynesian framework:
1. Precision regarding time
2. Tracking of stocks
3. Several assets and rates of return
4. Modelling of financial and monetary policy operations
5. Walras’s law and adding up constraint
All five features are compatible with the modern SFC models presented in Godley
and Lavoie (2007). Features (1) and (2) echo the very core of the SFC approach.
As for every specific point of time, there is a set of stock values in the economy that
are listed in a sectoral matrix, known as the stock matrix. With the help of the
transaction flow matrix (changes in payments/receipts and net acquisition of new
assets/liabilities) and the revaluation matrix (changes in values), a new stock matrix
at the end of the period is generated12. In a standard IS/LM model, the bill rate is
the only rate of return and money is the single financial asset within an economy.
Feature (3) emphasises the importance of modelling a sophisticated financial system
in the modern economy. Tobinesque portfolio allocation, based on the different
rates of return, has become one of the most widely used behavioural equations
in theoretical SFC models. Feature (4) was mainly missing from the mainstream
models (e.g. DSGE) before the financial crisis, as the financial sector was treated in
such models as an intermediary with little role in money creation. The endogenous
money creation view13 is fully integrated into the SFC models. A simple money
12See Section 4.3 for more detail.
13See Section 2.4 for a detailed explanation.
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circuit can be described as follows. Money is firstly created by the banking sector to
finance production and subsequently destroyed after full repayment together with
interest. Feature (5) is consistent with the accounting consistency requirements
advocated by SFC modellers14. For example, the horizontal consistency in the stock
matrix implies that the financial assets held by one sector must be matched by the
same amount of financial liabilities of another sector.
Although both the Yale School and the New Cambridge School agree on the above
modelling features, the two schools still hold different views concerning the be-
havioural assumptions behind the accounting identities. The former embraces neo-
classical assumptions (e.g. general equilibrium) like the New Keynesian school, while
the latter mainly follow the premises found in Post-Keynesian economic theories15.
This section does not intend to provide an exhaustive review of the differences be-
tween the two schools but instead only highlights a few key differences.
Apart from Tobin, Taylor (2008) pointed out that Godley’s SFC approach is closely
related to other Cambridge economists. Its accounting framework is an extension
of the Social Account Matrix (SAM) developed by Richard Stone, and the causal
assumptions can be traced back to Keynes and Kaldor. Nikiforos and Zezza (2017)
presented a way to reconcile the SFC transaction flow matrix with the SAM. After
some modification of the SAM, the two matrices essentially cover the same infor-
mation. In fact, according to Shipman (2019), Stone’s Grow Project was running
in parallel when Godley was the director of Cambridge Economic Policy Group
(CEPG) until the early 1980s. The advantage of the SAM is that it is readily com-
patible with the Input-Output (IO) tables16 and the national accounts conventions
adopted by most countries across the world. This means data are much easier to
collect. Recently there have been some attempts to bridge the IO analysis with the
SFC framework, especially for ecological models that have a focus on energy analysis
(e.g. Berg et al. (2015)).
14Zezza and Zezza (2019) listed five consistency conditions that are required by all SFC models.
15See Lavoie (2014) for a discussion on the major differences between mainstream and Post-
Keynesian theories.
16Most of the IO Tables published today are known as the Supply and Use Tables (SUTs), which
are derived from the work of two Nobel Prize laureates in economics: Wassily Leontief and Sir
Richard Stone. SUTs reveal a detailed structure of the inter-industry linkages that exist within
a region. It is the starting point for a complete social accounting matrix (SAM). In order to
use the IO table for analytical uses, it needs to be transformed into analytical tables.
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Table 4.1.: The advantages and disadvantages of SFCM
Pros Cons
Typically use national accounting
constraints to provide a framework
The model equations are not explicitly
linked to the optimisation problems of
particular agents
Allow modelling of gross flow and
balance sheet positions by sector
The framework is not yet
well-established, which makes it
harder to take on board insights from
other work
Can be used to model feedback from
financial asset and liability positions
to the paths for production and
spending
The complicated system makes it hard
to explain the primary economic
mechanisms at work
Can include an important role for
money, credits, and financial system
The data requirements are large
relative to standard DSGE models
Can offer a framework for exploring
different specifications for agents
expectations
Model parameters suffer from the
Lucas critique: they can be affected by
changes in policy regime or time series
properties of the driving processes
Arguably SFC models have more
realistic behavioural assumptions than
many micro-founded models
The models are not explicitly linked to
economic theories
Source: Burgess et al. (2016)
Burgess et al. (2016) listed the pros and cons of using SFCMs compared to standard
DSGE models17 (see Tab. 4.1). Of these, the ability to model gross capital flows (in-
stead of net flows) and national balance sheet positions under different assumptions
are essential in understanding the GFC. Although the analysis of international gross
capital flows is not yet well-established, the SFC approach provides a solid analyti-
cal framework to go forward. Also, unlike their mainstream counterparts18, SFCMs
allow for an important and realistic role for money, credit and banks, which are fully
integrated with the real side of the economy. Besides, SFC models, despite not be-
ing micro-founded and suffering from Lucas critique, can nonetheless impose more
realistic specifications for expectations and are more realistic than typical DSGE
17The BoE’s COMPASS model is chosen as a representative for the standard DSGE model.
18Financial sector is mainly added as frictions into the economic systems.
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models in terms of the behaviour, and heterogeneity of agents.
Hence we believe that the SFC approach should be taken more seriously in macroe-
conomics or at least should become one of the models in the suite of analytical tools
for macroeconomic analysis proposed by Blanchard (2018). As Fig. 4.2 reveals, in
terms of their theoretical-empirical coherence, the SFC models can lie on both ends
of the frontier for different research purposes. Both theoretical and empirical SFC
models will be discussed in the methodology section. While the former is useful for
examining theoretical hypotheses and arguments, the latter works better for medium
to long-term forecasting.
Figure 4.2.: Theoretical and empirical coherence frontier for heterodox macroeco-
nomic models
Source: Passarella (2019)
Given the complexity of the economic system in reality, all models suffer from the
Lucas critique at some level. After all, the SFC accounting system and the micro-
foundations are not mutually exclusive. A group of SFC modellers, such as Caverzasi
and Godin (2015), suggest combining the SFC framework with agent-based mod-
elling (ABM) at the micro-level to counter the Lucas critique. However, like almost
all economic models, the ABM-SFC approach also has to face the trade-off be-
tween realism and feasibility. This thesis does not intend to adopt the agent-based
approach because doing so would add another layer of complexity to the already
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complex financial transactions within the economy and would not necessarily pro-
vide more revealing results than the SFCMs modelled at the aggregate level. Also,
given this approach is still in its infancy, it seems unlikely to be readily applicable
to empirical modelling at this stage.
4.3. Methodology
The SFC framework is best described by Godley and Lavoie (2012). Within their
book, Chapter 11 presents a growth model (GL11) for a single closed economy.
It has a fairly developed financial sector, but it is still insufficient for our mod-
elling purposes. This section firstly summarises both the accounting framework and
behavioural assumptions of this model and then discusses recent developments in
building empirical SFC models. The SFC model described in this section is a simpli-
fied, theoretical framework of an economy. Hence it does not reflect all the essential
empirical features that have been discussed in previous chapters. For instance, the
housing stock is still missing. It is intended as a prototype to demonstrate the use-
fulness of SFC approach in analysing financial flows within an economy and why
the empirical SFC modelling approach is our preferred methodology for this study
on the GFC.
4.3.1. SFC matrices
Like all SFC models, the economy is first described using a set of accounting matri-
ces – the stock matrix, the flow matrix, and the revaluation matrix. These matrices
provide a watertight accounting framework that sets boundary conditions for all eco-
nomic relationships within the closed economy. There are five sectors: households,
firms, the government, the central bank, and banks.
The stock matrix records all assets (with “+” sign) and liabilities (with “−” sign)
within the economy. Each row within the stock matrix shows the interconnected
asset/liability relationships across different sectors. Assets of one sector are liabilities
of another, apart from inventories and fixed capital. Hence most rows add up to zero.
For example, loans taken from banks are liabilities to households (−Lh) and firms
(−Lf ), but at the same time they are assets to the banks (+L). Within each sector
(column), the difference between assets and liabilities gives the net worth of the
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sector, which is regarded as a balancing item at the bottom row to ensure the sum
of each column is also zero. For instance, households diversify their asset holdings
among different assets: cash money from the central bank (+Hh) and other banks
(+M), Treasury bills (+Bh), government bonds (+BLPbl), and equities (+ePe).
Bank capital (+OFb) are the funds of privately owned banks, which belong to the
private owners of the banks, and therefore are categorised as household wealth.
Households are assumed to only be liable to banks through bank loans.
The net worth of households (Vh) is thus equal to the sum of all assets and liabilities.
The same principle applies to all the other sectors. The net worth of all five sectors
must be, by accounting identity, equal to the stock of inventories and fixed capital
within the economy.
Table 4.2.: Stock Matrix
Source: Godley and Lavoie (2012)
The flow matrix captures the net transactions across all sectors in the economy
within a particular period. Different to the stock matrix, a capital account column
is created to record the capital transactions of firms, the central bank and banks.
The flow matrix consists of three major blocks.
The first block coincides with GDP accounting using the income and expenditure
methods. Resource inflows are given “+” signs, while resource outflows are assigned
“−” signs. The composition of GDP is best illustrated using the current account
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column under the firm sector. Consumption expenditures from households (−C),
government expenditures (−G), firms investment expenditures (−I) and changes in
inventories (−∆IN) are all recorded as resource inflows under the current account.
Combining all inflows, we have the GDP of the current period. In the same way
as the familiar circular flow model, such resource inflows are again used to pay
wages to employees (−WB), profits to entrepreneurs (−Ff ) and for inventory finance
(−rl−1IN−1).
The second block describes interest payments across sectors. Banks earn inter-
est from lending to households (−rl−1Lh−1) and from their holdings of government
bonds (−rb−1B−1). At the same time, banks must also honour interest payments to
depositors. The double entry system ensures that each row adds up to zero.
The third block is formally known as the flow of funds matrix. It outlines how sav-
ings/dissavings within each sector are distributed/financed. The government sector
is used as an example. Government expenditures (−G) and its interest payments on
bills (−rb−1B−1) and bonds (−BL−1) are partially financed by tax revenues (+T )
and the internal transfers from the central bank (+Fcb). The rest of the deficits are
funded through the new issuance of Treasury bills (+∆B) and government bonds
(+∆BLPbl).
The revaluation matrix complements the flow matrix by adding capital gains into the
picture. For firms, price movements will impact two of the major assets – equities
and fixed capital. Unlike the other assets, fixed capital has no liability counter-
parts. Therefore, the capital gains from fixed capital will add to the accumulation
of national wealth.
Combining the initial stock matrix with the results from both the flow matrix and the
revaluation matrix, a new stock matrix will be generated, which sets the foundation
for a dynamic economic system. Having constructed the accounting framework,
behavioural assumptions must be assigned to establish the baseline model. The
model will be solved either numerically or theoretically. The following subsections
briefly describe the critical behavioural assumptions for each sector.
4.3.2. Households
The nominal incomes of households (YP) come from all income inflows (e.g., wages,
dividends and interest earnings etc.) in the flow matrix. Households are liable to pay
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Table 4.3.: Transaction flow Matrix
Source: Godley and Lavoie (2012)
income tax (T = θY P ) and interest on their borrowing from banks (rl−1Lhd−1). The
net outcome of the two gives the disposable income (Y Dr = Y P − T − rl−1Lhd−1).
The level of real household consumption (c) depends on the expected real regular
disposable income (yder), real net lending (nl) and the net worth from the previ-
ous period (v−1). ydr−1is assumed to be dependent on the real regular disposable
income of the current period (ydr) and of the previous period, which grew by the
productivity growth trend rate (ydr−1 · (1 + grpr)). ydr not only reflects the real
disposable income (Y Dr/p), but also takes the capital losses, due to inflation, into
account.
The gross amount of new loans to households is assumed to be proportional to
nominal incomes. The proportion (η) is negatively related to the real lending rate
and a borrowing limit (η0) is assigned to reflect banking policy. Principal repayments
are a fraction (δrep) of the previous level of the outstanding stock of loans (Lhd−1).
The financial burden of households is given by the debt (including both principal
and interest payments) to income ratio. Netting out the principal repayments from
the gross amount of loans to households gives the net amount of new household
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Table 4.4.: Revaluation Matrix
Source: Godley and Lavoie (2012)
loans.
Households accumulate wealth using four main financial assets - money deposits
(Md), Treasury bills (Bhd), government bonds (pblBLd), and equities (peed). The
sum of these four assets in the stock matrix gives the current market value of the
financial assets (Vfma) held by households. The money deposit is treated as residual
in the model to bridge the gaps between expected incomes and realised incomes,
given the demand for all the other assets are always realised.

Md
Bhd
pblBLd
peed
 =

λ10
λ20
λ30
λ40
Vfma−1+

λ11 λ12 λ13 λ14
λ21 λ22 λ23 λ24
λ31 λ32 λ33 λ34
λ41 λ42 λ43 λ44


rm
rb
rbl
rK
Vfma−1+

λ15
λ25
λ35
λ45
Y P
(4.1)
The above matrix demonstrates how the wealth of households is invested in these
four financial assets under a Tobinesque allocation system19. The assumption on
the expected investible wealth is simplified to the previous level of financial assets.
The relative holding of financial assets is affected by the corresponding returns for
each asset and current period income flows.
19The coefficient matrix has to satisfy both vertical and horizontal adding up conditions. See Lavoie
(2014) for a detailed discussion of this issue. The portfolio allocation behavioural equations are
greatly simplified in the UKSIMM.
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4.3.3. Firms
Firms’ real output decisions differ from the typical macroeconomic models by in-
troducing the concept of inventories into the equation. Therefore, the choice of real
output depends on firms’ expectations of real sales (se) and changes in inventories
(ine). The expectation functions are given below,
se = βs+ (1− β)s−1(1 + grpr); ine = in−1 + γ(inT − in−1)
The expected real output level is assumed to be a weighted average of current
and previous sales. Productivity growth is added to the latter to reflect the long-
term growth rate. The expected level of inventory coverage towards the long-run
inventory target level (inT ) at a speed γ. inT is assumed to be proportional to se.
The inventories are valued at their cost of production.
The capital formation grows at a rate, grk, which is positively correlated to the rate
of utilisation of capacity (u) and negatively related to the real lending rate (rrl).
u is proxied by the real output produced from one unit of capital (y/k−1). Real
investment is a flow concept. It gives the change in capital stock levels, which takes
both growth and depreciation into account.
For simplicity, the model assumes a single price for sales, investment, and capital
stocks. The price adds a mark-up to the unit costs. The mark-up is considered
to be regularly adjusted to meet the ideal mark-up, which is given by the targeted
profits per unit of expected historical costs (F T/HCe). F T must be sufficient to
cover dividends, interest payments, and the target retained earnings. HCe is the
weighted average of expected sales measured by the actual unit costs at both the
current and previous period.
The target real wage rate responds to labour productivity, and the bargaining pres-
sure exerted from the demand side. The relationship, also known as the Philips
curve, can be further adjusted to match empirical observations. In the model, a
flat segment is introduced to reflect evidence from UK data that prior to 1975 the
inflation rate did not respond to changes in employment levels within a specific
range.
The last set of behavioural equations focus on the capital accounts of the firm sector.
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Under the third column of the flow matrix, the accounting identity gives the demand
for loans,
∆Lfd = I + ∆IN − FUf −∆espe −NPL
Investment, by assumption, is entirely financed by retained earnings and equities.
Hence the demand for loans is wholly driven by the variation in inventories. De-
faulted loans (NPL) are treated as financial transfers to firms from the banking
sector. It assumes that a fixed share of loans will end up as non-performing loans.
4.3.4. Government and central bank
Government behaviour is relatively simple. It collects tax revenues from households.
The growth rate of public expenditures and the income tax ratio can be exogenously
set by the government based on its fiscal policies. The government is liable to pay
interest on its previous period debt stock. Therefore, the government deficit is given
by the difference between public expenditures (including interest payments) and tax
revenues. The gap is financed through the issuance of Treasury bills and bonds.
The Central Bank (CB) is a semi-independent public entity, in the model, that is
separate from the central government. The money supply from the CB is driven
by demand from other sectors (e.g. households and firms). Also, the Bank’s asset
position (Treasury bills) must always match its liability position (money supply)
on the balance sheet. Therefore, the stock of the Treasury bills under the Central
Bank must be equal to its money supplies at all time. The Bank’s profits are the
interest earnings from the Bank’s holding of Treasury bills. Given its status as a
public entity, such profits are transferred back to the government sector as a stream
of revenue. The interest rates of the Treasury bills and bonds are exogenously
determined. The long-term interest rate adds a mark-up to the interest rate on
bills, while the short-term rate is a policy variable.
4.3.5. Banks
This focus on consumption/production financing, debt, and portfolio behaviours
requires a detailed examination of the financial system. Banks and their balance
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sheets have to be fully integrated into the production process, and interest flows have
to be explicitly taken into account. The SFC framework offers a comprehensive
approach to fully integrate the financial system into the real economy, which is
essential to understanding the mechanism of the credit cycle.
In this model, the supply of money deposits and loans are mainly demand-driven.
In other words, banks will always meet the demand of credit-worthy borrowers from
different sectors within the economy to ensure the market is in equilibrium. A
percentage of banks’ money deposits must be held as high-powered money at the
central bank to meet the reserve requirement set externally by regulators.
Liquidity is measured by the ratio between banks’ holdings of bills and money de-
posits. Although banks have no direct control over the holding of bills, they can
indirectly influence the holdings through the spread between the deposit interest
rate and the interest rate of the bills. A higher interest rate for deposits relative to
the bill rate will reduce the holdings of bills.
The lending rate is assumed to add a mark-up over the deposit rate. The mark-up
is set to meet banks’ target level of profits (own funds) aiming to absorb the fluc-
tuations in default loans and to achieve the capital adequacy ratios set by domes-
tic/international regulators. In other words, banks must hold a minimum amount of
their own funds as a proportion of their assets that are associated with risks. In this
model, the capital adequacy ratio is given by the banks’ own funds as a percentage
of corporate and personal loans. Because other assets (e.g. the bills and cash) are
assumed to carry little or almost zero risk.
4.3.6. Empirical SFC models
Applying the SFC approach to the empirical data of a particular country was the
initial intention of Wynne Godley in the 1970s (Zezza, 2019). Godley often referred
to Coutts et al. (1985) as the first comprehensive attempt at constructing a consis-
tent accounting framework. This work also saw a stock matrix presented for the first
time. However, the complete theoretical framework, as described in previous subsec-
tions, only became available following the publication of Godley and Lavoie (2007).
Section 3.1 has briefly illustrated how the sectoral financial balances approach, an
early version of the empirical SFC analysis, was useful in shaping Godley’s analysis
and prediction concerning the sustainability of the US economy. After the GFC, a
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growing interest in developing an empirical SFC has developed not only in academia
but also in policy institutions such as the BoE (See Burgess et al. (2016)). Zezza
and Zezza (2019) and Nikiforos and Zezza (2017) provide a comprehensive list of
countries that have already developed empirical SFC models at various scales.
Despite the rapid development, this strand of the SFC literature remains relatively
under-researched. Much of the SFC literature focuses on building GL11 type simula-
tion models to examine theoretical arguments and explore medium-term dynamics
under different scenarios. Although there are no ‘black holes’ in the accounting
structures, explicit explanation concerning how the initial values are determined in
these models are mostly absent. These values are of great importance in generating
the desired model simulations. For example, the GL11 model consists of more than
100 variables, but the initial values are highly hypothetical and unitless with min-
imal explanation given concerning how they are derived20. As a first attempt, as
part of this thesis, a semi-empirical SFC model was constructed to introduce some
realism into the baseline model.
The accounting structure of GL11 has been kept, but the behavioural equations
have been significantly simplified21 to stabilise the simulation. All initial values
have been replaced by UK national accounts 2013 data, measured in billions, which
is the reference year used by the national accounts, so that it gives the price level of
1 initially. The setting of a closed economy, along with many other simplifications
in the accounting matrices, imposes restrictions on the degree of freedom and some
data must be estimated and reconciled using mixed methods. After a lengthy process
of trial and error, the model can indeed be stabilised after 15 years (annual model).
Hence simulated results from the sixteenth year are chosen as the starting year in
order to remove the initial fluctuations using UK data. However, after 15 years of
simulation, the initial values again deviate considerably from reality. The purpose
of bringing realism into the model is thus lost using this method22.
The unsatisfactory results from the semi-SFC models led us instead to develop a fully
estimated empirical model from scratch, similar to the initial intention of Wynne
20We thank Professor Gennaro Zezza, who kindly provided guidance on this issue while I visited
the Levy Institute in the summer of 2018. From our informal conversations, I learned that
these initial values were generated through a long process of trial and error through the model
simulations.
21For example, the Tobineseque portfolio allocation is replaced by fixed share allocations.
22This issue deserves more attention. Having been through a minor detour during this PhD
research journey I hope my experience can guide future SFC researchers to travel a smoother
path.
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Godley. In fact, according to Godley and Lavoie (2007),
“Our accounting will always be solid and comprehensive – and this by
itself will carry us a considerable distance, particularly when it comes
to characterising the interactions between the real and financial parts of
the more elaborate models. But we leave every functional relationship
in a primitive state yelling to be more thoroughly explored.”
At the same time, the presence of new research papers that pursue similar lines
of inquiry, such as Zezza and Zezza (2019) and Passarella (2019), have provided
additional assurance for the change in the direction of the methodology.
The aim of building a realistic empirical SFC model is to better understand and
investigate the interactions between the financial sector, especially the credit cycle,
and the overall economy in a more realistic setting. There are three key reasons
that the UK has been chosen as the focal country of analysis. Firstly, as one of the
principal global financial centres and one of the economies most severely affected
by the financial crisis, the financial system of the UK shares a lot of similarities to
its US counterpart. Furthermore, as noted previously, both countries experienced
rapid financial liberalisation during the Thatcher and Reagan administrations in the
1980s.
Secondly, the UK is one of the most active financial trading partners with the US,
as shown in Fig. 3.11. According to Avdjiev et al. (2016), the gross capital (round
trip) flows between the UK and US before the GFC far exceeded the capital inflows
from emerging economies such as China. Consequently, it was European banks,
not Chinese banks, that bore the majority of losses from the subprime mortgage
crisis. Therefore, modelling the UK economy, should generate valuable evidence
from another country’s perspective to supplement empirical analysis of the US.
Finally, the availability of UK data is another major advantage. A fully estimated
SFC model requires abundant time-series data to ensure accounting consistency and
the estimation of robust behavioural parameters. Mortgage market data in the UK
is both better recorded and more accessible than that in the US.
To the best of our knowledge, to date there have only been three empirical SFC
models developed for the UK. Davis (1987a) was the first attempt, as part of the
BoE’s initiative to improve its macroeconomic modelling. The model simulation
results highlighted the importance of financial assets in explaining the dynamics
of critical macroeconomic variables, such as consumption and employment, in the
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UK. However, Davis (1987b) also acknowledged the limitations of his model, which
deserves further development. One limitation highlighted is the absence of bank
credit and its impact on expenditures. To remedy this, bank sector behaviour has
to be modelled, but detailed UK balance sheet data across sectors only became
available from 1987. Unfortunately, there was no follow-up to this line of research in
the 1990s when the data was available. A more recent attempt has come from the
Centre for Business Research’s (CBR) UKMOD developed by Gudgin et al. (2015),
The UKMOD is grounded in the UK national accounts with a particular focus on
forecasting accuracy. More considerable attention has been given to the external
consistency of the model with 80 behavioural equations that are econometrically
estimated. Like the model presented by Davis (1987b), although the UKMOD
follows SFC accounting, it also does not have a banking sector, so its ability to
identify future financial crises is significantly compromised. Burgess et al. (2016)
resumed the BoE’s interest in SFC modelling for the UK economy in the 1980s and
the empirical model they developed is by far the most complex in the empirical
literature. Both calibration and econometric methods were used to estimate the
coefficients in the model. Most importantly, the banking sector is finally presented
after three decades of pursuit. In terms of scale, it is much smaller in comparison
with the UKMOD to meet the behavioural assumptions specified for the transactions
flow matrix.
The UK Simulation Model (UKSIMM) extends the UKMOD by adding detailed
sectoral financial balance sheets and a more comprehensive financial system. It
essentially models the entire UK 2018 national accounts23, also known as the Blue
Book (BB). Therefore the majority of data in our model are from the UK Office
for National Statistics (ONS). Compared with the BoE model, the UKSIMM is
modelled at a much larger scale and fully estimated using time series econometrics.
It thus allows more realism to be incorporated into the model. To the best of
our knowledge, it is the first and only large-scale empirical SFC model for the UK
economy at the time of writing.
The UKSIMM is designed24 to study the impact of the housing credit boom, which
was the critical empirical feature observed in the financial market before the GFC,
23The glossary definitions are consistent with the OECD definitions as described by Lequiller and
Blades (2007).
24Obviously, the model can be tailored to meet demand for other relevant research questions. For
example, the role of shadow banking requires the addition of non-bank financial institutions to
be modelled along with the banking sector.
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in the UK. A credit cycle and its impact are presented in the simulation section.
Differing to the partial equilibrium model for the US economy, the UKSIMM is a
general equilibrium model, so it provides a more complete account of the trans-
mission mechanisms between the financial sector and the overall economy. The
UKSIMM expands to full national accounts and is econometrically estimated. The
following section describes the fully estimated empirical SFCM for the UK economy.
Our work thus builds on the previous literature and offers the first UK empirical
SFC model at this scale.
4.4. An Empirical UK Simulation Model - UKSIMM
There are five sectors in the model: households (HI), non-financial corporations
(NFCPC), the financial sector25 (FC), government26 (GG) and the rest of the world
(W ). A banking sector (FCMO) is separated out from the financial sector and non-
banking financial institutions27 (NBFI). According to Zezza and Zezza (2019), a
top-down design, orientated towards the proposed research questions, should be the
first step for all empirical SFC models. The current setup enables us to model the
domestic credit creation process and its impact throughout the domestic economy
and to generate what-if scenario simulations for shifts in lending practices/credit
standards. We firstly specify the national account version of the SFC stock matrix
and then move on to the behavioural equations for the transaction flows.
The notations in the UKSIMM remain the same as those in the Eviews model file
presented in Appendix B. Real variables28 are in small letters and nominal ones are
in capital letters29. ECM is the main estimation method used in this paper30. All
data after 2017 are generated by the model simulation.
25The banking sector is derived from the financial sector for the credit creation simulation. For
future research, a non-bank financial sector will also be derived to capture the role of shadow
banking.
26The central bank is also included, but its behaviour is greatly simplified. Only the financial
balance sheet is presented.
27The NBFI is not explicitly modelled in the UKSIMM. Given the importance of the shadow
banking sector before the crisis, the interactions between the NBFI and the banking sector will
be a major focus of future research.
28It refers to the chained volume measures with 2016 as the reference year in the UK 2018 national
accounts.
29In terms of notation, the Eviews model file assigns real variables with the letter V and nominal
variables with the letter N. For example, GDPV is real GDP and GDPN is nominal GDP.
30See Section 3.2 for a detailed discussion on ECM.
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4.4.1. Sectoral financial balance sheet
UK balance sheet data are detailed in Chapter 9 of the BB. It records all financial
assets and liabilities, which are consistent with the stock matrix shown in Tab. 4.2.
It should be noted that only the stocks of financial assets and liabilities are discussed
in this subsection. The financial account, that is the flow of funds block in Tab. 4.3,
is entirely captured by the sectoral net lending positions (FSt), which is identical to
the changes in net financial assets position (∆NFASt) in each sector according to
the accounting consistency31. The financial account data are available in Chapter 13
of the BB for researchers who are interested in modelling at a more granular level.
The behavioural equations assigned to the sectoral balance sheets thus capture both
the volume effects and the revaluation effects. Therefore, the revaluation prac-
tice in Tab. 4.4 is treated as residual in the UKSIMM. After taking account of the
volume changes, they are implicitly given by the differences between the financial
assets/liabilities of two years.
Households (HI)
Households’ total financial assets are driven by two behavioural equations and the
scenario variable (MORT add). The first equation concerns the pension fund assets
held by households32 (PFUNDHI), which occupies over 50 per cent of households’
financial asset portfolios (see Fig. 4.3).
∆ln(PFUNDHI) = 4.60− 0.49ln(PFUNDHI−1 )− 0.01BR−1
− 0.47ln(EARN
priv
−1
LFSEpriv−1
) + 0.16ln(USASP500−1 )
− 0.024(LR) + 0.86∆ln(FASHI) (4.2)
In (4.2), the pension fund is positively correlated with average earnings in the private
sector and US stock market performance, measured using the S&P500 index. Both
short-term (BR) and long-term (LR) interest rates have a negative impact, which
31In the BB, net lending positions are estimated using income data, while net financial assets posi-
tions are estimated using the balance sheet data. Therefore, there are statistical discrepancies
between two data series. In the UKSIMM, we introduce a balancing item to ensure that they
are identical during the simulation period.
32The data consists of insurance, pension and standardised guarantee schemes at current price.
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suggests households may divert their financial holdings to other financial assets
which offer higher returns. The total financial assets held by households also appear
to be positively correlated with household pension funds holdings in the short run.
The second equation (4.3) is assigned to all other financial assets (FASHIEXCL).
4ln(FASHIEXCL) = 0.13− 0.63ln(FASHIEXCL−1 ) + 0.57ln(EARNpriv−1 )
+ 0.18ln(FTSE−1) + 0.224ln(FTSE) (4.3)
It is positively correlated to private sector income and UK stock market performance,
measured using the FTSE index. The FTSE index is modelled because it measures
the revaluation effects in the total financial assets, especially for equity holdings.
The index and private earnings are simultaneously determined in the model. It is
estimated using (4.4).
4ln(FTSE) = −0.05− 0.26ln(FTSE−1) + 0.09ln(SP500us−1)
+0.11MORTN−1 + 0.794ln(SP500us−1)− 0.154ln(XRusd)
+0.014(QEus)− 0.914ln(EARNprivavg)
−0.804ln(LFSEpriv−1 ) + 0.11ln(GOScos−1 ) (4.4)
UK and US capital markets are highly correlated due to the free movement of
capital across the Atlantic. Therefore, the FTSE index is found to be positively
correlated with the S&P500 index in both the short-run and long-run. The QE index
captures the impact of unconventional monetary policy in the UK and US since the
GFC. Exchange rate (XRusd) depreciation could impact companies’ asset values,
and hence appear to have a short-term negative impact. The number of mortgage
loans (MORTN) appears to have a long-term positive impact on the FTSE index,
which may be due to the positive economic boom effects created by credit expansion.
As a key variable of interest, in the high mortgage scenario, we would expect it to
indirectly contribute to the accumulation of financial assets, other than insurance
and pension funds, by the household sector. Additionally, an improvement in the
gross operating surplus of the corporate sector (GOScos) signals strong performance
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which has a positive long-term impact on the stock market.
Figure 4.3.: Shares of each financial assets(up) and liability(down), Household
Source: ONS and own calcualtion
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Among all the financial assets, cash and deposits, equities, insurance and pensions
together account for over 95 per cent of the total financial assets held by households.
The trend for each asset has been reasonably stable over many decades (See Fig. 4.3).
We conducted an empirical estimation of three separate equations, following the
Tobin portfolio allocation system (see (4.1)), for each financial asset held by the
household sector using data between 1987 and 2017. Deposit rate and long-term
interest rate are treated as the rate of return for bank deposits33 and insurance
and pensions respectively. The rate of return for equities are estimated using the
sum of percentage change of the FTSE index and the dividend rate of the non-
financial corporation sector. The data contradicts with many of the theoretical
predictions. Firstly, although the coefficients for deposit rate have the correct signs
in all three equations, none of it shows statistical significance. Secondly, the share
of insurance and pension held by households appears to be negatively correlated
with the long-term interest rate and the estimated coefficient is also statistically
insignificant. Considering the pension funds and insurance companies hold a lion
share of treasury bonds in their portfolio, an increase in long-term rate should be
associated with rising share of holding of insurance and pension assets under the
Tobin portfolio theory. Thirdly, coefficients for the rate of return for equities appear
to be positive in all three equations. It has nearly no impacts on the holding of bank
deposits.
Therefore, instead of Tobin-type portfolio allocation, the model uses constant shares
for each financial asset and liability in the simulation. Such a design not only helps to
reduce the model’s degree of complexity, but also follows the empirical observations
more closely, especially for the household sector.
It should be noted that we have added a high mortgage scenario variable which is
explained in detail in sec. 4.5. In the baseline, MORT add is a constant number. A
cyclical behaviour will become active when the high mortgage scenario solution is
activated.
On the liability side, total liabilities consist of three components: long-term debt
(DEBTHIlt), which is dominated by mortgages; short-term debt (DEBTHIst); and
all other debt (DEBTHIoth). The repayment rate of DEBTHIlt is around 6 per
cent per annum and the inflows are measured using the number of new mortgages
(MORTN) and the average mortgage advance (HMEANADV ). Both variables
33It excludes the non-interest bearing notes and coins in circulation (M0).
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are endogenous and critical for our understanding of the credit cycle. They will be
explained in the housing subsection. DEBTHIst is assumed to be 12 per cent of
households’ previous period disposable income Y DHI−1 . It mainly includes consumer
credit such as credit cards and short-term automobile loans.
4DEBTHIoth = −381551.6− 0.44DEBTHIoth−1 + 0.14gdp−1
+6023.01LR−1 + 21.58POP 65−1 + 0.224gdp (4.5)
Other household debt consists of all other liabilities. It is positively related to real
GDP growth and the long-term interest rate (LR−1). The long-term interest rate
also serves as the basis for the interest rates applied to other forms of household
debts, its positive coefficient thus suggests that a higher interest rate leads to more
debt service payments and an increasing stock level for other debt instruments.
Other household debts also appear to be positively correlated with the population
aged over 65 in the UK. The positive correlation between the elderly population and
all forms of household debts is also evident in the US (Li, 2019).
In Tab. 4.5, around 65 per cent of DEBTHIoth is assigned to loan liabilities (β =
0.65). The remaining 35 per cent is shared between insurance, pensions and other
liabilities. In the baseline, we assume 60 per cent of such remaining ends up in
holding pensions and insurance (α = 0.6).
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Non-financial corporations34 (NFCPC)
Figure 4.4.: Shares of each financial assets(left) and liability(right), NFCPC
Source: ONS and own calcualtion
Changes in total financial assets (FASNFCPC) depend on the growth of the nomi-
nal GDP. On the asset side of the balance sheet, cash and deposits (M4ANFCPC)
are subject to change in the simulation. The high mortgage scenario will stimulate
additional investment from households into housing, therefore, some of the mort-
gage lending (δ = 0.25) will end up in the accounts of real estate or construction
companies as payments from the household sector (see (4.6)).
FASNFCPC = GDP
GDP−1
FASNFCPC−1 + δMORT add (4.6)
In the baseline scenario, all assets have constant shares relative to total assets
throughout the simulation periods. With additional inflows coming in asM4ANFCPC ,
the portfolio composition will be altered. Other assets are estimated according to
their previous shares, as in the baseline scenario, to ensure the adding-up constraint
is adhered to (see Tab. 4.5).
Total liabilities are the sum of all of the sub-components of financial liabilities. Like
the household sector, there are no cash liabilities for the NFCPC sector. Apart from
equities, all other liabilities are estimated based on their historical shares and the
previous level of liabilities. Equities grow at the same rate as the accumulation of
the stock of non-financial assets in the NFCPC sector.
34Public corporations are also included in this sector. Hence the acronym NFCPC
174
4.4 An Empirical UK Simulation Model - UKSIMM
Ta
bl
e
4.
5.
:S
ec
to
ra
lb
al
an
ce
sh
ee
ts
-U
K
SI
M
M
eq
ua
tio
ns
H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
(H
I
)
N
on
-fi
na
nc
ia
lc
or
po
ra
ti
on
s
(N
F
C
P
C
)
Fi
na
nc
ia
lc
or
po
ra
ti
on
s
(F
C
)
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
(G
G
)
C
en
tr
al
ba
nk
(F
C
C
B
)
R
es
t
of
th
e
w
or
ld
(W
)
Fi
na
nc
ia
lA
ss
et
s
(A
)
C
as
h
an
d
de
po
si
t
(M
4)
M
4A
H
I
−
1
F
A
S
H
I
−
1
(F
A
S
H
I
−
0.
75
M
O
R
T
A
D
D
)+
0.
75
M
O
R
T
A
D
D
0.
3(
F
A
S
N
F
C
P
C
−
0.
25
M
O
R
T
A
D
D
)+
0.
25
M
O
R
T
A
D
D
0.
24
1F
A
S
F
C
0.
14
F
A
S
G
G
M
4A
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
A
S
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
A
S
F
C
C
B
M
4A
W −
1
F
A
S
W −
1
F
A
S
W
Se
cu
ri
ti
es
(D
S
)
D
S
A
H
I
−
1
F
A
S
H
I
−
1
(F
A
S
H
I
−
0.
75
M
O
R
T
A
D
D
)
0.
04
(F
A
S
N
F
C
P
C
−
0.
25
M
O
R
T
A
D
D
)
0.
13
1F
A
S
F
C
0.
12
F
A
S
G
G
R
es
id
u
a
l
D
S
A
W −
1
F
A
S
W −
1
F
A
S
W
Lo
an
s
(L
)
L
A
H
I
−
1
F
A
S
H
I
−
1
(F
A
S
H
I
−
0.
75
M
O
R
T
A
D
D
)
0.
14
(F
A
S
N
F
C
P
C
−
0.
25
M
O
R
T
A
D
D
)
0.
22
F
A
S
F
C
0.
33
F
A
S
G
G
L
A
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
A
S
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
A
S
F
C
C
B
L
A
W −
1
F
A
S
W −
1
F
A
S
W
E
qu
it
ie
s
(S
T
)
S
T
A
H
I
−
1
F
A
S
H
I
−
1
(F
A
S
H
I
−
0.
75
M
O
R
T
A
D
D
)
0.
44
(F
A
S
N
F
C
P
C
−
0.
25
M
O
R
T
A
D
D
)
0.
16
F
A
S
F
C
0.
25
F
A
S
G
G
S
T
A
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
A
S
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
A
S
F
C
C
B
F
T
S
E
F
T
S
E
−
1
S
T
A
W −
1
F
A
S
W −
1
F
A
S
W
In
su
ra
nc
e
an
d
pe
ns
io
ns
(I
P
)
I
P
A
H
I
−
1
F
A
S
H
I
−
1
(F
A
S
H
I
−
0.
75
M
O
R
T
A
D
D
)
0.
00
2(
F
A
S
N
F
C
P
C
−
0.
25
M
O
R
T
A
D
D
)
0.
05
62
F
A
S
F
C
0
I
P
A
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
A
S
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
A
S
F
C
C
B
I
P
A
W −
1
F
A
S
W −
1
F
A
S
W
D
er
iv
at
iv
es
(D
E
R
)
D
E
R
A
H
I
−
1
F
A
S
H
I
−
1
(F
A
S
H
I
−
0.
75
M
O
R
T
A
D
D
)
0.
02
(F
A
S
N
F
C
P
C
−
0.
25
M
O
R
T
A
D
D
)
0.
19
F
A
S
F
C
0
D
E
R
A
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
A
S
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
A
S
F
C
C
B
D
E
R
A
W −
1
F
A
S
W −
1
F
A
S
W
O
th
er
s
(O
A
R
)
O
A
R
A
H
I
−
1
F
A
S
H
I
−
1
(F
A
S
H
I
−
0.
75
M
O
R
T
A
D
D
)
0.
05
98
(F
A
S
N
F
C
P
C
−
0.
25
M
O
R
T
A
D
D
)
0.
00
24
F
A
S
F
C
0.
16
F
A
S
G
G
O
A
R
A
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
A
S
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
A
S
F
C
C
B
O
A
R
A
W −
1
F
A
S
W −
1
F
A
S
W
Fi
na
nc
ia
ll
ia
bi
lit
ie
s
(L
)
C
as
h
an
d
de
po
si
t
(M
4)
0
0
−0
.3
3F
L
S
F
C
0
R
E
S
V
+
N
O
T
E
S
−0
.2
5F
L
S
W
Se
cu
ri
ti
es
(D
S
)
0
−0
.0
75
F
L
S
N
F
C
P
C
−1
−0
.0
9F
L
S
F
C
D
S
L
G
G −1
+
F
S
G
G
D
S
L
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
L
S
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
L
S
F
C
C
B
−0
.0
9F
L
S
W
Lo
an
s
(L
)
D
H
I L
T
+
D
H
I S
T
+
β
D
H
I O
T
H
−0
.2
4F
L
S
N
F
C
P
C
−1
−0
.0
75
F
L
S
F
C
L
L
G
G
G
D
P
P
G
D
P
P
−
1
L
L
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
L
S
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
L
S
F
C
C
B
(1
+
lr
)
−0
.1
7F
L
S
W
E
qu
it
ie
s
(S
T
)
0
S
T
L
N
F
C
P
C
−1
K
I
V
L
N
F
C
P
C
K
I
V
L
N
F
C
P
C
−
1
−0
.1
15
F
L
S
F
C
0
S
T
L
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
L
S
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
L
S
F
C
C
B
F
T
S
E
F
T
S
E
−
1
−0
.2
8F
L
S
W
In
su
ra
nc
e
an
d
pe
ns
io
ns
(I
P
)
α
(1
−
β
)D
H
I O
T
H
−0
.1
55
F
L
S
N
F
C
P
C
−1
−0
.1
8F
L
S
F
C
I
P
G
G
−1
I
P
L
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
L
S
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
L
S
F
C
C
B
0
D
er
iv
at
iv
es
(D
E
R
)
0
−0
.0
12
F
L
S
N
F
C
P
C
−1
−0
.1
8F
L
S
F
C
D
E
R
G
G −1
D
E
R
A
F
C
C
B
−0
.1
9F
L
S
W
O
th
er
s
(O
A
R
)
(1
−
α
)(
1
−
β
)D
H
O
O
T
H
−0
.0
4F
L
S
N
F
C
P
C
−1
−0
.0
03
F
L
S
F
C
O
A
R
L
G
G −1
G
D
P
P
G
D
P
P
−
1
O
A
R
L
F
C
C
B
−
1
F
L
S
F
C
C
B
F
L
S
F
C
C
B
−0
.0
01
F
L
S
N
W
175
Chapter 4 A Stock Flow Consistent (SFC) model for the financial crisis
Financial corporations (FC)
The total financial assets of financial corporations grow at the same rate as the
GDP deflator. Net lending positions are also incorporated into their total assets.
Their financial liabilities are assumed to be equal to the total assets, hence the net
financial asset position is zero in the simulation. Specific shares based on 2017 data
are given to each type of financial asset and liability.
As explained later in sec. 4.4.9 and sec. 4.5, further research is needed to be able
to better model financial flows within the FC sector. According to Burrows et al.
(2015), the balance sheet of the semi-banking sector35 in the UK may be as large as
₤590 billion, which is around 8 per cent of the overall banking sector, using 2014
data.
Government and central bank (GG, FCCB)
Changes in the value of total financial assets held by the government sector are
mainly the result of revaluation effects, which are captured by growth of the GDP
deflator (GDPP/GDPP−1). All the other financial assets grow at the same rate as
total financial assets and are assumed to maintain their 2017 shares relative to the
total.
Debt securities (DSLGG) dominate the liability side. They are the major financing
instrument used by the government sector to meet its deficit demand. Hence the net
lending position (FSGG) is entirely financed by the net flows of securities, DSLGG =
DSLGG−1 +FSGG. As shown by Fig. 4.5, the shares of other liabilities are dwarfed by
government securities. Loan liabilities (LLGG) and other liabilities (OARLGG) are
also assumed to grow at the same rate as GDPP , while derivatives, insurance and
pensions are constant at the 2017 level.
Unlike the other sectors in the BB, the central bank balance sheet is not readily
available, as it is recorded under the financial corporation (FC) sector. Therefore,
the balance sheet data are gathered through the Bank of England’s annual reports36
and presented in Fig. 4.6. The balance sheet data then have to be deducted from
the balance sheet of the FC in the national accounts to avoid double counting.
35It mainly includes securitisation special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and finance companies, which
are often owned by banks
36We thank Cam Bowie for his help gathering UK balance sheet and transaction flow data.
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Figure 4.5.: Shares of financial assets (left) and liabilities (right), government sector
Source: ONS, created by the author
The financial assets and liabilities are given in absolute values instead of shares
so that the massive expansion of the BoE’s balance sheet after the GFC can be
observed. This expansion is the direct result of Quantitative Easing (QE), when
after 2008, in order to stimulate the economy, massive amounts of cash and deposits
were created by the Bank in exchange for securities with the private sector.
Based on the current balance pattern, the UKSIMM assumes the total financial as-
sets of the Bank (FASFCCB) remain 20 per cent larger than its liabilities (FLSFCCB)
throughout the simulation periods. Consequently, its growth trajectory follows the
dynamics of FLSFCCB . Most of the assets follow the growth trend of FASFCCB by
fixing their shares at the 2017 level. Equities holdings also respond to the general
trend in the stock market, represented by the FTSE index. Although debt securi-
ties are treated as residual, given the historical shares of other asset holdings, they
remain the dominant financial asset on the balance sheet.
On the liability side, cash and money deposits (M4LFCCB) consist of notes issued by
the BoE and reserves from commercial banks. The supply of bank notes increases
at the same rate as nominal GDP (GDP/GDP−1). Commercial bank reserves are
exogenous and held constant at the 2017 level. This is another key policy variable.
For example, the impact of QE across the economy can be simulated through a rapid
expansion of this variable. Therefore, in the baseline, the expansion of the BoE’s
balance sheet is mainly driven by GDP growth.
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Figure 4.6.: Financial assets (left) and liabilities (right), central bank
Source: ONS, created by the author
Shares and equities on the liability side also react to the general trend of the stock
market. Also, debt security liabilities are accumulated through interest payments.
There are no additional behavioural assumptions assigned to the other liabilities.
External sector
The net financial assets (NFASW ) of the external sector are treated as a horizontal
residual in the UKSIMM. In Tab. 4.2, we have shown that the net financial assets
across all sectors in the economy must add up to zero. The same principle applies
here, therefore, we have
NFASW = 0−NFASGG−NFASNFCPC−NFASFC−NFASHI−NFASFCCB
(4.7)
Over past decades, the value of total financial assets of the external sector (FASW )
has ranged between 80 per cent and 110 per cent of the value of total financial
liabilities (FLSW ). Given the NFASW is strictly negative37 and it is the net value
between total assets and total liabilities, FASNW is assigned to be 80 per cent
(or any value that is below 100 per cent) of the FLSNW to ensure this condition
holds in the model. Therefore, we can derive the function of total liabilities38 as
37In reality, the NFASNW can also be positive. The strict negative values in the model are a
result of positive net positions projected for the other sectors in the economy.
38Total liabilities in the UKSIMM model file are negative values, while each financial liability is
in positive.
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FLSNW = −NFASNW0.2 in the model. Each financial asset and liability is estimated,
using 2017 data as the reference, based on the constant shares approach.
4.4.2. GDP components
Real GDP, measured using the expenditure approach, is the sum of final consump-
tion expenditure, gross capital formation and the external balance of goods and
services. The final consumption expenditure consists of final consumption from
households (cHI) and the government (cGG). Gross capital formation captures39 the
changes in real gross fixed capital formation (4k) and changes in inventories (4in).
Real output is also divided into private sector (gdppriv) and public sector (gdppub)
categories. Nominal GDP (GDP ) is derived by multiplying real GDP with the GDP
deflator (GDPP )40.
gdp = c+ i+ (x−m) = (ch + cg) + (4k +4in) + (x−m) (4.8)
Final consumption expenditure
The final consumption expenditure function41 for households (ch) is estimated us-
ing the ECM method. It is consistent with the US consumption model and the
consumption function in the UKMOD developed by Gudgin et al. (2015)
cHI = 139196.73− 0.54cHI−1 + 0.26ydHI−1 + 0.04fasHI−1 + β5
DEBTHI−1
Y DHI−1
+0.03MORTN(hmeanadv) + 151887.04Rmrepay−1 + 1065.98Rmort−1 + 0.144ydHI
−22.6784debtHIst + 12.364debtHIlt + 115803.614ln(hp) + 1.524fasHI (4.9)
As expected, all coefficients are statistically significant and the error correction
coefficient is -0.54, which indicates convergence towards the long-run equilibrium.
39Strictly speaking it should also include the net acquisition of valuables, which records transac-
tions of gemstones, precious metals (except gold) and valuable paintings. However, this value
is negligible. For example, the share of the net acquisition of valuables within gross capital
formation in the UK is less than 0.1 per cent.
40gdpp = GDPP/100,the same format applies to all other deflators in the thesis
41The parameters in (4.9) are estimated using data between 1975 and 2017.
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Real household consumption is positively correlated with the real disposable income
(ydHI) and financial wealth level (fasHI). The previous credit standard variable
for the US is replaced by MORTN and average mortgage advances (hmeanadv) at
constant price. The positive relationship is evident from the estimated coefficient
(0.03). The mortgage repayment rate42 Rmrepay and mortgage interest rate Rmort
have a negative impact on household consumption, as both require more income to
service debt.
The coefficients for the short-term debt liability variable (debtHI) also appear to
be negative in the short-run and the long-run, which is identical to the US results.
The housing wealth effect and access to long-term debt, represented by the growth
rate of real house prices and the net change in real long-term debt liabilities, have
a significant positive impact on household consumption over the short-run.
The real consumption of the government sector (cGG) is treated as an exogenous
policy variable, growing at a constant rate of 2 per cent, which can be changed
based on different fiscal policy scenarios. The same consumption defaltor is applied
to both the household and government sectors. It grows at an exogenous rate of 1
per cent.
Gross capital formation
The change in gross fixed capital formation43 (4k) is further divided into invest-
ments in the household sector (4kHI), the corporate sector (4kCOS), and the gov-
ernment sector (4kGG).
4k = 4kHI +4kCOS +4kGG (4.10)
4kCOS and 4kGG are assumed to grow at an exogenous rate of 3 per cent in the
model, given the variable of interest is 4kHI , which consists of the purchase of
dwellings. 4kCOS can be further divided into two subcategories: the non-financial
corporate sector (4kNFCPC) and the financial sector (4kFC). The baseline house-
hold investment function44 is given by (4.11),
42For simplicity, it is assumed to be constant at the 2017 level in the simulation. It limits the
negative impact of debt servicing to the mortgage interest rate channel.
43It is the net acquisition of produced fixed assets, which include both tangible assets (e.g.
dwellings) and intangible assets (e.g. software).
44It is subject to modification in the simulation section to respond to a credit boom.
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4ln(4kHI) = 3.95− 0.35ln(4kHI−1 ) + 0.005Rmort−1 + 0.25
MORT add
gdpp
+ 0.514ln(HB
priv ·HPmean
Y DHI
) (4.11)
where HBpriv is private sector house building and HPmean is the average house
price in the UK. Given that a considerable amount of household investment is in
residential buildings, it is thus positively associated with the stock-flow ratio between
the increased housing wealth and household disposable income, in the short run. A
higher ratio signaling a better rate of return for investment, is likely to attract more
fixed investment. The mortgage rate Rmort, as a cost of access to financing, has a
negative impact on household gross fixed capital formation in the long-run. The
high-mortgage scenario variable MORT add is added into households’ investment
function, which means around a quarter of the additional mortgage liabilities are
used for household investment in residential buildings. This adds the new housing to
the current stock and mortgage lending will end up as cash payments to construction
and real estate companies as reflected in M4ANFCPC .
Stockbuilding or changes in inventories (4in) is another important component of
gross capital formation. This includes material inputs, finished goods for sale or
resale and strategic stocks such as oil and food items. Stockbuiding can be a good
indicator of investor confidence about future growth, should there be a positive
increase in the material inventory. This is indeed the case in the UK where it is pos-
itively correlated with changes in private sector GDP (gdppriv) in (4.12). However,
a negative sign is possible when most of the inventories accumulated are finished
products - a sign of an economic downturn.
42in = 87.95− 0.714in−1 + 0.184gdppriv
−2080.964(CPm) (4.12)
The nominal value of inventories takes both the GDP deflator growth and import
price growth into account, given that the prices of many strategic stocks such as
oil are reflected in import prices. Stockbuilding of the UK household sector is
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approximately 0.25% of the real GVA in 2017 and the nominal value is about 0.1%
of household GVA. The stockbuilding of the UK public sector is negligible.
External balance of goods and services
The external balance of goods and services coincide with the trade balance in the
current account. Export volumes are assumed to grow at 2 per cent per annum,
and as a small open economy, this can be expected to be driven by the GDP growth
of key trading partners. Therefore, it is treated as an exogenous variable, although
other factors such as the real exchange rate, real imports, domestic inflation and
real interest can be expected to have some impact. The assumption is 1 per cent
below the average between 2000 and 2017, which reflects a conservative view on UK
export performance after Brexit.
The import volume equation is given by (4.13),
4ln(m) = −6.73− 0.71ln(m−1) + 0.78ln(cHI−1 ) + 0.23ln(x−1)
+ 0.09ln(cGG−1 ) + 0.07ln(4kCOS−1 ) + 1.664ln(gdpdom)
+ 0.464ln(x)− 0.05ln(LFSE
un
−1
POPw−1
) (4.13)
where LFSE
un
−1
POPw−1
is the share of unemployment within the total working-age population
and gdpdom is total domestic consumption and investment expenditure. The import
function is mainly driven by domestic demand. In the long-run, the coefficients for
domestic consumption and investment are all highly significant and appear to have
the expected positive sign. Import elasticities differ considerably among domestic
demand components. Import propensity is found to be highest for household con-
sumption cHI (| 0.87−0.89 | = 0.97) in the UK. There is also a high degree of positive
correlation between UK export volumes and the import volumes in both the long
and short runs, which may have captured the positive effects from the imports of
intermediate inputs for the UK exporters. A high unemployment ratio not only
coincides with low levels of capacity utlitisation but also reduces household income
and consumption demand. Hence it is negatively related to import growth in the
short-run dynamics. Although the estimated coefficient for the relative price be-
tween import price (MP ) and domestic producer price (GDPP ) has a negative sign
as theory predicts, it appears to be statistically insignificant even at the 10 per cent
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level. Therefore, the relative price term is not included in the equation.
4.4.3. Prices
This section specifies all the price dynamics in the UKSIMM. It also includes the
interest rates and exchange rate equations. There are five endogenous variables,
which will be described in detail. They are the long-term interest rate (LR), the
consumption deflator (CPm), the export price (XP ), import price (MP ) and ex-
change rate (EFXI). The GDP deflator is estimated using an ARDL equation that
consists of all other major deflators in the model. For simplicity, the deflator for
gross capital formation is set equal to the GDP deflator in the model. The short-
term interest rate is a monetary policy variable controlled directly by the Bank of
England (BoE), which sets the base for all other interest rates in the market.
Unlike the endogenous mark-up applied by Godley and Lavoie (2012), the mortgage
rate is assumed to add a fixed mark-up on long-term interest rates, LR, which is
the yield of 10-year government bonds in the UK. The LR is estimated based on
consumer price inflation and short-term interest rates in both the US and UK. It
seems likely that trans-Atlantic capital market arbitrage could be the reason behind
the strong co-movements of interest rates in the US and UK.
In terms of prices, the consumption deflator is a critical measure of inflation in the
model. It is thus an explanatory variable for LR and exchange rate. There are both
domestic and external drivers of the consumption deflator. On one hand, domestic
private sector earnings and labour productivity can influence consumption deflation
through wages. On the other hand, given that the UK economy is a small open
economy, an increase in either world oil prices or import prices can infuse inflation
into the domestic economy.
4ln(CPm) = 0.58− 0.32ln(CPm−1) + 0.25ln(EARNprivawe−1 ) + 0.11ln(MP−1)
−0.27ln(gdppriv/Lpriv−1 ) + 0.124ln(MP ) + 0.104ln(Wmin−1 )
+0.474ln(EARNprivavg) + 0.0034ln(P oil) (4.14)
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4ln(MP ) = 1.59− 0.19 ∗ ln(MP−1)− 0.19 ∗ ln(XRef−1) + 0.02 ∗ ln(P oil−1)
+0.05 ∗ 4ln(Pwrm−1 ) + 0.04 ∗ 4ln(P oil)− 0.70 ∗ 4(XRef )
+0.25 ∗ 4ln(WTI) (4.15)
The price indices for imports and exports (in logarithm) are determined by (4.15)
and (4.16). Effective exchange rates and world oil prices appear to be statistically
significant in influencing the import price index in the long-run and short-run. Other
short-run influences come from world raw material prices and movements in world
trade volumes.
ln(XP ) = 0.008 + 0.94ln(XP−1)− 0.13ln(XP−2)
+ 0.63ln(MP )− 0.44ln(MP−1) (4.16)
Figure 4.7.: Co-movement of the export price and import price in the UK
Source: ONS
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There is a strong co-movement observed in the UK between export prices and import
prices (See Fig. 4.7). Having specified the import price equation, the export price
equation is essentially an ARDL type equation with only lagged values of export
and import prices as independent variables in the UKSIMM.
4LR = −0.98− 0.04LR−1 + 0.01EFXI−1
+ 0.174BR + 0.224BRusa (4.17)
In (4.17), the short-term interest rates in the UK (BR) the US (BRusa) , which are
proxies of the policy rate, seem to have a significant positive impacts on LR in the
short run. This is not surprising given both countries have an open capital account,
the comovement of interest rates is expected. The effective exchange rate (EFXI)45
is the only level variable that shows statistical significance. It confirms that, under
the flexible exchange rate regime, the interest rate differentials across the Atlantic
indeed positively correlate with exchange rate movements between two currencies
over the long term.
The effective exchange rate equation is given by (4.18). The equation complies
with basic economic principles such as the purchasing power parity (PPP). When
the lagged UK inflation level (4ln(CPM−1)) exceeds the US (4ln(CPUSm−1 )), it has
depreciating pressure on Sterling. Also, an improvement in the lagged trade balance
as a share of GDP ( (X−1−M−1)
GDP−1
), or a positive differential between domestic long-term
interest rate and US long-term interest rate is associated with currency appreciation
as expected for countries with a floating exchange rate regime. 4WTI is the world
trade index46. In the simulation periods, the index essentially acts as a trend factor
which is growing at 4 per cent per year.
∆ln(EFXI) = 0.34− 0.07ln(EFXI(−1))− 0.01(4ln(CPM−1)−4ln(CPUSm−1 ))
+ 0.0074WTI + 0.02(X−1 −M−1)
GDP−1
+ 0.02(LR−1 − LRUS−1 ) (4.18)
45An increase(decrease) in EFXI indicates that sterling appreciates(depreciates) against the US
dollar.
46The index is a volume index for global trade. It is calculated by Oxford Economics.
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Although international capital flows are expected to have direct impacts on exchange
rates in theory, none of the UK capital flows measures47 appears to show statistical
significance in the model. The impacts might have been partially accounted by the
interest differentials between the UK and the US. Forecasting exchange rate move-
ments with any degree of accuracy in a macroeconomic model is almost impossible.
The current equation is still under development.
4.4.4. Employment and Population
Labour market
The labour market is divided into the private sector (LFSEpriv) and public sec-
tor (LFSEpub). Projections for each segment together with nominal earnings will
produce estimates for wages and salaries, which are essential in estimating personal
incomes, income taxes, and national insurance contributions. The private sector
labour force equation is given by (4.19), which is mainly demand driven.
4LFSEpriv = 8948.14− 0.38LFSEpriv−1 + 0.002gdp− 0.002kivlCOS−1 − 173.73BR−1
+0.014kivlCOS−1 + 0.006V ATREG−1 − 0.003V ATDEREG−1 (4.19)
Apart from real GDP, private sector labour demand is positively related to private
investment from firms. This is captured by the net acquisition of non-financial assets
(4kivlCOS) at a constant price and the number of firms in the market, represented
by the VAT registration and deregistration number (V ATREG and V ATDEREG) in
the long-run. The inclusion of short-term interest rates reflects the impacts of repay-
ment costs over existing debt stocks on private sector employment. Lower interest
rates allow firms to retain more post-interest profits, which will have a positive
impact on employment. Firms’ demand for labour is well captured, especially the
unexpected increase since 2009, by the change in the number of firms registered for
VAT48. Private sector labour is further divided into self-employed (17.8 per cent)
and employees (82.2 per cent) based on 2017 data.
47It includes total capital inflows (∆FLSw), total capital outflows (∆FASw) and net capital
inflows.
48The number of firms registered and deregistered for VAT is assumed to be constant at the last
available data point.
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4ln(LFSEpub) = 0.38− 0.45ln(LFSEpub−1 ) + 0.36ln(cGG−1 )− 0.14ln(
kivlGG−1
LFSEpub−1
)
−0.10ln( gdp
priv
−1
LFSEpriv−1
) + 0.574ln(cGG)
−0.244ln(gdp−1) (4.20)
The positive impact of real public consumption (cGG) expenditures on demand for
public employment can be witnessed in both the short-run and long-run in (4.20).
The kivlGG is adjusted by LFSEGG, which acts as a proxy of the demand for public
investment expenditures, which is negatively related to public employment. That
is, the lower the non-financial assets per head, the more public investment that
is needed. Real GDP growth and private sector productivity growth both have a
negative impact and this might be the result of competition for labour from the
private sector.
The unemployment equation is given by (4.21),
4LFSU = 1318.40− 0.20LFSU−1 − 0.05LFSEpriv−1 + 0.98MIGw−1
−0.804LFSEpub + 1.324LFSE65 − 0.464LFSEpriv
−44.134SR + 23.884ln(CPM)
+9467.86 WAGE
min
−1
EARNINGprivawe−1
(4.21)
In the long-run, the strong performance of the private sector will decrease the number
of unemployed in the economy, while an increase in migrant workers and the ratio
of the minimum wage to private sector earnings displays replacement effects. Public
sector employment and monetary policy can have a significant impact on reducing
unemployment in the short-run. People who are still beyond the retirement age
seem to have a short-term crowding-out effect.
Population
The trend of natural population growth is around 1 per cent per year. Slightly
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faster growth is assigned to people aged over 65, which is consistent with the aging
demographic profile of the UK. This has implications for the social benefits paid
by the government sector. The working-age (defined as ages 15 to 64) population
is dependent on its previous stock value and the net number of incoming migrant
workers. This is estimated as a fixed share of real GDP, but it can be treated
as another exogenous policy variable given that immigration policy may change
substantially after Brexit.
4.4.5. Households
The household sector is one of the most comprehensively modelled sectors in the
UKSIMM, given its importance in understanding the financial crisis. Tab. 4.6 is
useful in illustrating how transaction flows in the national accounts (Tab. 4.3) are
modelled and how the net lending/borrowing positions (FS) are calculated. FS is
the variable that connects the transaction flows with the balance sheets presented
in Tab. 4.5. The same procedure applies to all sectors in the UK with only minor
modifications. In this subsection, we use the household sector as an example to
illustrate how the net lending/borrowing position is derived in the national accounts.
The GVA of the household sector49, which corresponds to the first line in the primary
distribution of the income account (BB Table 6.1.2) in Tab. 4.6, is assumed to be
21 per cent of total GVA in the model. It thus follows the trend of estimated
GDP growth. To derive the gross operating surplus (GOSHIMIX)50, we need to
deduct compensation to employees, paid (COMPHHI) and taxes less subsidies on
production other than products (IT PDTNhi − SUBPDTNhi) from households’ GVA.
COMPHHI is 1.23 times the annual wage bill51 and the wage bill in turn follows
a weighted growth trend of households GVA. (IT PDTNhi − SUBPDTNhi) is roughly
-0.5 per cent of the household sector. These coefficients are calculated based on the
latest available data in the BB (i.e., 2017 data).
After deriving the GOSHI , we can move to the allocation of primary income ac-
count in Tab. 4.6 (BB Table 6.1.3). The balance of gross primary income requires
49Non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH) are also included.
50For households, it also contains gross mixed incomes, these are incomes paid for the work carried
out in the NPISH sector, which only applies to the household sector in the UKSIMM.
51The ratio between the overall compensation of employees and wages and salaries remained rel-
atively stable between 1987 and 2017, with a minimum ratio of 1.19 and a maximum of 1.25.
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Table 4.6.: Deriving net lending/borrowing position in the UK national accounts
Accounts in the UK blue book Accounting items UKSIMM Code
Primary
distribution of
income account
GVA GVA
Compensation of employees, use (-) COMPH
Taxes on production other than products (-) IT
Subsidies on production other than products (+) SUB
Gross operating surplus (=) GOS
Allocation of
primary income
account
Compensation of employees, resource (+) COMP
Property incomes received (+) PIC
Property incomes paid (-) PID
Gross primary incomes (=) YP
Secondary
distribution of
income account
Net social contributions (-/+) ECC
Net social benefits (-/+) SBF
Taxes on income and wealth (-/+) TTAX
Net current transfers (+) OCTB
Gross disposable income (=) YD
Use of disposable
income account
(Consumption expenditure (-)) C
Gross savings (=) SAVINGS
Accumulation
accounting -
capital account
Net capital transfers (+) OKTB
Gross capital formation (-) DK
Changes in inventories (-) DIN
Net acquisition of valuables (-) DV
Net acquisition of non-produced non-financial assets (-) DL
Net lending and borrowing position (=) FS
Adding to financial balance sheets (or stock matrix)
Source: created by the author
that income resources are further added, such as compensation to employees, re-
ceived52 (COMPHI) and net property incomes53 (λHIFASHI−1 − brDEBTHI−1 ). A
capital return coefficient (λHI) and the short-term interest rate (br) are assigned
to total financial assets and total debt liabilities respectively to estimate the prop-
erty incomes received and paid. Other current transfers are economic transactions
of goods, services, and financial items received that expect nothing in return. It
follows the dynamics of the consumption deflator.
Secondary distribution of income account in Tab. 4.6 is consistent with the BB Table
6.1.4. It should be noted that in the table, the addition or subtraction of an item
depends on which sector is of interest. This is the result of a double-entry system
design in the national accounts and is fully consistent with the SFC approach - an
inflow in one sector is matched by an equivalent amount of outflow in another. In
our case, households receive social benefits54 (+SBFHI) from either the public or
52This is the income received through direct participation in the production process.
53It includes interest payments, dividends, rents etc.
54This item is estimated separately for the public and private sectors. The former grows in line
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private sector, at the same time, they are also liable to pay for social contributions55
(−ECCHI) and to pay taxes on income and wealth56 (−TTAXHI). The opposite
is true for the corporate and the government sectors.
Once gross disposable income Y DHI is estimated, we can calculate the gross savings
SAV INGHI by subtracting households’ consumption expenditures (CHI) in the use
of disposable income account57. It should be noted that, in some sectors, such as
the NFCPC, Y DNFCPC is entirely saved.
SAV INGHI is used in the capital account (BB Table 6.1.7) for the calculation of
net lending and borrowing position (FSHI), which is the identical to the changes in
net acquisition of financial assets based on stock-flow consistency. It shows how
gross saving is allocated. Investment grants are additional sources of financing
(i.e. changes in liabilities and net worth), and hence add to gross saving. Capital
tax, gross fixed capital formation and changes in inventories are uses of funds (i.e.,
changes in assets) and need to be netted out from gross savings. Other capital
transfers58 are a net item, so could be either a positive or negative figure and net
acquisitions of non-produced, non-financial assets59 are assumed to be zero. In
addition to all the items listed in the capital account60, the household sector is also
subject to capital tax61, which is estimated by (4.22).
4TAXCAPITALhi = −802.32− 0.53TAXCAPITALhi−1 + 6.26HPmean−1
+446.70NFASh−1/GDP−1 + 0.014GDP (4.22)
with CPM and the latter is assumed to remain at 2.3 per cent of IPAHI−1 .
55Social contributions are paid on a compulsory and voluntary basis from households. Both ac-
tual and imputed social contributions paid by employers are included in the compensation to
employees in the national accounts. Hence it is reasonable to assume they grow in step with
total compensation. They are around 20 per cent of gross income.
56It is assumed to be 15 per cent of Y PHI .
57Adjustment for changes in pension entitlements is not counted in the model.
58Other capital transfers refer to the redistribution of savings or wealth. For instance, transfers
made to compensate for the impact of a natural disaster will be recorded in this category.
59It consists of assets that have not been produced within the production boundary, and that may
be used in the production of goods and services. For instance, natural resources (e.g. land,
mineral and energy reserves, non-cultivated biological resources such as virgin forest, water
resources, radio spectrum and others), contracts, leases and licences as well as goodwill and
marketing assets.
60These are mainly estimated using the fixed share method.
61Capital tax is a tax levied on assets owned or transferred.
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Both house prices (HPmean) and financial asset measures (NFASh
GDP
) appear to have
a positive relationship with the amount of capital taxes collected.
4.4.6. Housing
The housing market is crucial to our analysis of the financial crisis. There are two
behavioural equations, which have a significant impact on the model simulations
(see sec. 4.5 for simulation results).
As we have seen from the US analysis, mortgage lending secured on properties can
leak into consumption through housing equity withdrawal. Therefore, the positive
feedback cycle between house prices and mortgage lending played an essential role
in the GFC. The UKSIMM uses the number of mortgages issued (MORTN) as a
measure of credit standards to study the economic impact of the credit cycle. The
house price equation is given by (4.23). On the supply side, both housing stock
(Hstock) and new houses built (HBha) have expected negative signs for their coeffi-
cients. On the demand side, the mortgages issued per thousand people, the number
of incoming migrant workers and private sector salaries have positive effects on the
UK house prices. A higher long-term interest rate or stamp duty will discourage
people from purchasing, so have negative coefficients.
4ln(HPI) = 1.34− 0.19ln(HPI−1) + 0.09ln(MORTN/POP−1)
+ 0.334ln(EARNprivawe)− 0.06ln(HBha−1)
− 0.074ln(STAMP−1)− 0.03LR−1
− 6.744ln(Hstock−1 ) + 0.0003MIGw−1 (4.23)
The number of mortgages issued is modelled using (4.24). A positive reinforcing
effect once again appears in the UKSIMM, as real house price growth shows a
strong positive correlation with MORTN . This may be because of the collateral
effects. Similarly, high population growth will also increase the demand for mort-
gages. Both the mortgage rate (Rmort) and the long-term interest rate influence the
cost of housing finance so they both have negative coefficients. Moreover, a higher
debt-to-income ratio of households will also limit the demand for mortgages.
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MORTN = −7159466.09 + 259.77POPw−1 − 1715098.75DEBTHIlt−1 /Y DHI−1
− 41804.90LR−1 − 62051.444Rmort + 831740.21 ∗ 4ln(HPI−1
CPm−1
)
(4.24)
The average mortgage advance grows with the house price index with a constant
coefficient of 60 per cent in the simulation. Newly built houses remain constant
at their 2017 level. Given the current ‘greenbelt’ policy62, no rapid expansion in
housing supply is foreseen.
4.4.7. Corporate sector (COS)
Sales from the corporate sector as a whole should be equal to the GDP figure esti-
mated using the expenditure approach. Taxes63 and subsidies64 on products relative
to GDP have been fairly constant since 2011, hence we assume them to be 11.4 per
cent and 0.5 per cent of the GDP respectively. GVA is calculated by netting out
the GDP by taxes and subsidies on products.
As shown by Fig. 4.8, the GVA share for non-financial institutions (NFCPC) and
financial institutions (FC) have also been quite steady over past decades, so they
are projected using the same shares as in 2017.
62It is a planning policy that controls the urban expansion in the UK.
63Over half of the taxes on products in the UK are value-added taxes.
64Subsidies on products apply to every unit of goods and services that are produced and imported.
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Figure 4.8.: The GVA shares for NFCPC and FC
Source: ONS and own calculation
Again we use the income approach to derive GOScos as a balancing item between
GDP and all other incomes (BB Table 1.3B). These include the gross operative
surplus of all the other sectors apart from NFCPC and FC, mixed incomes65 , total
compensation of employees66 and taxes less subsidies on production and imports67.
COMPHI is estimated using the annual wage bill from the private sector and the
compensation to employees paid (COMPHGG) from the government sector. The
private sector annual wage bill is driven by two factors: the average private sector
salary (EARNprivavg) and the total private sector labour force. The average wage
equation is given below,
65Mixed incomes include incomes generated from unincorporated enterprises, such as small family-
run firms and self-owned professional service providers. both labour incomes and capital in-
comes
66It is the compensation received by the household sector, COMPHI and the net compensation
received from the external sector, COMPW − COMPHW
67They come from two sub-sectors of the corporate sector: NFCPC and FC and the household
sector.
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4ln(EARNprivavg) = 0.39− 0.21ln(EARNpriv−awe−1 ) + 0.007W t
+0.45ln(LFSE−1/POP−1) + 0.10ln(goscos−1)
−0.90 MIG
cum
POPW−1
+ 0.034ln(ftse−1) (4.25)
where W t is a trend variable that reflects wage inflation over time. Average salary
growth is positively correlated with the employment ratio in the entire population
and the profitability of the corporate sector in the long-run. Strong stock market
performance also has a positive impact in the short-run. The cumulative number
of migrant workers within the working age population, however, has a deflationary
effect as expected.
4.4.8. Non-financial corporations (NFCPC)
The GVA of the NFCPC is the sum of the compensation of employees (COMPHNFCPC),
taxes less subsidies on production other than products (IT PDTNNFCPC−SUBPDTNNFCPC )
and the gross operating surplus (see BB Table 3.1.2). COMPHNFCPC has been
around 1.17 times the wage bill68 for the past decade, and the UKSIMM fixes it at
the 2017 level for the baseline simulation. The sectoral wage bill in turn follows the
dynamics of the NFC sector employment69 and average annual salaries70, an coeffi-
cient λEARN is assigned as well so it captures the unexplained share of the sectoral
wage bill (see 4.26).
EARNNFCPC = λEARNEARNAnnualLFSENFCPC (4.26)
Similarly, the gross operating surplus (GOSNFCPC) is assumed to be 59 per cent of
the COMPHNFCPCand IT PDTNNFCPC −SUBPDTNNFCPC remains its 2017 share of
the GVA over the simulation period.
68Compensation of employees is the total remuneration payable by an employer to an employee in
return for his/her work. In addition to wages and salaries (in cash and in kind), it also includes
employers’ social contributions.
69It employs 75 per cent of total private sector total employees, so it follows the dynamics of 4.19.
70It is driven by the equation of the average weekly salary.
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The primary income is detailed in BB Table 3.1.3. The balance is the sum of
GOSNFCPCand the net property incomes received. The gross property incomes
received and paid are 3.5 per cent and 4.2 per cent of the total financial assets and
liabilities respectively.
Primary income is the sum of the gross operating surplus and net property incomes.
The property income received is assumed to be 3.5 per cent of the total financial
assets, while property income paid is assumed to be 4.2 per cent of the financial
liabilities.
Gross disposable income is derived from primary income in the secondary distribu-
tion of income table (BB Table 3.1.4). In the national accounts, total resources must
equal total uses. The total resources are mainly from net social contributions from
employees (ECCNFCPC). Total uses consist of taxes on incomes (TTAXNFCPC)
and social benefits paid (SBFNFCPC). The residuals are accounted for by the net
current transfers71 in the UKSIMM and are assumed to be constant after 2017.
Based on the observation of UK data (see Fig. 4.9), the other three sub-components
( ECCNFCPC
COMPHNFCPC
, TTAXNFCPC
GOSNFCPC
, and SBFNFCPC
Y PNFCPC
) are largely stationary over time, hence
we assign historical shares for them in the model.
The net lending position (FSNFCPC), which contributes directly to the acquisition
of financial assets in the balance sheet, is consistent with the data presented in
the capital account (BB Table 3.1.7). It is equivalent to the net value of the first
two blocks for each column in Tab. 4.3. The resources that are not consumed will
be in the form of gross savings72, (SAV INGNFCPC) and net capital transfers73.
They are either used for investing in fixed assets (4KNFCPC) or financing inventory
accumulation (4INNFCPC) and net acquisition of non-produced non-financial assets
(4LNGG).
kivlNFCPC grows at an exogenous rate of 2 per cent, and the nominal value can be
calculated using the GDP deflator. The value contributes to the value K in Tab. 4.2.
71Unlike capital transfers, current transfers have a direct impact on consumption and the level of
disposable income.
72The capital depreciation is not modelled in the UKSIMM. It is equivalent to the gross disposable
income in the model.
73There are three components of the capital transfer receivables: capital taxes from other sec-
tors, investment grants and other transfers. The capital transfers payable only consist of two
subcomponents: investment grants and other transfers. The sum of the net values from the
corresponding sub-categories gives the net capital transfers in the capital account. It is assumed
to take a negative value of 2 per cent of government consumption and investment. As a net
value, this component has been highly volatile in the past and is therefore difficult to forecast.
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Figure 4.9.: Shares of income taxes, net social contributions, and social benefits,
1987-2017
Source: ONS and own calculation
The gross capital formation at constant price contributes to the new acquisition of
non-financial assets and also to the replenishment of depreciated fixed assets (8 per
cent in the model).
Accumulation of inventories (4inNFCPC) , deflated by GDPP , is described by
(4.27), it contributes to the IN term in Tab. 4.2.
42inNFCPC = 32361.62− 0.614inNFCPC−1 − 0.13inNFCPC−1
−141480.864ln(CPM) + 0.154gdppriv (4.27)
4inNFCPC is negatively related to the previous stock value in the long-run, which
is sensible, given that high stock of inventories not only places a financial burden on
business owners but also is a sign of an economic slowdown that signals to sellers
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they need to adjust their expectations. Similarly, when the economy experiences
high growth, reflected by4gdppriv then businesses need to build up their inventories
for the next period sales. It uses the GDP deflator.
4.4.9. Financial corporations (FC) and Banks (FC_MO)
Financial corporations
The same steps of deriving the net lending and borrowing positions described in
previous subsections and Tab. 4.6 also apply to financial corporations. Also, given
our intention is to simulate the interaction between the banking sector, a sub-sector
of the FC, and the real economy, the UKSIMM has dedicated most of its behavioural
relationships to the banking sector. The equations will be listed in the Appendix.
There is only one behavioural equation that is specific to the FC sector - the gross
fixed capital formation equation given by (4.28),
4ln(4kFC) = 5.76− 0.57ln(4kFC−1 )− 0.499ln(kivlFC−1 /gvaFC−1 )
+0.097LR−1 − 0.04TAXCTbank−1 + 6.624ln(gdp) (4.28)
where4kFC is positively correlated with real GDP in the short-run. In the long-run,
the share of non-financial assets at constant price over GVA (kivlFC−1 /gvaFC) has a
significant negative impact on investment growth. This might be due to diminish-
ing returns from additional investment. Unsurprisingly, a higher bank corporation
tax rate74 (TAXCTbank) will also limit investment, considering the banking sector
accounts for a significant share of the FC. The sign for the long-term interest rate
(LR) can either be positive or negative depending on whether the lending rate ef-
fects75 outweigh the effects from borrowing costs. The UK data shows a positive
sign consistently across various periods.
As discussed in the sec. 4.5, a significant limitation that can be improved in future is
to further disaggregate the FC sector so that the interactions between the banking
74Adjustment to the data is made after 2016 to reflect the implementation of the bank corporation
tax surcharge. It is set at a rate of 8 per cent on profits over ₤25 million.
75A higher lending rate will increase the profits for the sector.
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sector and non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs), where shadow banking re-
sides, can be simulated. This is important as shadow banking plays a highly salient
role in the endogenous credit creation story.
Banks
The banking sector is a sub-sector of financial corporations. We again start by
describing the key national accounting identities that are presented in the BB
2018. They are essentially a more comprehensive version of the transaction flows
described in the top two blocks of the banking sector column in Tab. 4.3. The
primary distribution of income account for the banking sector (BB Table 4.2.2)
lists the GVA using the income approach. It contains the compensation of em-
ployees (COMPHFCmo), taxes less subsidies on production other than products
(IT PDTNFCmo − SUBPDTNFCmo )76, and the gross operating surplus (GOSFCmo).
COMPHFCmo is estimated using a similar approach as in the NFCPC sector. It is
1.25 times the annual wage bill. The wage bill of the banking sector is in turn driven
by the average private sector wage and the total number of banking professionals in
the economy. The salary of an average banking professional is significantly larger
than that of the average private sector worker in the UK, which is consistent with
the empirical observation77. Banking professionals are assumed to comprise 1.96 per
cent of total private sector employees78.
GOSFCmo is estimated based on the profitability of the banking sector. Consider-
ing the sector profits from the interest rate spreads, the UKSIMM calculates the
gross operating surplus by applying the long-term interest rate (LR) to the banking
sector financial assets FASFCmo and short-term rate (BR) to its financial liabilities
(FLSFCmo). An additional behavioural equation for bad debts (DEBT bad), is as-
signed to the gross primary incomes of the banking sector, as it has to be written
off from the books and contributes negatively to the sector’s incomes. In (4.29),
the level of bad debts negatively correlates with GDP in both levels and in changes.
Without major shifts in lending practices, it is unlikely to witness bad debts ac-
cumulate during economic booms. Similarly, the negative relationship between the
76It is around 2.5 per cent of the banking sector’s GVA. It is relevant to note that there are no
subsidies applied to the banking sector’s production.
77The average salary in the UK financial industry exceeds 50k per annum, while the average private
sector salary is about half that amount.
78The 2018 Labour Force Survey shows that business, research and administrative professionals
account for 2.4 per cent of the total UK labour force so the share for banking professionals is
adjusted accordingly.
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short-term rate and the level of bad debts also appears to be statistical significant in
the short run and long run. As the basis for other yield curve rates in the market, a
lower short-term rate leads to lower lending rate, which ultimately affects borrowers’
ability to service the existing debt stocks.
∆ln(DEBT bad) = 60.14− 0.54ln(DEBT bad−1 )− 3.67ln(gdp−1)
− 0.26SR−1 − 28.00∆ln(gdp)
− 0.244SR (4.29)
As usual, the gross primary incomes (BB Table 4.2.3) are derived by adding net
property incomes to the GOSFCmo . Fixed rates of 1.4 per cent and 1.5 per cent
are assigned to the property incomes received and paid respectively. The secondary
distribution of income account (BB Table 4.2.4) details how gross disposable income
(Y DFCmo) is derived. Total resources must be matched by total uses in the account,
so we have
Y DFCmo = Y P FCmo +OCTBFCmo − TTAXFCmo (4.30)
where OCTBFCmo is the net current transfers79 and TTAXFCmo is the current taxes
on income and wealth, which is estimated by applying an adjusted corporate tax
rate (δTAXCTbank−1 /100) to its tax base measured by GOSFCmo . Social contributions
and social benefits exactly cancel out each other in the banking sector, hence are
not included. As shown in BB Table 4.2.6, Y DFCmo is equal to the gross savings
SAV INGSFCmo .
The net lending/borrowing position of the banking sector (FSFCmo) can be derived
using the same steps described in Tab. 4.6 and then linked to the banking sector bal-
ance sheet. There are literally no changes in assets due to the changes in inventories,
net acquisitions of valuables and net acquisitions of non-produced and non-financial
assets in the banking sector, so all three items are zero in the model. Net capital
79Net current transfers consist of net non-life insurance premiums, non-life insurance claims and
miscellaneous current transfers in the national account for the financial corporations. It remains
constant in the model baseline.
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transfers are assumed to be constant and KFCmo is about 10 per cent of the sectoral
GVA every year.
As observed in Fig. 4.10, financial asset and liability positions in the banking sector
have undergone structural shifts after the early 2000s. In particular, there has been
a surge in the importance of derivative holdings both on the asset and liability
sides. Such a change in the nature of banking makes modelling very challenging.
Considering our research focus is the traditional loan assets of the banking sector,
2017 shares are again used as the baseline scenario for our simulations.
Figure 4.10.: The Shares of Financial Assets and Liabilities, Banks
Source: ONS and own calculation
The growth of total financial assets in the banking sector (credit growth) is driven
by nominal GDP, given the strong positive correlation between the two. A high
mortgage scenario variable MORT add is also added to both the loan assets and
total assets (see Tab. 4.7). This is consistent with the EM creation hypothesis,
given the banking sector is the originator of mortgage loans in the economy. Their
credit supply decisions are currently exogenous in the model. For a more realistic
picture, they can be endogenised80.
On the balance sheet, to ensure the mortgage loans added to the total financial
assets are solely attributed to the loan assets, we have to use FASFCmo−MORT add
as the base for the high mortgage scenario simulations. Mortgage lending to the
household sector (MORTHI) comprises 33 per cent of the total loan assets of the
banking sector. In the high mortgage scenario, although the loan assets as a whole
remain at 33.24 per cent of the total assets, the mortgage lending share within the
80See sec. 4.5 for more discussion of this issue.
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loan assets increases over time. The equation is given by
MORTHI = 0.33LAFCmo +MORT add (4.31)
Mortgage lending on the asset side is matched by cash and deposits (M4LFCmo) on
the liability side. The deposits are transferred to either the bank accounts of house
sellers or the accounts of real estate companies soon after the transaction takes
place. In the high mortgage scenario, the shares of M4LFCmo will rise relative to
the total. The relative shares of the other financial liabilities must fall accordingly
to accommodate this change.
Table 4.7.: Financial balance sheet for the banking sector
Financial instrument Asset Liability
Money 0.335(FASFCmo −MORT add) −0.66(FLSFCmo +MORT add) +MORT add
Securities 0.0736(FASFCmo −MORT add) −0.09(FLSFCmo +MORT add)
Loans 0.3324(FASFCmo −MORT add) −0.0003(FLSFCmo +MORT add)
Equities 0.036(FASFCmo −MORT add) −0.0229(FLSFCmo +MORT add)
Insurance and pension 0.0001(FASFCmo −MORT add) −0.2254(FLSFCmo +MORT add)
Derivatives 0.22(FASFCmo −MORT add) −0.004(FLSFCmo +MORT add)
Others 0.0002(FASFCmo −MORT add) −0.0001(FLSFCmo +MORT add)
4.4.10. Government and central bank
The central bank, as the monetary policy authority, has a high level of autonomy.
Both the policy rate and the amount of reserves are under its direct control. These
two variables are set to be exogenous policy variables in the UKSIMM. Both can be
used to generate scenario analyses. Therefore the current behavioural equations for
the central bank are limited to the balance sheet only.
This section focuses more on the behavioural equations for the government sector.
The nominal GVA of the government sector is estimated to be the sum of 50 per cent
of nominal government consumption expenditure (0.5CGG) and gross fixed capital
formation (4KGG). This gives the total resources of the government sector.
In the primary distribution of income account (BB Table 5.1.2), the total resources
of the government must be equal to the total uses. Total uses consist of gross
operating surplus (GOSGG), compensation of employees (COMPHGG) and the
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tax less subsidies expenditure on production other than products81 (IT PDTGG −
SUBPDTGG). Public sector compensations is a product of the total size of the pub-
lic sector labour force (LFSEGG) and the average salary. The average public sector
salary is assumed to be slightly below the private sector level, which is given by,
0.9(COMPHNFCPC/LFSENFCPC). Therefore, GOSGG can be derived as a resid-
ual from the accounting identity.
The balance of gross primary incomes (Y PGG) is given by (4.32). It follows the
accounting identity presented in BB Table 5.1.3. In addition to GOSGG, we also
need the difference between total taxes received on production and imports (ITGG)
and total subsidies paid by the government sector (SUBGG). The resources and
uses of property incomes are assumed to be proportional to the total financial assets
(3.2 per cent) and liabilities (2.4 per cent) respectively.
Y PGG = GOSGG + ITGG − SUBGG + 0.032FASGG−1 − 0.024FLSGG (4.32)
Gross disposable income for the general government is the net outcome of secondary
distribution of income (See BB Table 5.1.4). The total resources are the sum of gross
primary income (Y PGG), tax revenues from the income and wealth (TTAXGG) and
net social contributions (ECCGG). Total uses, on the other hand, consist of social
benefits paid (SBFGG) and other current taxes (TAXGGpaid). The last term of
the equation is the net amount of other current transfers. To limit the degree of
complexity of the UKSIMM, OCTBGG is set at zero in the simulation.
Y DGG = Y PGG+(TTAXGG−TAXGGpaid)+(ECCGG−SBFGG)+OCTBGG (4.33)
TTAXGG is dependent on the the total taxes received from households and firms
net of the net direct tax revenues paid to the external sector, while TAXGGpaid is
relatively small in size. As it has been held constant in the BB at ₤1.389 billion
since 2012, the UKSIMM does likewise.
Social benefits paid at current prices, adjusted by CPm, are estimated using the
size of the retired and unemployed populations. A coefficient η, unit level of social
81There are neither taxes levied on government production nor subsidies given for government
production. Both terms are zero across the simulation periods.
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benefits, is assigned to the relevant population size. Social contributions received
by the government sector include both compulsory social security contribution82
(ECCNIC) and pensions (ECCGGpension). Pension contributions account for 16.5
per cent of COMPHGG and ECCNIC is estimated using (4.34).
4ln(ECCNIC) = −1.57− 0.19ln(ECCNIC−1 ) + 0.34ln(EARNpriv−1 )
− 0.18ln(NICuel−1 ) + 1.064ln(LFSEpriv)
+ 0.034(NICmain) (4.34)
ECCNIC effectively works like an income tax. It is positively related to the ‘tax’
base, i.e., private sector income level (EARNpriv) and the total labour force (LFSEpriv).
It is also affected by the ‘tax’ rate for each income band. As in 4.34, a higher stan-
dard tax rate (NICmain) will increase the total contributions received, while the
upper earning limit (NICuel) seems to have the opposite effect.
The government net lending/borrowing position (FSGG) is derived from the BB
Table 5.1.7 following the same steps as in Tab. 4.6. FSGG is the net between total
savings, which includes gross savings83 and net capital transfers and total investment
which consists of gross capital formation and the net acquisition of non-produced
non-financial assets (4LNGG). The values of the other items are negligible and
hence are not modelled.
The gross fixed capital formation at constant price assumes to grow at a constant
rate of 3 per cent annually and the investment price deflator is the same as the
GDP deflator. There are no changes in inventories for the government sector in the
simulation.
82Social security contributions are compulsory payments paid to the general government that con-
fer an entitlement to receive a (contingent) future social benefit. They include: unemployment
insurance benefits and supplements, injury and sickness benefits, old-age pensions, disability
and survivors’ pensions, family allowances, reimbursement for medical and hospital expenses
or provision of hospital or medical services. Contributions may be levied on both employees
and employers.
83It is the difference between the gross disposable income and the final consumption expenditure
of the government sector.
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4.4.11. External
Given the primary focus of the UKSIMM is on the domestic credit creation process
and its macroeconomic impacts, the modelling practice of the external sector is
significantly simplified. The current account balance consists of the external account
of goods and services (BB Table 7.1.0), the primary incomes, and current transfers
(BB Table 7.1.2), which is given by (4.35).
CAB = (X −M) +NCOMPW + (ITW − SUBW )
+(PICW − PIDW ) + TTAXW
+(OCTCW −OCTDW ) + SBFW (4.35)
X −M is the balance of goods and services, NCOMPW is the net compensation of
employees, ITW − SUBW is the tax on production net of subsidies paid, PICW−
PIDW gives the net property incomes received, tax on income, social benefits and
net other current transfers are given by TTAXW , SBFW , and OCTCW −OCTDW
respectively.
The net lending position is the sum of the current account balance and the capital
account (BB Table 7.1.7), which includes net capital transfers (OKTW ) and the net
acquisition of non-produced non-financial assets (4LNW ). The goods and services
balance is the main behavioural driver of the current account and net lending po-
sitions. The volume and price equations for exports and imports are described in
sec. 4.4.2 and sec. 4.4.3.
Most of the other sub-components in the current account and capital account are
growing in line with nominal GDP, using the fixed shares calculated by BB 2017
data. PICW and PIDW are calculated based on the previous period stock of total
financial assets and liabilities. 4LNW is assumed to be zero. Therefore, the position
of the external balance is entirely driven by domestic dynamics.
4.5. Simulation and future development
Simulation
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The UKSIMM allows us to explore different economic scenarios by introducing
shocks into the system with different scenario variables. Given our primary interest
is to understand the interactions between housing finance, the credit cycle and the
real economy, we constructed a high mortgage scenario to compare with the baseline
results. As explained in the modelling section, a scenario variable, MORT add, has
been added to the balance sheets of three sectors in the economy. These are the
banking sector, the NFCPC sector and the household sector.
In the baseline, the variable is constant throughout the simulation periods between
2018 and 2040. Since the total loan liabilities of the banking sector increases over
time, so the share of MORT add inevitably decreases. In the alternative scenario, we
have engineered a significant credit boom (high mortgage) which reaches more than
25 per cent of the loan liabilities in the banking sector at its peak. This is similar to
the relaxation of credit standards observed in Fig. 3.8 before the GFC. This boom is
then followed by a prolonged period of credit tightening. After the first super-cycle,
the cyclical behaviour continues as suggested by Minsky’s FIH, which enables us to
quantitatively investigate the economic impact of such financial booms and busts.
Figure 4.11.: Share of additional mortgage lending in the total loan liabilities of
the banking sector, baseline versus scenario
The balance sheet transactions are better illustrated with the help of Tab. 4.8. In
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T1, additional mortgage lending of ₤100,000, is issued to the household sector. The
banking sector thus increases its loan assets by ₤100,000 and an equal amount of loan
liabilities appears on the balance sheet of the household sector. As the mortgages
are credited to the bank accounts of the borrowers as assets, the banks now also
have an additional ₤100,000 as cash and deposit liability. The assets of both sectors
match their liabilities. In T2, as some of the households buy new residential buildings
from real estate companies, 25 per cent of the deposits are now transferred to the
companies’ accounts in the NFCPC sector. If a borrower buys an existing property,
such a transaction will end up in the account of another household. Therefore,
₤75,000 remain in the household sector. These shares remain exogenous in the
simulation.
Table 4.8.: Financial balance sheet in the high mortgage scenario, 000s, ₤
Banks Non-financial corporations Households
Asset Liability Asset Liability Asset Liability
T1 Loan ₤100 Deposit ₤100 Deposit ₤100 Loan ₤100
T2 Loan ₤100 Deposit ₤100 Deposit ₤25 Deposit ₤75 Loan ₤100
Source: created by the author
Some simulation results are presented in Fig. 4.12 and Fig. 4.13. Fig. 4.12 shows the
number of mortgage loans issued per thousand people in the UK. Since the 1970s
the UK economy has been through various episodes of boom and bust. We have
highlighted four major economic recessions and they seem to align closely to the
mortgage loan cycle. Before the financial crisis, the number of mortgages issued
remained above the historical average for nearly a decade.
In UKSIMM, mortgage lending is linked to the number of loans using (4.24). With-
out additional adjustments, the baseline scenario recovers very slowly. Although it
increases continuously between 2020 and 2040, it is still below the historical mean
level. The high mortgage scenario gives a more plausible picture, which presents sim-
ilar cyclical patterns as observed in the historical data. It provides some justification
for the feasibility of our assumption concerning the scenario variable, MORT add. It
should be noted that, our US analysis suggests that there is an indirect channel for
the international capital flows to influence the domestic mortgage lending and house
price. Kneer and Raabe (2019) also find evidence for the UK economy. Given the
UKSIMM do not explicitly model the capital flows, the amplitudes of the simulated
credit cycle are designed to be slightly lower than the previous cycles.
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Figure 4.12.: Financial cycle, number of mortgage loans per thousand people
Fig. 4.13 compares the simulated results between the high mortgage scenario and
the baseline, so the units are in percentage terms. The four variables of interest are
real household consumption, household net financial assets, real GDP and household
new debt to income ratio.
In Fig. 4.11, we notice that the share of mortgage lending constantly remains above
the baseline level over the simulation period. A relaxation in lending standards
would initially boost households and the overall economy compared with the base-
line. However, when there is a tightening in credit standards, both real outputs and
consumption will fall below the baseline level. The results appear to be consistent
with the simulation in Section 11.8.2 of Godley and Lavoie (2007), which shows how
a shift in the willingness to borrow can provide a stimulus to the economy in the
short-term but will result in permanently lower levels of real output and consump-
tion. The desire to borrow in the UKSIMM is estimated by the gross new mortgage
to person income ratio, which is indeed much higher in the high mortgage scenario
than the baseline on average.
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The reverse effect might be the result of increasing debt service payments84 and a
worsening of the household net financial assets position. In Tab. 4.8, we have shown
that some financial assets are transferred to NFCPC sector due to the purchase of
new residential buildings, but that all mortgage liabilities will stay in the household
sector. This reverse effect indeed took place in the UK and US, as GDP fell away
from the historical trend after the GFC (see Fig. 5.1).
The simulation results supplement our findings from the US analysis. Given that the
decline in trans-Atlantic capital flows only have short-run effects on real consumption
and the trans-Pacific inflows continued to grow, there must be some other factors
that have resulted in the permanent deviations of real consumption from its trend
level. With the both the UK and US have kept their policy rate low after the
GFC, the tightening in credit condition in the private sector seems to be the most
important contributory factor.
Figure 4.13.: Impacts on the real economy, high mortgage versus baseline
The high mortgage simulation is not a purely hypothetical construct. The more
realistic micro-level mechanism can be demonstrated using a set of sectoral balance
84Reinold (2011) argued that the declining in housing market transactions could be another suspect
for the negative HEW observed in the UK after the GFC.
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sheets and simulated using the UKSIMM accordingly. However, due to the time
constraints on this PhD, we can only present the case set out by Lavoie (2019) as a
guide for future work. Lavoie provided a more sophisticated version of Tab. 4.8 by
incorporating interactions between non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) and the
non-financial sector (NFS). The presence of the NBFIs, also known as the shadow
banking sector, is crucial in understanding the credit boom during the pre-crisis
period.
Table 4.9.: Money creation through the shadow banking sector, 000s, ₤
Bank NBFI Non-financial Sector
Asset Liability Asset Liability Asset Liability
T1 Loan ₤100 Deposit ₤100 Deposit ₤100 Loan ₤100
T2 Loan ₤100 Deposit ₤80
CD ₤20
CD ₤20 MMF ₤20 Deposit ₤80
MMF ₤20
Loan ₤100
T3 Loan ₤100 Deposit ₤95
CD ₤5
CD US₤5
Security ₤15
MMF ₤20 Deposit ₤95
MMF ₤20
Loan ₤100
Security ₤15
Source: Lavoie (2019)
In T1, an initial mortgage of ₤100,000 is originated by the banking sector to meet
the demand from the household sector, a sub-sector of the NFS. The mortgage is,
therefore, a financial asset for the banking sector and a liability for the NFS. The
seller will receive the payment from the mortgage borrower and then deposit the
same amount into the banking sector. In T2, we assume some (₤20,000) of the NFS
deposits are invested in a Money Market Fund (MMF), as a result of the demand
to diversify portfolio holdings. Consequently, the NFS holds two financial assets,
deposits and an investment in a MMF, that are worth ₤100,000 in total. The
banking sector is only partially liable to meet the withdrawal demand from the NFS
(₤80,000 at maximum), given the NBFI has now received a certificate of deposit
of ₤20,000 from the NFS. In T3, the NBFI invests ₤15,000 in company securities.
A new source of credit is generated within the economy, given that the NFS holds
a ₤100,000 mortgage and another ₤15,000 company securities as a liability. The
increase in the liability of NFS is matched by an equal increase in deposit holdings.
Therefore, the initial finance of ₤100,000 from the banking sector eventually resulted
in an additional 15 per cent of credit entering the economy through the interactions
between the NBFI and NFS.
In a more general form, we assume that the initial financing amount is L, the
percentage of the NFS assets engaged in an asset swap is α, and the portion of
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additional credit created by the shadow banking sector is β. Both α and β range
between 0 and 1, and β must not exceed the value of α. The total amount of credit
in the economy is thus given by (1 + β)L, with a maximum value of 2L. The value
of α and β reflect the investment preferences of the NFS and the NBFI respectively,
which are likely to show a procyclical pattern aligned with the credit and asset boom
and bust cycle.
Limitations and future development
The UKSIMM is only a prototype working model, and there is always room for im-
provement. Some of the behavioural equations are still ad-hoc in nature. Therefore,
the realism of the UKSIMM is compromised to a certain degree. In order to examine
the empirical validity in capturing the financial crisis, we conducted a within sample
simulation between 2005 and 2010. Four key variables are selected and are shown
in Fig. 4.14.
Figure 4.14.: In-sample simulation, selected variables
As expected, the results are mixed. The household sector has been the major focus
of the UKSIMM at current stage, given its importance in the UK economy. The
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in-sample forecasts for household consumption and total financial assets appears to
reflect the actual data very well. However, the forecast performance for real GDP
and house price index is less satisfactory. This is the result of the simplification
of certain features, which will be subject to revision in future development. For
example, real exports is assumed to grow at an exogenous rate of 2 per cent in
the model. There are three features that would be highly valuable to add to the
UKSIMM as the next step:
The first is to explicitly spell out the behavioural equations for the shadow banking
sector. As presented by Lavoie (2019), the NBFI plays an essential role in the credit
creation and securitisation process85 in the modern economy. The lending activities
between the NBFI and the real sector act as a multiplier of the initial finance that
comes from the banking sector. Similarly, the NBFI can also help the banking
sector to relax its liquidity and regulatory constraints through various ways, such
as purchasing securitised financial products off the balance sheets of banks.
The second feature is to incorporate regulatory measures and examine the effective-
ness of limiting credit creation from the domestic financial sector. This is closely
related to the first feature. In Godley and Lavoie (2007), when the level of own
funds of the banking sector is endogenised to the spread between lending and de-
posit rates. A low level of own fund requires a large enough spread to improve its
position. Alternatively, the banks can either issue new shares or restrict dividends.
All three methods require the acquiescence of capital markets to inject more capital
when needed, otherwise public institutions have to step in as happened after the
GFC. Lavoie (2019) argued that the higher capital adequacy ratio (CAR) require-
ment imposed by Basel III after the GFC may not be an effective measure to limit
endogenous money creation. An example of the potential ineffectiveness of the mea-
sures occurred when UBS offered loans to purchasers of its newly issued shares to
incentivise the purchase. Technically, this might be feasible but whether it is legal
is subject to question, for example the Barclays-Qatar deal.
The third feature is to allow more realism in the dynamics of the external sector
by building a multi-country SFC model. In the UKSIMM, the balance sheet of the
external sector is only a residual item with no behavioural assumptions assigned.
Both our US analysis in previous chapters and other empirical evidence from the
85Gorton and Metrick (2013) provided a detailed account of the securitisation process. Keys et al.
(2012) argued that the increasing securitisation seem lower the lender’s origination standards.
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UK86 lead us to believe that international capital flows are crucial in making sense
of the lending dynamics within the UK economy. However, as the workload involved
in building a multi-country empirical SFCM significantly exceeds the capacity of an
individual researcher, a theoretical or semi-empirical approach must be considered.
The four-country theoretical SFC model developed by Valdecantos and Zezza (2015)
could serve as a baseline in this regard.
4.6. Conclusion
This essay firstly reviewed the development of pre-GFC macroeconomic models.
Their failure in predicting the GFC is not a mere coincidence. Instead, there is a
deep structural issue that plagued these models. In particular, a macroeconomic
model that assigns no importance to the financial sector can be said to be like
Hamlet without the ‘Prince’ (Borio, 2014). The financial sector is the missing piece
of the puzzle that helps make sense of the GFC and the modern capitalist economy.
Consequently, since the GFC much macroeconomic research seeks to bring back the
‘Prince’.
Mainstream economists, such as Wren-Lewis (2018), do not think the GFC will result
in a paradigm shift like those that followed the GD and GI in the 1930s and 1970s,
as they still believe micro-founded macroeconomic models are fit for the future. To
them what is needed are more realistic assumptions and behavioural modelling at
the micro-level. However, the GFC has made economists more aware of the limits
of mainstream models (e.g. the DSGE models), and to become more tolerant of
other modelling strategies, such as structural econometric models and agent-based
modelling.
Among all the alternative modelling strategies, the SFC approach has received the
most rapid growth in interest from both academic researchers and policymakers
across the globe. Advanced by Wynne Godley, one of the few economists to have
foreseen the GFC, and his various co-authors, the SFC literature has expanded
rapidly in the last decade. Instead of focusing on micro-foundations87, the SFC
approach is deeply rooted in national accounting and emphasises the completeness
86Kneer and Raabe (2019) found that foreign capital inflows positively correlated with the domestic
credit boom, especially in the construction sector, during the pre-crisis period.
87In sec. 4.3, we have mentioned that there is a group of researchers that are engaged in incorpo-
rating the ABM into the SFC framework to provide micro-level behaviours.
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of the economic system through watertight accounting rules. The words of Godley
best describe this principle - ‘everything must come from somewhere, and everything
must go somewhere’. Along with the other econometric-based forecasting models, the
SFCM provides greater external consistency with empirical data. It should be taken
much more seriously or at least be accepted as part of the suite of macroeconomic
models proposed by Blanchard (2018).
Our working empirical SFC model of the UK economy (UKSIMM) contributes to a
burgeoning strand of literature on empirical SFCM. Compared with the other (only)
three empirical UK SFC models, it has two distinctive features. Firstly, it added
an active financial sector, in particular the banking sector, which allows us to study
the interactions between the financial sector and the real economy. This is precisely
what is missing from the pre-GFC literature. Secondly, the UKSIMM empirically
estimates the full national accounts. Therefore, to the best of our knowledge, this
is the first empirical SFCM for the UK at this scale. A simple case of the high
mortgage scenario, which features a Minsky type credit cycle, has already captured
many features observed before and after the 2007-09 financial crisis.
It complements very well with our inquiry into the underlying causes of the GFC
in the previous chapters. Firstly, in the US analysis, foreign holding of corporate
bonds only appear to have short-run effects on real consumption. As the surplus
(GSG) countries continued their purchase of the US Treasury bonds after the crisis
and the US policy rate was almost lowered to its zero-lower bound, the credit cycle
contraction thus seems to be the most significant contributory factor in causing the
permanent decline in real consumption in the US and UK.
That said, this work is nowhere near complete and will be the subject of more
development in the future. This is merely the beginning of a long journey in SFC
research. As mentioned in the last section, the accounting structure, especially the
financial and external sector, is not yet complete and there are many other realistic
features/behavioural equations that should be appended to the model.
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5. Conclusion
The GFC led to the worst global recession since the Great Depression in the 1930s.
As shown in Fig. 5.1, real household consumption in the US and UK, as a measure
of welfare, has dropped permanently away from the historical trend after 2008.
A decade later, there is still no sign of convergence back to the previous trend.
Lower consumption levels have translated either into lower real incomes or, in some
countries, into mass unemployment. Behind these numbers lies the suffering of
millions of ordinary people. It is the responsibility of our generation to unravel the
mysteries of the GFC and to provide a sensible solution to prevent or, at the very
least, mitigate the impact of such calamities in future decades. The primary purpose
of this thesis has been to inquire into the underlying causes of the 2007- 2009 GFC
and its linkages with the current episode of global imbalances. Three independent
yet interconnected essays have been developed to support this investigation. Each
essay has analysed the GFC from a different perspective.
Figure 5.1.: Real household consumption in the US (left) and UK (right) after the
GFC, millions, domestic currency
The first essay is a theoretical paper that sets the scene for the rest of the thesis. It
contributes to the theoretical debates on the financial crisis by providing a critical
review of the most up-to-date literature, especially on the GSG hypothesis. The
GSG story emphasises the role of global current account imbalances in causing the
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GFC (see sec. 2.3.2). Our assessment reveals that the conclusion of the GSG hy-
pothesis relies on the classical theory of interest with interest rates acting as the
equilibrating price that brings supply and demand of loanable funds into market
equilibrium. The hypothesis argues that excessive savings in global markets that
ended up flowing into the US economy were accountable for the decline of the US
long-term interest rate. These excessive savings from surplus countries either di-
rectly fuelled the US domestic credit and housing boom or indirectly contributed
to the boom through the channel of the long-term interest rate. The consequent
consumption boom further worsened the US current account position and a vicious
cycle developed leading to the financial meltdown of 2008. Advocates of the GSG
hypothesis thus argue that the leading cause of the GFC was external to the US
economy.
Theoretically, a persistent current account deficit can indeed pose a threat to eco-
nomic stability. However, our review of various historic episodes of global imbal-
ances (see sec. 2.3.3) suggests such a linkage between global imbalances and financial
crises, as advocated by GSG proponents, cannot be justified. For example, the im-
balances between the Roman Empire and the East persisted for centuries and the
trans-Atlantic imbalances between the US and Europe in the late 19th Century ad-
justed smoothly through the price-specie flow mechanism. Therefore, there must
be something unique to the current episode of the global imbalances that led to
such a different result. Our review of two alternative hypotheses, the GFG and EM
hypotheses, resolves this puzzle by highlighting two major theoretical weakness of
the GSG hypothesis.
The GFG hypothesis argues that the current account position is inadequate as it
only captures net capital flows, not gross capital flows, and that these gross flows are
crucial in making sense of the GFC (see sec. 2.4.2). While in the 19th century, when
capital flowed predominantly from Europe to the Americas to finance the develop-
ment of the New World, the current account might have been a suitable measure (as
net flows remained close to gross flows), with the rapid growth of two-way capital
flows across the Atlantic over the past few decades it has become clear, if both gross
inflows and outflows are large scale, then the current account alone cannot suitably
capture such a development. Indeed this was clearly the case between Europe and
the US in the years leading up to the GFC, when BIS estimated gross inflows from
advanced European economies amounted to US$0.7 trillion but the current account
as a whole remained broadly in balance. Unlike the trans-Pacific capital flows, which
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consisted mainly of inflows from current account surplus countries used primarily for
the purchase of US Treasury bonds and agency bonds, the majority of trans-Atlantic
capital inflows went into the purchase of US corporate bonds, including the private-
label MBSs that were at the epicentre of the financial crisis. Therefore, the clear
implication is that the focus on current account imbalances alone was inadequate as
it diverted attention away from a key development witnessed in the lead up to the
GFC.
The EM hypothesis further highlights a weakness in the GSG hypothesis in that
it fails to recognise the difference between saving and financing (sec. 2.4.1). The
former is merely a national account concept showing what is left unconsumed, while
the latter is a cash-flow concept that is critical in understanding the credit and
housing boom before the GFC. The modern banking sector is capable of creating
money/credit without acquiring savings in the first place. In fact, according to re-
searchers at BoE and BIS (McLaren (2012); McLeay et al. (2014)), it should be the
other way around, when a loan is issued, the same amount of deposits will be simul-
taneously credited to the borrower’s account. Therefore, loans create savings and
consequently there is no need for foreign savings to finance the housing and credit
booms in the US. Thus, under this hypothesis, the relaxation in credit standards
after decades of financial liberalisation and loose monetary policy in the US was the
most significant contributory factor to the GFC.
However, although the first essay highlighted that the GSG hypothesis has significant
theoretical flaws, it should not be entirely rejected without empirical support. Hence
the second essay aimed to verify the claims made by the three competing hypotheses
using US data. Four essential questions (see chapter 1) were formulated to guide our
inquiry. For each question, a single equation ECM was constructed as the empirical
strategy, which allowed us to study both the short-run and long-run effects.
Given the importance of household consumption in the US economy, the first ECM
equation focuses on the determinants of household consumption. Our findings in-
dicate that although neither mortgage lending nor housing wealth shows a robust
positive correlation with household consumption, their interaction effects, reflected
by the measure of HEW, appear to be highly significant and have a positive impact
on household consumption. A negative HEW after the GFC was also witnessed
in the UK. Despite its importance in explaining household consumption, research
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on HEW remains surprisingly limited1. Its underlying mechanism deserves more
investigation in future.
The second equation focuses on identifying the domestic determinants, suggested by
the EM hypothesis, of the boom and bust cycles in the US housing and credit mar-
kets. We find that the rent-arbitrage model conforms very well with US house price
data, but credit conditions only shows short-term effects. The mortgage liability
model, however, identifies significant positive reinforcing effects with house prices as
suggested by Ryan-Collins et al. (2017) and a strong positive correlation with credit
standards in the long-run dynamics. Both house prices and the mortgage liability
model therefore seem to support the claims of the EM hypothesis.
The third and fourth ECM equations investigate both direct (trans-Pacific capital
flows) and indirect channels (long-term interest rate) as proposed by the GSG hy-
pothesis. Measures for the trans-Atlantic capital flows are also included to examine
the claims of the GFG hypothesis. The results identified no direct effect on house
prices and mortgage liabilities from capital inflows measures. However, the GSG
hypothesis makes a comeback through the long-term interest rate channel. The
trans-Pacific capital flows appear to have long-run negative effects on the long-term
interest rate, while the trans-Atlantic capital flows also exert downward pressure on
the long-term interest rate, although the impact is short-lived.
The presence of two-way interactions among the four endogenous variables makes
it extremely difficult to compare the relative importance of each factor. Therefore,
a partial equilibrium model (USMOD) was constructed to fulfil this purpose. The
USMOD is entirely consistent with the ECM findings, but it can now fully capture
both direct and indirect effects after shocking the exogenous variables such as foreign
capital flows.
The simulation results are very revealing. During the GFC, it was the fall in the
foreign purchases of corporate bonds which hurt the US housing and credit market
and consequently depressed household consumption. Foreign holdings of Treasury
bonds continued to grow even during the post-crisis period and actually acted as
a stabiliser for the US economy. Should the trend of foreign holdings of Treasury
bonds have followed that of corporate bonds, the economic recession would have
been much worse. However, given that the trans-Atlantic flows only have short-
term effects on the long-term interest rate, this factor is unlikely to explain the
1Reinold (2011) is the only working paper on HEW at the BoE since 2000.
218
Conclusion
permanent deviation from the trend as seen in Fig. 5.1. Therefore, further inquiry
into domestic factors such as credit standards and monetary policy is required. The
stimulus effects are apparent when both measures are relaxed in the simulation.
In order to better model the domestic factors and their role in the GFC the third
essay endeavoured to build an empirical SFC model with a banking sector for the
UK. The essay commenced by providing a detailed discussion of the role of various
macroeconomic models in understanding the GFC. The extensive literature review
on the development of macroeconomic models led us to conclude that a macroe-
conomic model without an active financial sector is inadequate in analysing the
modern monetary economy. Therefore, many mainstream macroeconomic models
that do not have a financial sector significantly limit our ability to make sense of
the GFC.
The growing interest in the SFC approach from both academia and policy institu-
tions is a response to the failure of mainstream models in predicting and providing
a satisfactory analytical framework for the GFC. We seconded the proposal of Blan-
chard that one should not expect a model to produce reliable answers for questions
that are beyond the purposes the model was originally designed to address. Macroe-
conomic modellers must embrace more pluralism in the profession. Godley’s success
in predicting both the dot-com bubble and the GFC exemplify the usefulness of the
SFC approach, which places great emphasis on the importance of accounting consis-
tencies in dealing with the monetary and financial sides of the economy. The SFC
approach thus undoubtedly deserves its legitimate place in the suite of economic
models.
Our work in the third essay on the UKSIMM, a large-scale empirical SFCM, repre-
sents a major contribution to this field of inquiry. It essentially models the entire UK
national accounts, so it provides a more complete picture of the economic dynamics
than the USMOD. To the best of our knowledge, it is currently the only empirical
SFCM for the UK economy at this scale. Compared with the other (only) three
empirical UK SFC models, it has two distinctive features. Firstly, it adds an active
financial sector, in particular the banking sector, to the CBR model which allows
us to study the interactions between the financial sector and the real economy. Sec-
ondly, the UKSIMM empirically estimates the full national accounts, which provides
a more comprehensive account than the BoE SFC model.
The simulation results from a Minsky-type financial cycle are complementary to
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the USMOD results. The amplitudes of the simulated credit cycle are smaller than
those in the early 2000s. This is reasonable as no international capital flows are
incorporated into the UKSIMM and they do appear to indirectly affect the credit
cycle in the USMOD. Moreover, the reverse effects during the downturn of the
credit cycle resulted in a permanently lower level of household consumption which
is consistent with the observation in Fig. 5.1. This in turn supplements the USMOD
results. As a fall in trans-Atlantic capital flows only generates short-term effects, a
permanent reduction in the levels of consumption and GDP in the US are likely to
be the result of a tightening in credit standards.
As a working model, the model specification of the UKMOD will inevitably be
subject to amendment in future research to further improve its realism2. In fact,
the research to incorporate non-bank financial institutions has already started.
2For more discussion on future research please refer to sec. 4.5.
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A. Statistical test results
The following tables contain the unit root test results for the variables of interest
presented in the long-run dynamics in Chapter 3. All the variables appear to be
I(1), that is, their first differences are stationary I(0).
Table A.1.: Unit root test results for the household consumption equation
Levels First difference
Variable ADF PP ADF PP
Housholds consumption, real -1.243559 -1.243559 -6.963154*** -6.963471***(0.8896) (0.8896) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Housing equity withdrawa, real -1.463031 -0.191529 -2.712707*** -2.667808***(0.1318) (0.6104) (0.0081) (0.0091)
Financial wealth, real -1.379722 -1.348944 -6.227405*** -6.324271***(0.8544) (0.8631) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Housing wealth, real -3.176737 -1.785839 -3.851074** -3.023223(0.1018) (0.6957) (0.0227) (0.1372)
Mortgage liability, real -2.282705 -2.029758 -4.060260** -2.293266(0.4341) (0.5705) (0.0135) (0.4292)
Consumer credit, real -1.219520 -1.337206 -5.248433*** -5.169971***(0.8950) (0.8663) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Disposable income, real -1.243559 -1.243559 -6.963154*** -6.963471***(0.8896) (0.8896) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Baseline model has a constant and trend is considered, P-values are in parenthesis
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
aNo costant or trend and pre-crisis sample
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Table A.2.: Unit root test results for house price, mortgage liabilities, long term
interest rate and foreign portfolio holdings
Baseline model has a constant, P-values are in parenthesis, anot in log form
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
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Table A.3.: Endogeneity test for short-term variables in equations
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Table A.4.: Bounds test for selected equations
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B. Notations and List of equations
for UKSIMM
The list of notations contains all the major variables that have been used in the
UKSIMM. Notations in the main text are slightly different from the Eviews model
file. There are some general rules applied when converting the Eviews notations into
the main text notations.
In Eviews, variable names that end with letter ‘N’ and ‘V’ represent the nominal
and real values of the corresponding variables. For instance, CN stands for the
nominal value of aggregate consumption and CV is the real value. In the main
text, however, nominal values are in upper cases and real values are in lower cases.
Therefore, CN and CV are converted into C and c respectively in Chapter 4.
In the main text, the superscript indicates the economic sector that the variable is
associated with. For example, while CV_HI stands for the real value of household
consumption in Eviews, it appears to be cHI in Chapter 4.
While the subscript gives the time lag of the variable in the main text, the time
lags are specified in brackets following the variables in Eviews. For example, the
nominal value of aggregate consumption with one lag is given by CN(-1) in Eviews
and C−1 in Chapter 4.
The list of equations specifies all the accounting identities and behavioural equa-
tions in the UKSIMM as appeared in the Eviews model file. The notation rules
described above also apply.
The statistical significance of the coefficients in the behavioural equations are de-
noted by * sign. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively. Adjusted R2, as a measure of goodness-of-fit, and the data sample
period are provided at the end of each behavioural equation.
If a behavioural equation or the accounting identity also appears in the main text as
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a displayed formula, its associated equation number and page number in the main
text will be presented as well.
Let us consider the equation for real household consumption (Eq4) in the list of
equations as an example. Almost all of the coefficients in the equation are statis-
tically significant at 1 per cent level, except the coefficient for mortgage rate. The
adjusted R2 suggests that the regression model can explain 95 percentage of the
variations in real household consumption using UK data between 1975 and 2017. In
the main text, the same equation is appeared to be equation (4.9) on page 181.
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List of notations
Notations in Eviews Description Notations in
Chapter 4
BAD_DEBTS Amount of bad debts in banks DEBT bad
CBALN Current account balance CAB
CN Aggregate consumption, nominal C
COMPHN Total compensation to employees, paid COMPH
COMPN Total compensation of employees COMP
CP_GG Consumption deflator for government sector CPGG
CUM_MIGW Cumulative working age migration MIGCUM
CV Aggregate consumption, real c
DEBT_HI_LT Household long-term debts DEBTHILT
DEBT_HI_ST Household short-term debts DEBTHIST
DEBT_HI_OTH Other debts held by households DEBTHIOTH
DERA Derivatives assets DERA
DERL Derivatives liabilities DERL
DIN Changes in inventories, nominal ∆IN
DIV Changes in inventories, real ∆in
DKIVP Deflator for gross fixed capital formation IV P∆K
DKN Total gross capital formation, nominal ∆K
DKV Total gross capital formation, real ∆k
DLN Acquisitions less disposals of non-produced, non financial assets ∆LN
DSA Debt securities, assets DSA
DSL Debt securities, liabilities DSL
DVN Acquisitions less disposals of valuables, nominal ∆V
DVV Acquisitions less disposals of valuables, real ∆v
EARNINGS Wages and salaries EARN
EARNINGS_PRIV_AWE Private sector average weekly salary EARNPRIVAWE
ECCN Total social contributions, nominal ECC
ECCN_GG_PENSIONS Social contributions, pension, government sector, nominal ECCGGpension
ECCN_HI_PRIV Total social contributions, private sector, nominal ECCHIpriv
ECCN_NIC General government compulsory social contribution received ECCNIC
EFXI Effective exchange rate index EFXI
EMP_RATE Employment rate REMP
FASN Total financial asset, nominal FAS
FLSN Total financial liability, nominal FLS
FSN Net lending and borrowing, nominal FS
FTSE FTSE all share index FTSE
GDPN Gross domestic product, nominal GDP
GDPP GDP deflator GDPP
GDPV Gross domestic product, real gdp
GDPV_PRIV Gross domestic product, private sector, real gdppriv
GOLDN Gold reserves and SDR, nominal GOLD
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Notations in Eviews Description Notations in
Chapter 4
GOSN Gross operating surplus, nominal GOS
GOSNMIX_HI Gross operating surplus and mixed incomes, nominal, household
sector
NA
GVAN Gross value added, nominal GV A
HB_HA House building, housing association HBha
HB_PR New house building, private sector NA
HMEANADV Average mortgage advances HMEANADV
HP_MEAN Average house price HPmean
HPI House price index HPI
HSTOCK_PR Total housing stock, private sector Hstockpriv
INV_GRANTS Investment grants INV grants
INVN_M Stock of inventories, nominal INV M
INVV_M Stock of inventories, real invM
IPA Insurance and pensions, assets IPA
IPL Insurance and pensions, liabilities IPL
ITN_GG Taxes on products and production, government sector ITGG
ITN_PDTN Taxes on production other than products IT PDTN
ITN_PDTS Total taxes on products (VAT and others) IT PDTS
KIVLN Stock of non-financial assets, nominal KIV L
KIVLV Stock of non-financial assets, real kivl
LA Loan, assets IV P∆K
LA_FC_MO_LT_HI Long-term loan assets held by banks against the household sector NA
LFSE Total labour force LFSE
LFSE_PRIV Total labour force, private sector LFSEpriv
LFSE_PRIV_EE Employees in private sector LFSEprivee
LFSE_SE Self-employed in private sector LFSEse
LFSU Unemployment LFSU
LL Loan, liabilities LL
LR Long-term interest rate LR
LRA Financial asset returns coefficient, household sector NA
M4A Cash and deposit, assets M4A
M4L Cash and deposit, liabilities M4L
MIGW Incoming migrant workers MIGw
MN Imports, nominal M
MORTGAGE_RATE Mortgage rate Rmort
MP Imports deflator MP
MV Imports, real m
NETDEBT_GG_ONS Net government debt, stock NDEBTGG
NFASN Net financial assets, nominal NFAS
NIC_UEL National insurance standard rate NICUEL
NOTES_ISSUED Bank notes NOTES
OARA Other financial assets OARA
OARL Other financial liabilities OARL
OCTBN Other current transfers, net OCTB
OCTCN Other current transfers, resource OCTC
OCTDN Other current transfers, uses OCTD
OKTBN Capital transfers, net OKTB
OKTCN Capital transfers, resources OKTC
OKTDN Capital transfers, uses OKTD
OTH_CAP_TRANS Other capital transfers NA
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Notations in Eviews Description Notations in
Chapter 4
PENSION_FUNDS_HI Pension funds, household PFUNDHI
PICN Property income received, nominal PIC
PIDN Property income paid, nominal PID
POPN Total population POP
POPN65 Population above 65 POP 65
POPW Working age population POPw
REPAY_RATE Repayment rate Rrepay
RESERVES Bank reserves Reserves
SALESN Total sales, nominal S
SALESV Total sales, real s
SAVING Gross savings SAV INGS
SBFN Net social benefits, nominal SBF
STA Stocks and equities, assets STA
STAMP_DUTY Stamp duty receipts STAMP
STL Stocks and equities, liabilities STL
SUBN Total Subsidies, nominal SUBGG
SUBN_PDTN Subsidies on production SUBPDT
SUBN_PDTS Subsidies on products SUBPDTS
TAX_CAPITAL_HI Capital taxes paid by households TAXCAPHI
TAXN_HI Taxes on incomes and wealth and compulsory social contributions,
household
TAXHI
TTAXN Taxes on incomes and wealth TTAX
WAGE_TARGET Wage target WAGETarget
XN Exports, nominal X
XP Exports deflator XP
XV Exports, real x
YDN Gross disposable income, nominal Y D
YPN Gross primary income, nominal Y P
251
Chapter B Notations and List of equations for UKSIMM
List of equations
No. Equation in UKSIMM Description
Eq1
GDPV = CV_HI + CV_GG + DKV + DIV_M + DIV_GG + DVV_M + DVV_GG + XV - MV,
Eq(4.8), p.181
Real GDP
Eq2 GDPN=GDPV*(GDPP/100) Nominal GDP
Eq3 GDPV_PRIV=GDPV-GVAN_GG/(GDPP/100) Private sector GDP, real
Eq4
D(CV_HI)=139196.73***-0.54***CV_HI(-1)+0.26***((YDN_HI(-1)))/(CP_M(-
1)/100)+0.037***FASN_HI(-1)/(CP_M(-1)/100)+0.027***NUMLOANS(-1)(HMEANADV(-
1)/100000)/(CP_M(-1)/100)+0.14***D(YDN_HI/(CP_M/100))+115803.61***DLOG(HPI/CP_M)-
151887.04***REPAY_RATE(-1)+1.52***D(FASN_HI/CP_M)-1065.98*MORTGAGE_RATE(-1)-
176404.72***DEBT_HI_ST(-1)/YDN_HI(-1)-
22.68**D(DEBT_HI_ST/CP_M)+12.36***D(DEBT_HI_LT/CP_M)+16779.98***D90+11678.55**D2005,
adj. R2 = 0.95, sample:1975-2017, Eq(4.9), p.181
Real household consumption
Eq5 REPAY_RATE=0.08 Repayment rate
Eq6 CN_HI=CV_HI*(CP_M/100) Nominal household consumption
Eq7 CP_GG=CP_M Government consumption deflator
Eq8 CV_GG=CV_GG(-1)*1.02 Real government consumption
Eq9 CN_GG=CV_GG*(CP_GG/100) Nominal government consumption
Eq10 DKV=DKV_HI+DKV_COS+DKV_GG, Eq(4.10), p.182 Gross fixed capital formation, real
Eq11 DKV_COS=DKV_NFCPC+DKV_FC
Gross fixed capital formation, real, corporate
sector
Eq12 DKN_COS = DKN - DKN_HI - DKN_GG
Eq13 DKN = GDPN + MN - (CN_HI + CN_GG + DIN_M + DIN_GG + DVN_M + DVN_GG + XN)
Gross fixed capital formation, nominal,
households
Eq14 DKN_HI = 0.251957767DKN
Eq15
DLOG(DKV_HIX) = 3.95***- 0.35***LOG(DKV_HI( - 1)) +
0.51***DLOG(HB_PR*HP_MEAN/YDN_HI) - 0.005*MORTGAGE_RATE(-1) + 0.17***D88 -
0.13***D97 - 0.09D2012, adj R2 = 0.88, sample:1987-2017, Eq(4.11), p.183
Gross fixed capital formation, real, households
Eq16 DKV_HI=DKV_HIX+0.25*LA_FC_MO_LT_ADD/(GDPP/100)
Gross fixed capital formation, real, households,
scenario
Eq17
D(DIV_MX) = 87.95-0.71***DIV_M(-1) + 0.18***D(GDPV_PRIV) -
2080.96***D(GDPP)-16747.42***D99 + 8735.54**D98, adj. R2=0.82, sample: 1980-2017, Eq(4.12),
p.183
Changes in inventories, real, total
Eq18 DIV_M=DIV_MX Changes in inventories, real, total, adjustment
Eq19 INVV_M=INVV_M(-1)+DIV_M Stock of inventories, real
Eq20 DIN_M=INVN_M-INVN_M(-1) Changes in inventories, nominal
Eq21 INVN_M=INVN_M(-1)*(MP+GDPP)/(MP(-1)+GDPP(-1))+DIV_M*(GDPP/100) Stock of inventories, nominal
Eq22 DIV_HI=0.0025*(GVAN_HI/(GDPP/100)) Changes of inventories, real, households
Eq23 DIN_HI=0.001*GVAN_HI Changes of inventories, nominal, households
Eq24 XV=XV(-1)*1.02 Exports, real
Eq25 XN=XV*(XP/100) Exports, nominal
Eq26
DLOG(MV) = -6.73***-0.71***LOG(MV(-1))+0.78***LOG(CV_HI(-1))+0.23***LOG(XV(-
1))+0.09*LOG(CV_GG(-1))+0.07**LOG(DKV_COS(-1))+1.66***DLOG(GDPV-
XV+MV)+0.46***DLOG(XV)-0.05***LOG(LFSU(-1)/POPW(-1))+0.05***D84+0.07***D74, adj.
R2 = 0.91, sample: 1970-2017, Eq(4.13), p.184
Imports, real
Eq27 MN=MV*(MP/100) Imports, nominal
Eq28 GOSN=GOSN_HI+GOSN_NFCPC+GOSN_FC+GOSN_GG+GOSN_W Total gross operating surplus
Eq29
DLOG(CP_M) = 0.58***- 0.32***LOG(CP_M(-1)) + 0.25***LOG(EARNINGS_PRIV_AWE(-1)) +
0.11***LOG(MP(-1)) - 0.27***LOG(GDPV_PRIV(-1)/LFSE_PRIV(-1)) + 0.12***DLOG(MP) +
0.10*DLOG(MINIMUM_WAGE(-1)) + 0.47***DLOG(EARNINGS_PRIV_AWE), adj. R2 = 0.90,
sample: 1982-2017, Eq(4.14), p.185
Consumption deflator
Eq30
DLOG(EFXI) = 0.34*-0.08**LOG(EFXI(-1))-0.01***(@PC(CP_M(-1))-@PC(USA_CPI(-
1)))+0.008***D(WTI)+0.01***(XN(-1)-MN(-1))/GDPN(-1)*100 + 0.02**(LR(-1)-USA_LR(-1)), adj.
R2 = 0.35, sample:1970-2017, eq(4.18) p.187
Effective exchange rate
Eq31 MORTGAGE_RATE=LR+0.75 Mortgage rate
Eq32 DKIVP=DKN/DKV Investment deflator
Eq33
GDPP = 1.03***GDPP(-1) + 0.63***CP_M - 0.64***CP_M(-1) + 0.24***XP - 0.24***XP(-1) -
0.19***MP + 0.18***MP(-1) + 0.12***BR - 0.497***, adj. R2 = 0.99, sample: 1951-2017
GDP deflator
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No. Equation in UKSIMM Description
Eq34 DLOG(MP)=1.59***-0.19***LOG(MP(-1))-0.19***LOG(EFXI(-1))+0.05***DLOG(WORLD_RMP(-
1))+0.022***LOG(OILPR$PB(-1))+0.035***DLOG(OILPR$PB)-
0.697***DLOG(EFXI)+0.25***DLOG(WTI)+0.08***D80-0.07***D86, adj. R2 = 0.92, sample:
1979-2017, Eq(4.15), p.186
Import prices
Eq35 D(LR) = -0.979**-0.04**LR(-1)+0.17***D(BR)+0.22***D(USA_BR)+0.01***EFXI(-1)+2.62***D74-
1.44***D98+1.81***D90-1.02**D2012, adj. R2 = 0.81, sample: 1970-2017, Eq(4.17),
p.187
Long-term interest rates
Eq36 LOG(XP) = 0.008 + 0.95***LOG(XP(-1)) - 0.14*LOG(XP(-2)) + 0.63***LOG(MP) -
0.44***LOG(MP(-1)), adj. R2 = 0.998, sample:1970-2017, Eq(4.16), p.186
Export prices
Eq37 YPN_HI=GOSNMIX_HI+COMPN_HI+(LRA/100)*FASN_HI(-1)-(0.01+BR/100)*DEBT_HI(-1) Gross primary incomes,
households
Eq38 LRA=(((1+BR)*M4A_HI)+(4*LA_HI)+(4*STA_HI)+4*IPA_HI)/FASN_HI(-1) Financial asset returns coefficient,
households
Eq39 YDN_HI=YPN_HI+SBFN_GG+SBFN_HI_PRIV-TTAXN_HI-ECCN_GG-
ECCN_HI_PRIV+OCTBN_HI
Gross disposable income,
households
Eq40 SBFN_HI_PRIV=0.023*IPA_HI(-1) Net social benefits, private sector
Eq41 ECCN_HI_PRIV=ECCN_HI_PRIV(-1)*(COMPN_HI/COMPN_HI(-1)) Net social contributions, private
sector
Eq42 OCTCN_HI=OCTCN_HI(-1)*CP_M/CP_M(-1)*0.99 Current transfers, received
Eq43 OCTDN_HI=OCTDN_HI(-1)*CP_M/CP_M(-1) Current transfers, paid
Eq44 OCTBN_HI=OCTCN_HI-OCTDN_HI Net current transfers
Eq45 TAXN_HI=TTAXN_HI+ECCN_NIC Taxes on incomes and wealth and
compulsory social contributions,
household
Eq46 TTAXN_HI=0.15*YPN_HI Taxes on incomes and wealth
Eq47 ECCN_HI=0.2*YPN_HI Social contribution, households
Eq48 SAVING_HI=YDN_HI-CN_HI Gross saving, households
Eq49 D(TAX_CAPITAL_HI)=-802.32***-0.53***TAX_CAPITAL_HI(-1)+6.26***HP_MEAN(-
1)+446.70***NFASN_HI(-1)/GDPN(-1)+0.009***D(GDPN)+598.93***D2013, adj. R2 = 0.71, sample:
1987-2017, eq(4.22), p. 192
Capital tax paid, households
Eq50 INV_GRANTS_HI=0.00265*GDPN Investment grants, households
Eq51 OTH_CAP_TRANS_HI=0.002*GDPN Other capital transfers, payable,
households
Eq52 FSN_HI = SAVING_HI + INV_GRANTS_HI - TAX_CAPITAL_HI + OTH_CAP_TRANS_HI -
DKN_HI - DIN_HI - DLN_HI + BALANCE_HI
Net lending position, households
Eq53 FASN_HI = FASN_HI_EXCL + PENSION_FUNDS_HI + (0.75 * LA_FC_MO_LT_ADD) Total financial assets, households
Eq54 DLOG(FASN_HI_EXCL)=0.13-0.63***LOG(FASN_HI_EXCL(-
1))+0.57***LOG(EARNINGS_PRIV(-1))+0.18***LOG(FTSE(-1))+0.22***DLOG(FTSE)-
0.09***D2001-0.14***D2002, adj. R2 = 0.73, sample: 1988-2017, Eq(4.3),
p.172
Total financial assets excl.
pensions, households
Eq55 DLOG(PENSION_FUNDS_HI) = 4.596***- 0.49***LOG(PENSION_FUNDS_HI(-1)) +
0.47***LOG(EARNINGS_PRIV(-1)/LFSE_PRIV_EE(-1)) - 0.01***BR(-1) +
0.16***LOG(USA_SP500(-1)) - 0.018***D(LR) + 1.12***DLOG(FASN_HI), adj. R2 = 0.93, sample:
1988-2017, Eq(4.2), p.171
Pension funds, households
Eq56 DLOG(FTSEX) = -0.05- 0.26***LOG(FTSE(-1)) + 0.086**LOG(USA_SP500(-1)) +
0.11***NUMLOANS(-1)/1000000 + 0.79***DLOG(USA_SP500) + 0.11*LOG(GOSN_COS(-1)) +
0.01D(USA_QE) - 0.91**DLOG(EARNINGS_PRIV_AWE) - 0.80*DLOG(LFSE_PRIV(-1)) -
0.15*DLOG(DOLLST) - 0.14***D83 - 0.14***D2003 + 0.12***D2006, adj. R2 = 0.90, sample:
1978-2017 Eq(4.4), p.172
FTSE index
Eq57 FLSN_HI = - DEBT_HI Total financial liabilities
Eq58 NFASN_HI=FASN_HI+FLSN_HI Net financial assets
Eq59 DEBT_HI_LT=0.925*DEBT_HI_LT(-
1)+(NUMLOANS*(HMEANADV/1000000))+LA_FC_MO_LT_ADD
Long-term debt liabilities,
households
Eq60 DEBT_HI=DEBT_HI_LT+DEBT_HI_ST+DEBT_HI_OTHER Total debt liabilities, households
Eq61 DEBT_HI_ST=0.12*YDN_HI(-1) Short-term debt liabilities,
households
Eq62 D(DEBT_HI_OTHER) = -381551.55***-0.44***DEBT_HI_OTHER(-1) + 0.14***GDPV( - 1) +
0.22***D(GDPV) + 6023.02***LR(-1) + 21.58***POPN65(-1) + 14248.86**D2002 +
20902.45***D2006 + 16193.93***D2011 + 17721.86***D2016 + 24623.70***D2017, adj. R2 = 0.85,
sample: 1988-2017, Eq(4.5), p.175
Other debt liabilities, households
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No. Equation in UKSIMM Description
Eq63 DLOG(HPI)=1.34***-0.19***LOG(HPI(-1))+0.09**LOG(NUMLOANS(-1)/POPN(-
1))+0.33**DLOG(EARNINGS_PRIV_AWE)-0.06*LOG(HB_HA(-1))-0.07*DLOG(STAMP_DUTY(-
1)/(HP_MEAN(-1)*NUMLOANS(-1)))-0.03***LR(-1)-6.74*DLOG(HSTOCK_PR(-
1))+0.0003**MIGW(-1)+0.097**D88, adj. R2 = 0.77, sample: 1979-2017, eq(4.23), p.
193
House price index
Eq64 NUMLOANS = -7159466.09**+259.77***POPW(-1)-1715098.75***DEBT_HI_LT(-1)/YDN_HI(-1)-
41804.897***LR(-1) - 62051.4***D(MORTGAGE_RATE) + 831740.21**DLOG(HPI(-1)/CP_M(-1)),
adj. R2 = 0.75, sample: 1979-2007, eq(4.24), p. 194
Number of mortgages
Eq65 HMEANADV=0.60*HP_MEAN*1000 Average mortgage advances
Eq66 HP_MEAN=HP_MEAN(-1)*HPI/HPI(-1) Average house price
Eq67 HB_PR=160000 New house built, private sector
Eq68 HSTOCK_PR=0.35*POPN Total housing stock
Eq69 STAMP_DUTY=55*HP_MEAN Stamp duty
Eq70 HB_HA=0.5*POPN House building, housing
association
Eq71 SALESV=GDPV Total sales, real
Eq72 SALESN=GDPN Total sales, nominal
Eq73 ITN_PDTS=0.114*GDPN Total taxes on products (VAT and
others)
Eq74 SUBN_PDTS=0.005*GDPN Total subsidies on products
Eq75 GVAN=GDPN-ITN_PDTS+SUBN_PDTS GVA, nominal
Eq76 GVAN_NFCPC=0.595*GVAN GVA, nominal, NFCPC
Eq77 GVAN_FC=0.073*GVAN GVA, nominal, FC
Eq78 GVAN_COS=GVAN_NFCPC+GVAN_FC GVA, nominal, corporate sector
Eq79 GOSN_FIRMS=GOSN_COS+GOSNMIX_HI GVA, nominal, corporate sector
and household firms
Eq80 GOSN_COS=GVAN-(ITN_PDTN-SUBN_PDTN)-
(GOSNMIX_HI+GOSN_GG+COMPN_HI+(COMPN_W-COMPHN_W)+STN_INC)
Gross operating surplus, corporate
sector
Eq81 COMPN_HI=1.23*(EARNINGS_PRIV)+COMPHN_GG Total compensation to employees
paid, households
Eq82 EARNINGS_PRIV=LFSE_PRIV*(EARNINGS_PRIV(-1)/LFSE_PRIV(-
1))*(EARNINGS_PRIV_AWE/EARNINGS_PRIV_AWE(-1))
Private sector wages and salaries
Eq83 DLOG(EARNINGS_PRIV_AWE)=0.39-0.21***LOG(EARNINGS_PRIV_AWE(-
1))+0.007*WAGE_TARGET+0.45***LOG((LFSE(-1))/POPN(-1))+0.10***LOG(GOSN_COS(-
1)/CP_M(-1))-0.90**CUM_MIGW/POPW(-1)+0.03**DLOG(FTSE(-1)/CP_M(-1))-
0.07DLOG(TU_MEMBERS_PRIVPC(-1))-0.04DLOG(HPI(-1))-0.02***D2000-0.04***D2009, adj.
R2 = 0.95, sample: 1988-2017, eq(4.25), p. 196
Private sector average weekly
salary
Eq84 TU_MEMBERS_PRIVPC=TU_MEMBERS_PRIVPC(-1) Union memberships
Eq85 WAGE_TARGET=@TREND Wage target
Eq86 COMPHN_COS=GVAN_COS-GOSN_COS-ITN_PDTN+SUBN_PDTN Total compensation to employees
paid, corporate
Eq87 ITN_PDTN=ITN_PDTN_NFCPC+ITN_PDTN_FC+ITN_PDTN_HI Other taxes on production
Eq88 SUBN_PDTN=SUBN_PDTN_NFCPC+SUBN_PDTN_FC+SUBN_PDTN_HI Other subsidies on production
Eq89 TTAXN_COS=TTAXN_NFCPC+TTAXN_FC Taxes on income and wealth,
corporate
Eq90 LFSE=LFSE_PRIV+LFSE_GG Total labour force
Eq91 D(LFSE_PRIV)=8948.14***-0.38***LFSE_PRIV(-1)+0.002**GDPV-0.00***KIVLV_COS_ONS(-
1)+0.01***D(KIVLV_COS_ONS(-1))-173.73***BR(-1)+0.006***VAT_REGS(-1)-
0.002**VAT_DEREGS(-1)-409.31***D2003+465.08***D2008, adj. R2 = 0.92, sample: 1987-2017,
eq(4.19), p. 188
Private sector labour force
Eq92 VAT_REGS=VAT_REGS(-1) VAT registration
Eq93 VAT_DEREGS=VAT_DEREGS(-1) VAT deregistration
Eq94 KIVLV_COS_ONS=1.01*GDPV Total non-financial asset stock,
real, corporate
Eq95 DLOG(LFSE_GGX)=0.38-0.45***LOG(LFSE_GG(-1))+0.36***LOG(CV_GG(-
1))+0.57***DLOG(CV_GG)-0.24**DLOG(GDPV(-1))-0.10LOG(GDPV_PRIV(-1)/LFSE_PRIV(-1))-
0.14***LOG(KIVLV_GG(-1)/LFSE_GG(-1))-0.04***D2012, adj. R2 = 0.86, sample:
1989-2017
Government sector labour force
Eq96 LFSE_GG=LFSE_GGX Government sector labour force
Eq97 KIVLV_GG=KIVLV_GG(-1)*0.97+DKV_GG Total non-financial asset stock,
real, government
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Eq98 POPW=POPW(-1)+MIGW Working age population
Eq99 POPN=(1.59*1.0035^TRENDX)*POPW Total population
Eq100 POPN65=POPN65(-1)*1.02 Population over 65
Eq101 CUM_MIGW=CUM_MIGW(-1)+MIGW Total number of migrant workers
Eq102 MIGW=0.00012*GDPV Incoming migrant workers
Eq103 EMP_RATE=LFSE/POPW Employment rate
Eq104 LFSE_SE=0.1775*LFSE_PRIV Self-employment in private sector
Eq105 LFSE_PRIV_EE=LFSE_PRIV-LFSE_SE Employees in private sector
Eq106 D(LFSU)=1318.40***-0.198***LFSU(-1)-0.05***LFSE_PRIV(-1)-0.46***D(LFSE_PRIV)-
0.80***D(LFSE_GG)+1.32***D(LFSE_65)+0.98***MIGW(-1)-
44.13***D(BR)+23.88***@PC(CP_M)+156.62**D2010+9467.86MINIMUM_WAGE(-
1)/EARNINGS_PRIV_AWE(-1), adj. R2 = 0.96, sample: 1987-2017, eq(4.21),
p.189
Unemployment
Eq107 ITN_PDTN_NFCPC=0.027*GVAN_NFCPC Production taxes other than
products, NFCPC
Eq108 SUBN_PDTN_NFCPC=0.0035*GVAN_NFCPC Production subsidies other than
products, NFCPC
Eq109 COMPHN_NFCPC=(COMPHN_NFCPC(-1)/EARNINGS_NFCPC(-1))*EARNINGS_NFCPC Compensation to employees, paid,
NFCPC
Eq110 EARNINGS_NFCPC=1.2*(EARNINGS_PRIV_AWE*55.5/1000)*LFSE_NFCPC, eq(4.26), p. 196 Wages and salaries, NFCPC
Eq111 LFSE_NFCPC=0.75*LFSE_PRIV_EE Labour force, NFCPC
Eq112 GOSN_NFCPC=0.59*COMPHN_NFCPC Gross operating surplus, NFCPC
Eq113 GVANX_NFCPC=COMPHN_NFCPC+GOSN_NFCPC+ITN_PDTN_NFCPC-
SUBN_PDTN_NFCPC
GVA, nominal, NFCPC
Eq114 YPN_NFCPC=GOSN_NFCPC+0.035*FASN_NFCPC(-1)+0.042*FLSN_NFCPC(-1) Gross primary incomes, NFCPC
Eq115 YDN_NFCPC=YPN_NFCPC+ECCN_NFCPC+OCTBN_NFCPC-TTAXN_NFCPC-SBFN_NFCPC Gross disposable income, NFCPC
Eq116 SBFN_NFCPC=0.018*YPN_NFCPC Social benefits, NFCPC
Eq117 OCTBN_NFCPC=OCTBN_NFCPC(-1) Net current transfers, NFCPC
Eq118 TTAXN_NFCPC=0.0125*GOSN_NFCPC(-1) Taxes on incomes and wealth,
NFCPC
Eq119 ECCN_NFCPC=0.005*COMPHN_NFCPC(-1) Social contribution, NFCPC
Eq120 FSN_NFCPC = SAVING_NFCPC + INV_GRANTS_NFCPC + OTH_CAP_TR_NET_NFCPC -
DKN_NFCPC - DIN_NFCPC - DLN_NFCPC - DVN_NFCPC + BALANCE_NFCPC
Net lending position, NFCPC
Eq121 SAVING_NFCPC=YDN_NFCPC Gross saving, NFCPC
Eq122 INV_GRANTS_NFCPC=0.045*GVAN_NFCPC(-1) Investment grants, NFCPC
Eq123 OTH_CAP_TR_NET_NFCPC=100 Other capital transfers, payable,
NFCPC
Eq124 DVN_NFCPC=0 Net acquisitions of valuables,
NFCPC
Eq125 KIVLV_NFCPC_ONS=KIVLV_NFCPC_ONS(-1)*1.02 Stock non-financial assets, real,
NFCPC
Eq126 KIVLN_NFCPC=KIVLV_NFCPC_ONS*(GDPP/100) Stock non-financial assets,
nominal, NFCPC
Eq127 DKV_NFCPC=D(KIVLV_NFCPC_ONS)+0.0875*KIVLV_NFCPC_ONS(-1) Changes in non-financial asset,
real, NFCPC
Eq128 DKN_NFCPC=DKV_NFCPC*(GDPP/100) Changes in non-financial asset,
nominal, NFCPC
Eq129 D(DIV_NFCPC)=32361.62***-0.613***DIV_NFCPC(-1)+0.15***D(GDPV_PRIV)-
0.13***INVV_M(-1)-141480.86***DLOG(CP_M)-15936.26***D99+7941.02**D98, adj. R2 = 0.83,
sample: 1988-2017, eq(4.27), p.198
Changes in inventories, real,
NFCPC
Eq130 DIN_NFCPC=DIV_NFCPC*(GDPP/100) Changes in inventories, nominal,
NFCPC
Eq131 DLN_NFCPC=0.0025*GVAN_NFCPC Net acquisition of non-produced,
non-financial assets, NFCPC
Eq132 FASN_NFCPC=FASN_NFCPC(-1)*GDPN/GDPN(-
1)+FSN_NFCPC+0.25*LA_FC_MO_LT_ADD, Eq(4.6),
p.176
Total financial assets, NFCPC
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Eq133 FLSN_NFCPC=-
(DSL_NFCPC+LL_NFCPC+STL_NFCPC+DERL_NFCPC+IPL_NFCPC+OARL_NFCPC)
Total financial liabilities, NFCPC
Eq134 NFASN_NFCPC=FASN_NFCPC+FLSN_NFCPC Net financial assets, NFCPC
Eq135 ITN_PDTN_FC=0.025*GVAN_FC Taxes on production other than
products, FC
Eq136 SUBN_PDTN_FC=0.0 Subsidies on production other
than products, FC
Eq137 COMPHN_FC=1.25*EARNINGS_FC Compensation to employees, paid,
FC
Eq138 EARNINGS_FC=1.8*(EARNINGS_PRIV_AWE*55.5/1000)*LFSE_FC Salaries and wages, FC
Eq139 LFSE_FC=0.05*LFSE_PRIV_EE Labour force, FC
Eq140 GOSN_FC=0.87*COMPHN_FC Gross operating surplus, FC
Eq141 GVANX_FC=COMPHN_FC+GOSN_FC+ITN_PDTN_FC-SUBN_PDTN_FC GVA, nominal, FC
Eq142 YPN_FC=GOSN_FC+PICN_FC+PIDN_FC Gross primary income, FC
Eq143 PICN_FC=0.013*FASN_FC(-1) Property incomes received, FC
Eq144 PIDN_FC=0.014*FLSN_FC(-1) Property incomes paid, FC
Eq145 YDN_FC=YPN_FC+SBFN_FC+ECCN_FC-TTAXN_FC+OCTBN_FC Gross disposable income, FC
Eq146 OCTBN_FC=OCTBN_FC(-1) Net current transfer, FC
Eq147 TTAXN_FC=0.26*GOSN_FC(-1) Taxes on incomes and wealth, FC
Eq148 SBFN_FC=1.25*COMPHN_FC Social benefits, FC
Eq149 ECCN_FC=2.0*COMPHN_FC Social contribution, FC
Eq150 FSN_FC=SAVING_FC+INV_GRANTS_FC-TTAXN_FC+OTH_CAP_TRANS_FC-DKN_FC-
DIN_FC-DLN_FC+BALANCE_FC
Net lending position, FC
Eq151 SAVING_FC=YDN_FC Gross savings, FC
Eq152 INV_GRANTS_FC=0 Investment grants, FC
Eq153 OTH_CAP_TRANS_FC=100 Other capital transfers, payable,
FC
Eq154 DLOG(DKV_FC) =
5.76***-0.57***LOG(DKV_FC(-1))-0.499***LOG(KIVLV_FC(-1)/(GVAN_FC(-1)/(GDPP(-1)/100)))
+ 6.62***DLOG(GDPV) + 0.097***LR(-1) - 0.04**TAX_CTRATE_BANKS(-1) - 0.61***D97, adj.
R2 = 0.64, sample: 1987-2017, eq(4.28), p.199
Gross fixed capital formation, FC
Eq155 KIVLV_FC=(1-0.06)*KIVLV_FC(-1)+DKV_FC Stock non-financial asset, real, FC
Eq156 DKN_FC = DKN_COS-DKN_NFCPC Changes in non-financial asset,
nominal, FC
Eq157 DLN_FC=4 Net acquisition of non-produced,
non-financial assets, FC
Eq158 FASN_FC=FASN_FC(-1)*GDPP/GDPP(-1) Total financial assets, FC
Eq159 FLSN_FC=-FASN_FC Total financial liabilities, FC
Eq160 NFASN_FC=FASN_FC+FLSN_FC Net financial assets, FC
Eq161 ITN_PDTN_FC_MO=0.025*GVAN_FC_MO(-1) Taxes on production other than
products, FC_MO
Eq162 COMPHN_FC_MO=1.25*EARNINGS_FC_MO Compensations to employees paid,
FC_MO
Eq163 EARNINGS_FC_MO=2.33*(EARNINGS_PRIV_AWE*55.5/1000)*LFSE_FC_MO Salaries and wages, FC_MO
Eq164 LFSE_FC_MO=0.0196*LFSE_PRIV_EE Labour force, FC_MO
Eq165 GVAN_FC_MO=COMPHN_FC_MO+ITN_PDTN_FC_MO-SUBN_PDTN_FC_MO GVA, nominal, FC_MO
Eq166 GOSN_FC_MO=155000+0.1*(((LR+0)/100)*FASN_FC_MO(-1)+((BR+0)/100)*FLSN_FC_MO(-
1))-BAD_DEBTS
Gross operating surplus, FC_MO
Eq167 DLOG(BAD_DEBTS) =
60.14***-0.54***LOG(BAD_DEBTS(-1))-3.67***LOG(GDPV(-1))-0.26***BR(-1) -
28.00***DLOG(GDPV)-0.24***D(BR), adj. R2 = 0.78, sample: 1989-2017, eq(4.29), p.201
Bad debts, FC_MO
Eq168 YPN_FC_MO=GOSN_FC_MO+0.015*(FASN_FC_MO(-1)-DERA_FC_MO(-
1))+0.014*(FLSN_FC_MO(-1)+DERL_FC_MO(-1))
Gross primary income, FC_MO
Eq169 YDN_FC_MO=YPN_FC_MO+OCTBN_FC_MO-TTAXN_FC_MO, eq(4.30), p.201 Gross disposable income, FC_MO
Eq170 SAVING_FC_MO=YDN_FC_MO Gross savings, FC_MO
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Eq171 OCTBN_FC_MO=OCTBN_FC_MO(-1) Net capital transfers, FC_MO
Eq172 TTAXN_FC_MO=0.5*TAX_CTRATE_BANKS/100*GOSN_FC_MO(-1) Taxes on income and wealth,
FC_MO
Eq173 FSN_FC_MO=SAVING_FC_MO+OKTBN_FC_MO-DKN_FC_MO-DIN_FC_MO-
DLN_FC_MO-DVN_FC_MO+BALANCE_FC_MO
Net lending position, FC_MO
Eq174 OTH_CAP_TRANS_FC_MO=100 Other capital transfers, FC_MO
Eq175 DKN_FC_MO=0.1*GVAN_FC_MO(-1) Gross fixed capital formation,
nominal, FC_MO
Eq176 FASN_FC_MO=FASN_FC_MO(-1)*GDPN/GDPN(-1)+LA_FC_MO_LT_ADD Total financial assets, FC_MO
Eq177 FLSN_FC_MO=-FASN_FC_MO-LA_FC_MO_LT_ADD Total financial liabilities, FC_MO
Eq178 NFASN_FC_MO=FASN_FC_MO+FLSN_FC_MO Net financial assets, FC_MO
Eq179 FASN_FC_CB=FLSN_FC_CB*1.2 Total financial assets FC_CB
Eq180 FLSN_FC_CB=(M4L_FC_CB+DERL_FC_CB+
DSL_FC_CB+IPL_FC_CB+STL_FC_CB+LL_FC_CB+OARL_FC_CB)
Total financial liabilities
Eq181 NOTES_ISSUED=NOTES_ISSUED(-1)*GDPN/GDPN(-1) Bank notes
Eq182 RESERVES=RESERVES(-1) Bank reserves
Eq183 GVAN_HI=0.211*GVAN GVA, nominal, households
Eq184 ITN_PDTN_HI=0.00165*GVAN_HI Taxes on production other than
products, households
Eq185 SUBN_PDTN_HI=0.0065*GVAN_HI Subsidies on production other
than products, households
Eq186 COMPHN_HI=1.23*EARNINGS_HI Compensation to employees paid,
households
Eq187 EARNINGS_HI=GVAN_HI*(EARNINGS_HI(-1)/GVAN_HI(-1))*1.02 Salaries and wage, households
Eq188 GOSNMIX_HI=GVAN_HI-ITN_PDTN_HI+SUBN_PDTN_HI-COMPHN_HI Gross operating surplus and mixed
incomes
Eq189 GOSN_HI=0.59*GOSNMIX_HI Gross operating surplus,
households
Eq190 LFSE_HI=0.2*LFSE_PRIV_EE+LFSE_SE Labour force, households
Eq191 GVAN_GG=0.5*CN_GG+DKN_GG GVA, nominal, government
Eq192 GOSN_GG=GVAN_GG-COMPHN_GG-ITN_PDTN_GG+SUBN_PDTN_GG Gross operating surplus,
government
Eq193 COMPHN_GG=LFSE_GG*0.9*(COMPHN_NFCPC/LFSE_NFCPC) Compensation to employees paid,
government
Eq194 YPN_GG=GOSN_GG+ITN_GG-SUBN_GG+0.032*FASN_GG(-1)+0.024*FLSN_GG, eq(4.32),
p.204
Gross primary income, government
Eq195 ITN_GG=ITN_PDTS+ITN_PDTN-ITN_W Taxes on products and production
Eq196 SUBN_GG=SUBN_PDTS+SUBN_PDTN-SUBN_W Subsidies on products and
production
Eq197 YDN_GG=YPN_GG+TTAXN_GG+ECCN_GG+OCTBN_GG-SBFN_GG-TAX_PAID_GG,
eq(4.33), p.204
Gross disposable income,
government
Eq198 SBFN_GG=19*(POPN65+LFSU)*(CP_M/100) Social benefits, government
Eq199 TAX_PAID_GG=0.0065*GVAN_GG(-1) Other current taxes, government
Eq200 OCTCN_GG=0.1*(CN_GG+DKN_GG) Other current transfers, resource,
government
Eq201 OCTDN_GG=0.1*(CN_GG+DKN_GG) Other current transfers, uses,
government
Eq202 OCTBN_GG=OCTCN_GG-OCTDN_GG Net other current transfers,
government
Eq203 TTAXN_GG=TTAXN_HI+TTAXN_COS-TTAXN_W Taxes on incomes and wealth,
government
Eq204 ECCN_GG=ECCN_NIC+ECCN_GG_PENSIONS Social contributions, government
Eq205 DLOG(ECCN_NIC)=-1.57***-0.19**LOG(ECCN_NIC(-1))+0.34***LOG(EARNINGS_PRIV(-1))-
0.18**LOG(NIC_UEL(-1))+1.06***DLOG(LFSE_PRIV)+0.031**D(NIC_MAIN)+1.81D(LFSE_SE(-
1)/LFSE(-1))-0.097*DLOG(NIC_SE_MAIN_RATE(-1))-0.06***D2002+0.05**D2004, adj. R2 = 0.71,
sample: 1988-2017, eq(4.34), p.205
Compulsory social contribution,
government
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Eq206 NIC_UEL=NIC_UEL(-1)*CP_M/CP_M(-1) National insurance standard rate
Eq207 ECCN_GG_PENSIONS=0.165*COMPHN_GG Social contributions, pension,
government
Eq208 OTH_CAP_TRANS_GG=OKTBN_GG-TAX_CAPITAL_HI-INV_GRANTS_GG Other capital transfers,
government
Eq209 OKTBN_GG=-0.02*(CN_GG+DKN_GG) Net capital transfers, government
Eq210 SAVING_GG=YDN_GG-CN_GG Gross savings, government
Eq211 INV_GRANTS_GG=0.045*GVAN_GG(-1) Investment grants, government
Eq212 FSN_GG=SAVING_GG+TAX_CAPITAL_HI+INV_GRANTS_GG+OTH_CAP_TRANS_GG-
DKN_GG-DIN_GG-DLN_GG+BALANCE_GG
Net lending position, government
Eq213 DKV_GG=DKV_GG(-1)*1.03 Gross fixed capital formation, real,
government
Eq214 DKN_GG=DKV_GG*(GDPP/100) Gross fixed capital formation,
nominal, government
Eq215 DIN_GG=DIV_GG*(GDPP/100) Changes in inventories, nominal,
government
Eq216 DLN_GG=-0.005*CN_GG Net acquisition of non-produced
non-financial assets, government
Eq217 FASN_GG=FASN_GG(-1)*GDPP/GDPP(-1) Total financial asset, government
Eq218 FLSN_GG=-(DSL_GG+LL_GG+STL_GG+DERL_GG+IPL_GG+OARL_GG) Total financial liabilities,
government
Eq219 NFASN_GG=FASN_GG+FLSN_GG Net financial assets, government
Eq220 NETDEBT_GG_ONS=NETDEBT_GG_ONS(-1)*FASN_GG/FASN_GG(-1) Net government debt stock
Eq221 CBALN=(XN-MN)+(COMPN_W-COMPHN_W)+ITN_W-
SUBN_W+SBFN_W+PICN_W+PIDN_W+(TTAXN_W_REC-TTAXN_W_PAID)+(OCTCN_W-
OCTDN_W), eq(4.35),
p.206
Current account balance
Eq222 COMPN_W=COMPN_W=0.00077*GDPN Compensation to employees
received, world
Eq223 COMPHN_W=COMPN_W=0.00067*GDPN Compensation to employees paid,
world
Eq224 ITN_W=0.00165*GDPN Taxes on production and imports,
world
Eq225 SUBN_W=0.00125*GDPN Subsidies on production and
imports, world
Eq226 SBFN_W=0.0014*GDPN Social benefits, world
Eq227 PICN_W=0.018*FASN_W(-1) Property incomes received, world
Eq228 PIDN_W=0.017*FLSN_W(-1) Property incomes, paid, world
Eq229 TTAXN_W_REC=0.004*GDPN Taxes on income, resource, world
Eq230 TTAXN_W_PAID=0.00025*GDPN Taxes on income, uses, world
Eq231 TTAXN_W=TTAXN_W_REC-TTAXN_W_PAID Net taxes on incomes
Eq232 OCTCN_W=0.018*GDPN Other current transfers, resources,
world
Eq233 OCTDN_W=0.009*GDPN Other current transfers, uses,
world
Eq234 FSN_W=CBALN+OKTCN_W-OKTDN_W+DLN_W+BALANCE_W Net lending position, world
Eq235 OKTCN_W=0.001*GDPN Capital transfers received, world
Eq236 OKTDN_W=0.0004*GDPN Capital transfers paid, world
Eq237 NFASN_W=0-NFASN_HI-NFASN_GG-NFASN_NFCPC-NFASN_FC-(FASN_FC_CB-
FLSN_FC_CB), Eq(4.7),
p.180
Net financial assets, world
Eq238 FASN_W=-0.8*FLSN_W Total financial assets, world
Eq239 FLSN_W=NFASN_W/0.2 Total financial liabilities, world
258
C. SFC matrices in ONS codes
Table C.1.: Transaction flow matrix, ONS codes
Blue book 2018 (data code) Households Non-financial corporations Financial institutions
Distribution and uses of income Resources Uses Resources Uses Resources Uses
B.1G Gross value added QWLK FAIS NHDB
D.1 Wages (D.1 incl employer social contributions) QWLY QWLP FCFV NHCR
D.2 Taxes on production and imports QWLQ EACJ QYPT
D.3 Subsidies QWLR JQJV NHCA
D.4 All property income received QWME QWMI FAKY FBXK NHDF NHDI
D.5 Taxes QWMS FCBS NHCP
D.61 Social contributions in kind (D.61) - pension contributions L8RF QWMY L8TP NQNZ
D.62 Other social contributions (D.62) QWML QWMZ L8TD L8R3
D.7 Other transfers (D.7) QWMO QWNC NRJB FCBX NQOE NHDT
B.6g Disposable income QWND NRJD NQOJ
D.8 Pension fund equity changes NSSE NQOK
P.31 Individual consumption expenditure NSSG
B.8g Gross savings NSSH NRJD NQOL
B.12 Current external balance
Capital Account (Table 1.6)
B.8g Gross savings NSSH NRJD NQOL
Capital transfers (Tables *.1.7)
D.9 Net capital transfers NSSN NSSR FCCQ JRWJ NHDZ NHEC
Investment
P.51c Consumption of fixed capital QWLL QWLL DBGF DBGF NHCE
P.5 Total gross capital formation NSSX FCCZ NHEG
Net non-financial assets NSSY FCFY NHEI
Changes in the year
b.9n Net lending (+) / net borrowing (-) NSSZ EABO NHCQ
dB.9 Statistical discrepancy from BB NZDV NYPF NYOX
B.9f Net lending (+) / net borrowing (-) NZDY NYNT NYNL
Financial Account Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
F.1 Gold
F.2 Currency and deposits NFVS NGII A4VR NFCU NFFY
F.3 Securities NFWB NFZF NGIR NGLV NFDD NFGH
F.4 Loans NFXD NGAH NGJT NGMX NFEF NFHJ
F.5 Equities NFXV NGKL NGNP NFEX NFIB
F.6 Insurance and pensions NPWX MA2Y NGLE NPXC NPWR NPWS
F.7 Derivatives MN5V MN5G MN62 MN5J MN65
F.8 Other accounts received NFYP NGBT NGLF NGOJ NFFR NFIV
FA/FLTotal net acquisitions NFVO NFYS NRGP NRGR NFCQ NFFU
Balance sheet
AN.2 Non-financial assets NG4A NG2I NG38
F.1 Gold
F.2 Currency and deposits NNMP NNZF NONX NLJD NLMH
F.3 Securities NNMY NNQC NNZO NOOG NLJM NLMQ
F.4 Loans NNOA NNRE NOME NOPI NLKO NLNS
F.5 Equities NNOS NOMW NOQA NLLG NLOK
F.6 Insurance and pensions NPYL NPYM NPYN NPYO NPYH NPYI
F.7 Derivates MMW5 MMY9 MMU6 MMX2 MMU9 MMX5
F.8 Other accounts received NNPM NNSQ NONQ NOQU NLMA NLPE
FA/FLTotal assets/liabilities NNML NNPP NNZB NONT NLIZ NLMD
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Table C.2.: Transaction flow matrix, ONS codes (continue)
Blue book 2018 (data code) Central Bank General government Rest of World
Distribution and uses of income Resources Uses Resources Uses Resources Uses
B.1G Gross value added NMXN
D.1 Wages (D.1 incl employer social contributions) NMXS KTMO KTMN
D.2 Taxes on production and imports NMYE FJWB
D.3 Subsidies NMRL FJWI
D.4 All property income received
D.5 Taxes NMZL EBFQ FJWM NHRS
D.61 Social contributions in kind (D.61) - pension contributions NMZR L8PV
D.62 Other social contributions (D.62) NNAD FJKO
D.7 Other transfers (D.7) NNAA NNAN FJWR NHRW
B.6g Disposable income NNAO HBOG
D.8 Pension fund equity changes NMZT NNAF
P.31 Individual consumption expenditure NMRK
B.8g Gross savings NNAU
B.12 Current external balance KTMY HBOG
Capital Account (Table 1.6)
B.8g Gross savings NNAU HBOG
Capital transfers
D.9 Net capital transfers NNAY NNBC NHRZ NHSC
Investment
P.51c Consumption of fixed capital NMXO NMXO
P.5 Total gross capital formation NNBI
Net non-financial assets NNBJ NHSG
Changes in the year
b.9n Net lending (+) / net borrowing (-) NNBK NHRB
dB.9 Statistical discrepancy from BB NYOZ NYPO
B.9f Net lending (+) / net borrowing (-) NYNO NYOD
Financial Account Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
F.1 Gold NFPH NFSN NEWJ M9MJ
F.2 Currency and deposits NFPK NFSO NEWM NEZQ
F.3 Securities NFPT NFSX NEWV NEZZ
F.4 Loans NFQV NFTZ NEXX NFBB
F.5 Equities NFRN No code NEYP NFBT
F.6 Insurance and pensions NPWV MA2W NPWP M9W4
F.7 Derivatives MN5S No code MN5Y MN6K
F.8 Other accounts received NFSH NFVL NEZJ NFCN
FA/FLTotal net acquisitions NFPG NFSK NEWI NEZM
Balance sheet
AN.2 Non-financial assets NG3I
F.1 Gold NIFC NLYW M98E M9ML
F.2 Currency and deposits NLUT NLYX NLCV NLFZ
F.3 Securities NLWC NLZG NLDE NLGI
F.4 Loans NLXE NNKW NLEG NLHK
F.5 Equities NLXW NLEY NLIC
F.6 Insurance and pensions NPYJ NNBZ NPYF M9RN
F.7 Derivates MMW2 MMY6 MMW8 MMZ4
F.8 Other accounts received NLYQ NNMI NLFS NLIW
FA/FLTotal assets/liabilities NPUP NPVQ NLEF NLHJ
It should be noted that the UKSIMM is a simplified version of the national account
matrices. For example, the financial account and the non-financial assets are not
modelled.
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